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Abstract
Why do levels of public service provision vary across governments? This dissertation examines this
question in the context of services for vulnerable populations, and in particular, through the lens of
psychiatric deinstitutionalization. Governments around the world have transformed mental health policy
over the past century by rejecting the insane asylum as an appropriate site of care. Yet some
governments opted for the wholesale closure of these hospitals, while others opted to diversify and
expand public psychiatric services.
The conceptualization and measurement of differences in public psychiatric care, both over time
(1935-present) and across countries (15 high-income democracies), demonstrate this variation in
government choices, and facilitates the selection of two countries for a comparative study: the United
States and France. The comparison draws on primary and secondary historical sources, such as archival
documents, out-of-print journals, and national statistical yearbooks.
This study proposes that, absent a powerful client interest group, the maintenance and expansion of
public services depends on public workers. The ability of public workers to organize together with their
managers constitutes a unique source of influence. Where a labor-management coalition formed,
governments maintained and expanded mental hospitals and facilities. But not all public employees
gained the support of their managers – particularly in countries where managers’ political representatives
included private practitioners. There, government reduced services.
The two case studies trace ensuing positive and negative feedback cycles. In France, public psychiatrists
placated the demands of their employees through the strategic use of student protests in 1968,
discretionary funds in the post-crises 1970s, and cost containment initiatives in the turn-to-austerity of
the 1980s. Each of these efforts attracted more state funds to mental health, and at every step,
empowered the public workforce further. Their counterparts in America, however, were unable to do the
same. The inclinations of the American Psychiatric Association’s public membership notwithstanding, its
otherwise private membership diverted its attention from the public mental health financing initiatives of
the Great Society programs, restrained its support for the employees of deinstitutionalizing hospitals in
the 1970s, and enabled the retrenchment of services in the 1980s, with contrasting consequences for the
American public mental health system and its workforce.
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ABSTRACT
STATES OF MIND: A COMPARATIVE AND HISTORICAL STUDY ON THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MENTAL HEALTH
Isabel M. Perera
Julia F. Lynch
Why do levels of public service provision vary across governments? This dissertation
examines this question in the context of services for vulnerable populations, and in particular, through the lens of psychiatric deinstitutionalization. Governments around the world
have transformed mental health policy over the past century by rejecting the insane asylum
as an appropriate site of care. Yet some governments opted for the wholesale closure of
these hospitals, while others opted to diversify and expand public psychiatric services.
The conceptualization and measurement of di↵erences in public psychiatric care, both
over time (1935-present) and across countries (15 high-income democracies), demonstrate
this variation in government choices, and facilitates the selection of two countries for a
comparative study: the United States and France. The comparison draws on primary and
secondary historical sources, such as archival documents, out-of-print journals, and national
statistical yearbooks.
This study proposes that, absent a powerful client interest group, the maintenance and
expansion of public services depends on public workers. The ability of public workers to
organize together with their managers constitutes a unique source of influence. Where a
labor-management coalition formed, governments maintained and expanded mental hospitals and facilities. But not all public employees gained the support of their managers –
particularly in countries where managers’ political representatives included private practitioners. There, government reduced services.
The two case studies trace ensuing positive and negative feedback cycles. In France,
public psychiatrists placated the demands of their employees through the strategic use of
student protests in 1968, discretionary funds in the post-crises 1970s, and cost containment
initiatives in the turn-to-austerity of the 1980s. Each of these e↵orts attracted more state
funds to mental health, and at every step, empowered the public workforce further. Their
counterparts in America, however, were unable to do the same. The inclinations of the
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American Psychiatric Association’s public membership notwithstanding, its otherwise private membership diverted its attention from the public mental health financing initiatives
of the Great Society programs, restrained its support for the employees of deinstitutionalizing hospitals in the 1970s, and enabled the retrenchment of services in the 1980s, with
contrasting consequences for the American public mental health system and its workforce.
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Part I

Introduction

1

But it’s the truth even if it didn’t happen.
- Ken Kesey, One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest

2

Chapter 1

States of Mind
Unlike the abled, the a✏uent, and the assembled, people with chronic and severe mental
illnesses possess neither the political clout nor the purchasing power to voice their demands.
Yet some governments supply services for marginalized groups at much higher levels than
others. Absent powerful clients, this study finds, the scope of public services depends on the
political influence of public sector trade unions. Facing the same challenges as other service
employees, public mental health workers around the world have pressured their managers
for better pay and better protection for decades – especially during the transformative
period of “deinstitutionalization,” when governments sought to reduce long-term psychiatric
care. Where managers have been able to satisfy workers’ demands, deinstitutionalization
proceeded by both maintaining psychiatric hospitals and expanding mental health care
outside the hospital; but where managers have not, deinstitutionalization resulted in the
significant decrease of public mental health services, and of public employment.
Consider the example of Billiers. This small French village on Brittany’s Atlantic
coast supplies about one psychiatric bed for every six residents, even though the local
prevalence of chronic and severe mental illness is no higher than elsewhere. It is because
of this over-supply of care that regional health authorities announced in 2015 a decision to
reduce it by half. Over 5,000 people readily signed a petition opposing the cuts. Activists
mobilized on the streets, too, by organizing a four-kilometer, 150-person march from the
3

large public psychiatric hospital to the neighboring town of Muzillac, and then on to the
departmental prefecture in Vannes. Elected officials voted unanimously to support the
mobilization, closing the town hall and the post office that day as an endorsement.1
The sweeping mobilization had been arranged by the Confédération française démocratique
du travail, France’s largest labor union for public employees. Located between the deindustrializing ports of Saint-Nazaire and Lorient, the town can no longer depend on the
shipbuilding, cargo, and naval industries for employment the way it once did. Reducing
the supply of services, the union argued, placed as much of a burden on patients as it did
on over 100 hospital employees: doctors, nurses, social workers, attendants, cooks, cleaners, and administrators.2 Now donning white laboratory coats instead of galoshes, these
Breton workers attended the protest with picket signs that revealed the facility’s dual constituencies: “Health and Jobs in Danger.”3 Similar banners have been hoisted by public
psychiatric workers in other countries, as well. But only a few have been e↵ective. The
following pages spotlight the three main theoretical contributions borne out of approaching
their politics and histories comparatively, and sketch the empirical findings that emerge
from contrasting the French experience with that of the influential American case.4

1.1. A comparative study of deinstitutionalization
Psychiatric deinstitutionalization, the policy transformation examined in this text, is a society’s movement down a continuum, in which the mentally ill become less likely to reside in
1
CFDT
CPR
de
Billiers,
“Sauvons
le
CPR
de
Billiers,”
2015,
https://www.petitions24.net/sauvonslecprdebilliers; “Billiers. Les Salariés Du Centre de Réadaptation
Inquiets,” Ouest-France, September 29, 2015, https://www.ouest-france.fr/bretagne/billiers-56190/billiersles-salaries-du-centre-de-readaptation-inquiets-3723952.
2
“Sauvons Le Centre de Réadaptation et de Postcure de Billiers,” Ouest-France, September 10, 2015, https://www.ouest-france.fr/bretagne/billiers-56190/sauvons-le-centre-de-readaptation-et-depostcure-de-billiers-3751188.
3
Le
Télégramme,
Domaine
de
Prières.
Forte
Mobilisation,
2015,
https://www.letelegramme.fr/morbihan/billiers/domaine-de-prieres-forte-mobilisation-14-10-201510812035.php.
“Santé et emplois en danger”(All translations are the author’s, unless otherwise noted).
4
The language of the “influential” case is drawn from John Gerring, “Case Selection for Case-Study
Analysis: Qualitative and Quantitative Techniques,” in The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology, ed.
Janet M. Box-Ste↵enmeier, Henry E. Brady, and David Collier (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008),
and is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.

4

an establishment that provides both psychiatric and custodial care than in the past.5 Scores
of studies have examined this transformation since its onset in the 1970s. However, most
studies have focused on English-speaking countries, with the unintended upshot of skewing both academic and public impressions of this process..6 Deinstitutionalization in these
subset of cases was especially extreme in that it led to the reduction of both inpatients
and and hospitals, rendering their experiences less applicable to cases where the number
of inpatients declined but hospitals remained open. While all countries reduced inpatient
populations, not all did so at the expense of hospitals. Anglophone governments such as
those in America and Britain tended to justify hospital closures by promising to replace
them with community-based care, and although many analysts now criticize this unfulfilled
pledge, the presumption that the two types of services belong to two distinct developmental stages has remained.7 Hospital care and community care are in fact complements, not
substitutes. In addition, the empirical attention to a select group of countries has led many
to overlook the role of public finance in mental health. The retreat of the public asylum
did not mean the retreat of the state from psychiatry, even in those economies that rely
heavily on the private sector for the provision of health and social welfare services. Around
the world, it is largely the public purse that pays for mental health care.
Figure 1 on the following page demonstrates the complementarity between hospitals
and community care. Country-reported data from the World Health Organization demonstrates that the countries that retained more institutional care now supply more community
care than the countries that did not. As a service in which costs exceed most clients’ financial
5
Note that scholars also apply the language of institutionalization and de-institutionalization to refer
to a range of other developments regulating social practices. This text limits its analysis to psychiatric
deinstitutionalization, a phrase with special resonance in this policy area. Section 2.2.1 discusses the concept
in detail.
6
The list of these studies is long, but important works include: Andrew Scull, Decarceration: Community Treatment and the Deviant - a Radical View, 2. ed (Cambridge: Polity Pr, 1984); Phil Brown, The
Transfer of Care: Psychiatric Deinstitutionalization and Its Aftermath (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1985); Gerald N Grob, From Asylum to Community: Mental Health Policy in Modern America (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1991).; Michael J Dear and Jennifer R Wolch, Landscapes of Despair From
Deinstitutionalization to Homelessness. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987).; Kathleen Jones,
Asylums and after: A Revised History of the Mental Health Services: From the Early 18th Century to the
1990s (London; Atlantic Highlands, N.J: Athlone Press, 1993).
7
Note that postwar enactment of the National Health Service, a unique public service that provides
care to all U.K. residents, helped to temper the aggressiveness of British deinstitutionalization in ways not
available to other English-speaking countries (e.g., the U.S., Canada, Australia, New Zealand).

5

capacity, mental health care requires more public than private compensation. The highest
care suppliers therefore tend to spend more of their government health budget on mental
health.8 Chapter 2 discusses these findings in more detail, and presents data collected from
the statistical yearbooks and related historical sources of 15 countries (1935-present) to
show that these outcomes were not foreseeable. Many of today’s highest suppliers once
provided very little mental health care, while some of the lowest suppliers once provided
much more care.

Figure 1: Scatterplot of psychiatric beds and community care facilities per 100,000 in 15
high-income democracies, with percentage of health budget allocated to mental health (as
available) and line of best fit, 2011
One contribution of this dissertation, then, is to bring the approach and findings of a
comparative political analysis to the interdisciplinary study of deinstitutionalization. The
tools of conceptualization and measurement help to systematically analyze cross-national
di↵erences in levels of public mental health services, both inpatient and outpatient. Moreover, the leading explanations for deinstitutionalization prove more adept at explaining why
8

Data for Figure 1 is available online, see World Health Organization, “Mental Health Atlas 2011,” Mental
Health, 2011, https://www.who.int/mental health/publications/mental health atlas 2011/en/.

6

it occurred than why it varied. As the use anti-psychotic medications spread throughout
western societies in the 1950s and 1960s, so too did social movements with reformist, and
often more radical, intentions aiming to lessen patient dependence on the asylum. By the
1970s and 1980s, a prolonged economic downturn motivated all governments to reduce expenditures, particularly on expensive hospital care. Comparative case selection techniques
can help to examine how similar social and economic conditions across countries nevertheless produced di↵erent policy outcomes. This study contrasts the experience of the United
States, one the cases that has most influenced the literature on deinstitutionalization, with
that of France, whose experience has received less attention. Although both countries
attempted to reform postwar public psychiatry in similar ways, over time the French developed one of the world’s largest contemporary public mental health systems, while the
Americans developed one of its smallest. A comparative lens therefore investigates both
the universal properties of this process as well as its national forms, highlighting the role of
an understudied actor – public sector trade unions – along the way.

1.2. Supply-side policy feedback
By emphasizing the political influence of public sector labor in contemporary welfare states,
this study contributes to foundational debates in political science. The discipline’s central
concern with questions of distributive justice has produced numerous theories about the
factors that shape the allocation of goods and services. Yet the two theoretical camps that
apply to the case of mental health have their limits. Arguments that underscore the power
of the “demand-side” to change supply levels are conditional on the influence of the client
population, for providers are more likely to satisfy the demands of the powerful than of
the poor.9 Arguments that underscore the “supply-side” tend to view service provision as
9

Scholarship on West European politics often emphasizes the role that trade unions play in communicating these demands to government, see for example: Gøsta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare
Capitalism (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1990); Walter Korpi, The Democratic Class Struggle
(London; Boston: Routledge & K. Paul, 1983); John D. Stephens, The Transition from Capitalism to Socialism (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1986); David Rueda, Social Democracy Inside Out: Partisanship
and Labor Market Policy in Industrialized Democracies (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).
Scholarship on American (and some British) politics instead examines the role of interest groups
more broadly, see: Paul Pierson, “The New Politics of the Welfare State,” World Politics 48, no.
02 (January 1996): 143–79, https://doi.org/10.1353/wp.1996.0004; Andrea Louise Campbell, “Policy Makes Mass Politics,” Annual Review of Political Science 15, no. 1 (June 15, 2012): 333–51,
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-012610-135202.; Suzanne Mettler and Joe Soss, “The Consequences
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an outcome of conflicts over partisan programs, but less attention has been paid to the
ways in which providers can override party priorities.10 In the case of mental health, some
countries (those on the high end of the mental health supply spectrum in Figure 1) supply
ample services to an under-resourced client population, despite the universal attempt to
reduce hospital care. Note that mental health is not the only public service that presents
this puzzle. Consider how some societies have developed large public education systems
for non-voting age school children or public social services for non-citizen immigrants, even
when the Left does not govern or political institutions do not favor welfare expansion.
To explain the conditions under which services for vulnerable populations abound,
analysts should look to the politics of public employment. Workers in the public service,
like all service employees, seek to protect their employment from the challenges of automation, competition from related services, and other factors, as well as to match their wages to
those of the more productive manufacturing sector. Their success depends on whether state
management agrees to finance public services with generosity and security. A positive response from government further entrenches public sector interests, unions, and importantly,
service provision, while a negative response weakens them. In this way, the logic of what I
call “supply-side policy feedback” is similar to theories proposed by scholars studying policy
feedbacks between the state and its clients. Only this time the relationship concerns the
state and its employees. Absent a powerful client group, the most likely avenue toward the
expansion of public services for the marginalized is through public unions.

1.3. Managers and workers in the public sector
Public workers are not always successful, but they do possess one advantage that their
counterparts in the private sector do not: camaraderie with management. The third theoof Public Policy for Democratic Citizenship: Bridging Policy Studies and Mass Politics,” Perspectives on
Politics 2, no. 1 (March 2004): 55–73, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704000623. for the predecessor
text to this literature, see: E.E. Schattschneider, Politics, Pressures and the Tari↵: A Study of Free Private
Enterprise in Pressure Politics, as shown in the 1929-1930 Revision of the Tari↵, (Prentice-Hall, 1935).
10
For attention to the role of providers in the supply-side literature, see for example, Jane Gingrich, Making
Markets in the Welfare State: The Politics of Varying Market Reforms (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2011); Ellen M. Immergut, Health Politics: Interests and Institutions in Western Europe, Cambridge
Studies in Comparative Politics (Cambridge [England]; New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press,
1992). https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511791529;
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retical contribution of this study thus inverts a basic convention of industrial relations by
pointing to the capacity of public workers to organize with, not against, their managers.11
Government managers may make decisions about hiring and firing, workplace protections,
and production capacities, but they do not “own” government workers. Since public managers are also employed by the state, increasing revenues to meet labor costs suits their own
interests. One way to raise funds is by charging clients more for services, but this approach
is unreliable if clients are poor. Public managers hence turn to the state to obtain secure
and generous compensation for public services, using their expertise, their secondary roles
as policy-makers, and even their own collective bargaining institutions to influence public
policy. Increasing public revenues increases the supply of public services.
Of course, public managers are not always successful, either. Many hypotheses flow
of out of this theory. The success of the labor-management coalition depends, for example,
on the presence of unions and labor laws that facilitate worker organization, the ability of
managers to access political and policy levers to secure financing, and the degree of labor
mobility between the public and private sector. But this text focuses on one hypothesis
in particular: who represents public managers determines whether they will support their
employees. That is to say, where public managers who are represented by public managers
alone, a public labor-management coalition is more likely. Organizations that independently represent public managers have clear economic priorities, advocating only on behalf
of the public sector. Organizations that represent both public and private managers, however, must contend with competing economic interests, advocating for policies with muted
benefits for the public sector. Managers organized independently of their private sector
counterparts, therefore, are better equipped to satisfy workers’ demands to raise revenues,
and hence increase the supply of public services for the vulnerable. Figure 2 on page 11
diagrams the implications of this hypothesis for the likelihood of public labor-management
coalitions, and for the general theory of supply-side policy feedbacks. A more detailed
diagram is in Chapter 3, which elaborates on these second and third contributions and
11

Workers and managers in the private sector sometimes organize together, too, see for example, Peter A.
Gourevitch and James Shinn, Political Power and Corporate Control: The New Global Politics of Corporate
Governance (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 2007).
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discusses why the paired process analysis of French and American deinstitutionalization
appropriately tests this argument.

1.4. The historical argument in brief
Laying the groundwork for the comparative study of deinstitutionalization in the twentieth
century is Chapter 4, which explains the similarities between French and American psychiatry in the nineteenth century. At first glance, psychiatrists may not seem like typical
public managers. But a look to the past reveals that a primary duty of this medical specialty has been the administration of hospitals. In the nineteenth century, when public
asylums were first constructed by states undergoing rapid enlargement, both French and
American nineteenth century “alienists” – the managers of these hospitals -- sought to
align themselves more closely with the burgeoning rational state than with the disorderly
medical profession. Most of alienists’ time, after all, was spent preparing asylum budgets,
managing attendants, and liaising with bureaucratic authorities. Very few hours were devoted to clinical care. In each country, the organizations that represented alienists, the
Congrès des médecins aliénistes et neurologistes de France et des pays de langue française
and the Association of Medical Superintendents for American Institutions of the Insane,
deliberately marginalized psychiatrists in private practice in order to protect these statist
and administrative identities.
However, the development of private competition in the form of the neurological specialty at the turn of the century, combined with strained access to public funds, forced the
organizations in both countries to reconsider their relationship to newly empowered private
practitioners. The question was whether public alienists should beat them or join them. The
French opted for the former. Public psychiatrists in the French Congrès maintained their
independence by establishing an organization even more exclusive to public practice - the
Association Amicale des médecins des élablissements publics d’aliénés. Their counterparts
in the United States, however, opted to swing open their doors to private practitioners.
Developments in medical and labor organization during the first half of the twentieth century reinforced these decisions, developing the Amicale into a union of public psychiatrists
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Figure 2: E↵ects of public management-labor coalition-making on the supply of public services (basic diagram of theoretical argument)

known as the Syndicat des psychiatres des hôpitaux, and the Superintendents into the American Psychiatric Association, a professional group whose private sector membership quickly
outpaced and outnumbered that of the public sector.
Although the basic structure of public mental health services remained similar until
the 1950s, the di↵erence in how public psychiatrists organized determined whether these
services would expand or contract in the second half of the twentieth century. Chapter 5
traces the French trajectory since the Second World War, and shows how the independent
organization of public managers supported the demands of public labor, feeding resources
back into public psychiatry at key moments. Seizing upon the reformist enthusiasm of the
postwar period, the Syndicat (still composed of public hospital superintendents) helped to
draft an administrative document that many now treat as the founding text of the “French
way” (la voie française) to deinstitutionalize. It established a mental health system that
equitably distributed a range of inpatient and outpatient facilities over equivalent population
catchment areas.12 But this was a non-binding administrative proposal, and one that
invited private entrepreneurs to participate in its implementation. To understand how this
document came to form one of the world’s largest mental health care systems, one must
look to the Syndicat’s strategic use of the 1968 student protests to expand the public mental
health workforce, its surreptitious diversion of discretionary funds to placate the demands
of sectorized workers in the 1970s, and most importantly, its collective e↵orts with these
workers’ unions to negotiate employment security during the turn to austerity in the 1980s.
As Figure 2 predicts, each of these activities attracted more state funds to public mental
health services, and at every step, empowered the public mental health workforce further.
Although rates of long-term institutionalization in France are lower today than before, the
provision of services remains robust.13
Chapter 6, by contrast, traces the negative feedback cycles in postwar America.14
12
The phrase is attributed to the influential report, M. and J. Demay, “Une Voie Française Pour Une
Psychiatrie Di↵érente, Document Établi à La Demande de M. Jack Ralite, Ministre de La Santé,” July
1982.
13
Figure 5 on page 94 illustrates how the theoretical argument applies to the French case.
14
For an illustration of how the theoretical argument applies to the American case, see Figure 6 on
page 142.
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The same reformist enthusiasm, and a nearly identical policy proposal, animated American
bureaucrats and psychiatrists in the mid-twentieth century. But the absence of independently organized public managers prevented a similar system from taking root in the United
States. The American Psychiatric Association (with the help of other private practitioners
in the American Medical Association) helped to draft community mental health legislation
in 1963 that resembled the French proposal in close detail. Much to the dissatisfaction of
the organization’s members in the public sector, however, the Association neither anchored
community mental health centers to the existing public system, nor attempted to develop
its workforce. The few centers that developed soon became private institutions that treated
a✏uent patients with mild conditions instead of the poor and elderly patients in state and
country hospitals, and hence o↵ered few new employment opportunities for public workers. Neither did the American Psychiatric Association make great overtures to help public
psychiatry and its workforce profit from the enactment of the Great Society programs a
few years later. Its absence from these debates in fact precipitated the demise of public
mental hospitals by diverting funds away from them. By the 1970s, the enactment of statelevel public sector bargaining laws had given public sector unions more authority, but it
was difficult for them to redress the policies enacted in the previous decade without the
help of their supervisors. Even a sympathetic Democratic presidential administration could
not bolster their influence. Rather, the cacophony of conflicting policy positions proposed
by the APA and others on President Carter’s Commission for Mental Health drowned out
the preferences of public mental health workers. Whatever limited protections they gained
for workers of deinstitutionalizing mental hospitals were rescinded upon lawmakers’ formal
adoption of Reaganomics in 1981.It was thus over the course of these developments that
one of the world’s largest public asylum systems became one of its smallest.
Chapters 3 through 5 use extensive archival material from government, legislative,
and union archives to document these changes. A rich array of other primary sources, such
as memoirs, reports, and articles in professional journals, as well as rare secondary sources,
such as out-of-print books, supplements this information. The postwar chapters also draw
on local examples to show how developments at the national level shaped the provision of
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services on the ground. Often these local changes informed national priorities, too. As a
whole, the comparative and historical analysis makes the case that the varying trajectories
of mental health services produce very di↵erent states of mind.
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Chapter 2

Nowhere to Go? The Supply of
Mental Health Services across
Countries
Observers of the American mental health system often state that people seeking its help have
“nowhere to go.” Consider, for example, E. Fuller Torrey’s influential 1988 book Nowhere
to Go: The Tragic Odyssey of the Homeless Mentally Ill ; or the more recent (2014) press
attention to the issue, such as the CBS 60 Minutes report “Nowhere to Go: Mentally Ill
Youth In Crisis” and the USA Today investigative piece “Cost of not caring: Nowhere to
Go -- the Financial and Human Toll for Neglecting the Mentally Ill.”1
Similar language is used in other countries. British novelist Nathan Filer, a former
psychiatric nurse, headlines an article in The Guardian: “Mental health care: where did
it all go so wrong?”2 Canada’s largest mental health and addiction teaching hospital, the
1

E. Fuller (Edwin Fuller) Torrey, Nowhere to Go: The Tragic Odyssey of the Homeless Mentally Ill, 1st ed.
(New York: Harper & Row, 1988); Scott Pelley, “Nowhere to Go: Mentally Ill Youth in Crisis,” CBS 60 Minutes (CBS News, January 26, 2014), Script: https://www.cbsnews.com/news/mentally-ill-youth-in-crisis/;
Liz Szabo, “Cost of Not Caring: Nowhere to Go - The Financial and Human Toll for Neglecting the Mentally
Ill,” USA Today, May 12, 2014, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/05/12/mental-healthsystem-crisis/7746535/.
2
Nathan Filer, “Mental Health Care: Where Did It All Go so Wrong?,” The Guardian, January 25, 2014,
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/jan/25/nathan-filer-mental-health-care-where-did-it-go-wrong.
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Centre for Addiction and Mental Health, premiered the film “Nowhere To Go: A Brokered
Dialogue” in 2016 to raise awareness about the mental health issues faced by LGBTQ
homeless youth.3 This declension narrative – that the mental health system has attenuated
to the point of disappearance – seems universal.
Not all countries have reduced the supply of mental heath services. Many governments
have retained a good deal of inpatient psychiatric care and, contrary to the expectations of
the deinstitutionalization paradigm, provide a good deal of community care, too. Previously
unexplored international data shows that it is only in select societies (those that have had
the greatest influence on scholarly perceptions of deinstitutionalization) that the mentally
ill have nowhere to go. To make sense of these findings, this chapter conceptualizes the
evolution of mental health services and measures it across 15 countries using an original
historical data set. Distinct patterns emerge. The scholarship on mental health policy and
on comparative political economy can help to interpret these di↵erences, but no existing
account can explain them in full.

2.1. The contemporary puzzles of provision
2.1.1. Inpatient care: the puzzle
When comparative analysts investigate the extent of deinstitutionalization, they tend to
look to the rates of psychiatric bed supply. Figure 2.1.1 on the following page shows the
number of psychiatric beds in 15 a✏uent democracies in 2011.4 These countries are the
first movers: societies whose early industrialization prompted the rise of the asylum, and
whose extraordinary economic prosperity in the twentieth century prompted its decline.5
3

Alex
Abramovich,
Nowhere
To
Go:
A
Brokered
Dialogue,
2016,
https://www.imdb.com/title/tt5498516/mediaindex; Centre for Addiction and Mental Health, “New Training Program and Film Tackle LGBTQ Youth Homelessness,” CAMH in the News (blog), October 5, 2016,
http://www.camh.ca/en/hospital/about camh/newsroom/CAMH in the headlines/stories/Pages/Newtraining-program-and-film-tackle-LGBTQ-youth-homelessness.aspx.
4
World Health Organization,
“Mental Health Atlas 2011,” Mental Health,
2011,
https://www.who.int/mental health/publications/mental health atlas 2011/en/.
5
There are di↵erent ways of quantitatively delineating the universe of advanced democracies under consideration in this study. I selected the most a✏uent democracies of the postwar period by examining their GDP
per capita in 1960. According to the Comparative Welfare States Data Set (2014), this indicator exceeded
$8,000 (in 2005 general dollars) in all countries, averaging about $11,000 in the set (standard deviation:
about $2,500). A relatively tight distribution, the next wealthiest country on the list (Italy) is almost a full
standard deviation (0.7) less than the lowest unit in the range (Finland). Countries with a population less
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Figure 3: Psychiatric beds in mental and general hospitals per 100,000 population in 15
high-income democracies, 2011
Their national trends eventually set the international standard.
Already, stark di↵erences are evident. Crossing the border from Norway into Sweden,
for example, reduces the inpatient care supply by 60 percent. At the extreme ends of the
spectrum, Belgium’s bed rate is about seven and a half times that of New Zealand. These
cases are not outliers, though, as New Zealand is one of six countries whose rate is less than
40, while Belgium is one of three whose rate exceeds 100. Note how the countries at the
higher end also tend to provide inpatient care in psychiatric hospitals, while those in the
middle and at the lower end of the spectrum are more likely to supply inpatient care in
general hospitals. In other words, countries that devote resources to separate psychiatric
than 1 million (micro-states) are excluded (Luxembourg). The exclusion of Italy from the list might surprise
some readers, particularly those familiar with the 1978 Basaglia law, whose radical features has drawn much
scholarly attention (see, for example, Donnelly 1992, Foot 2016). Compared to other countries, Italy’s late
and spatially unequitable economic development delayed its deinstitutionalization movement. While some
of this research applies to the Italian case, the country cannot be classified as a “first mover,” and so it
remains outside the scope of this project.
Evelyne Huber and Charles Ragin, “Comparative Welfare States Dataset,” Complementary Databases:
country-level data, 2014, http://www.lisdatacenter.org/resources/other-databases/.
For examples of scholarly work on Italian deinstitutionalization, see: Michael Donnelly, The Politics of
Mental Health in Italy (London; New York: Tavistock/Routledge, 1992); John Foot, The Man Who Closed
the Asylums: Franco Basaglia and the Revolution in Mental Health Care (London; Brooklyn, NY: Verso,
2015).
For a study of the role of turn-of-the-century industrialization and post-war welfare state formation on
deinstitutionalization, see Scull, Decarceration.
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facilities appear to supply more inpatient care than those that do not. One might draw
the conclusion that these mental health providers are not well integrated into the general
health system, but the graph does not capture the quality of service coordination between
mental and general hospitals. It does, however, suggest that the countries that retained
their mental hospitals supply more inpatient care than those countries that closed them.
2.1.2. Outpatient care: the puzzle within the puzzle
The standard narrative of deinstitutionalization would predict that countries with fewer
psychiatric beds, and by extension, fewer mental hospitals, should supply more outpatient
care. Consider the title of a recent press release from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD): “The Netherlands has an innovative mental health
system, but high bed numbers remain a concern.”6 The persistence of inpatient care, despite
an otherwise admirable performance record, is presented as a paradox. Implied here is the
notion that a modern psychiatric system should shrink the supply of inpatient care and
replace it with outpatient care instead.
But it turns out that the Netherlands is not the only country to couple high inpatient
care supply with high outpatient care supply. Figure 2.1.2 complements Figure 2.1.1 by
showing the other side of deinstitutionalization: the supply of community care facilities,
measured as the number of mental health outpatient and day care facilities per 100,000
persons. Figure 2.1.2 then turns to a more explicit comparison of the supply of inpatient
care and outpatient care, plotting the data from Figure 2.1.1 against that of Figure 2.1.2.7
Together, these complementary graphs reveal that the Dutch system is part of a more
general trend: a positive, direct association between the supply of inpatient and outpatient
6
The availability of psychiatric beds per 100,000 population in the Netherlands is 1.4, or about one
standard deviation higher than the OECD average (see Figure 2.1.1).
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Psychiatric Care Beds,” Database,
OECD.Stat, 2017, http://stats.oecd.org/#; Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development,
“The Netherlands Has an Innovative Mental Health System, but High Bed Numbers Remain a Concern”
(OECD, 2014), https://www.oecd.org/els/health-systems/MMHC-Country-Press-Note-Netherlands.pdf.
7
See section A2 of the Appendices on page 193 for a justification of the measures and sources used, a
discussion of how I treat missing data, and a replication of these graphs using an alternative source (the
OECD).
World Health Organization, “Mental Health Atlas 2011.”
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care.8 Typically, the countries with high levels of inpatient care, especially when provided
via specialized mental hospitals (e.g., the Netherlands, France, Switzerland, Germany), also
rank highly on the scale of outpatient care supply. Meanwhile, the countries that provide
the least amount of inpatient care, often through general hospitals only (e.g., New Zealand,
Denmark, the United States, and Sweden), also cluster on the low end of the outpatient
care spectrum.9
These graphs hence complicate the picture of contemporary mental health services.
Not only do some countries provide more psychiatric hospitals and inpatient care than
others, but in addition, these high suppliers also provide more community care. This
finding thus challenges the presumption that underpins the deinstitutionalization narrative
– namely, that the supply of inpatient and outpatient care is inversely related. Rather,
where outpatient mental health care is robust, mental hospitals remain robust as well.10
2.1.3. The prominence of the public sector in mental health care supply
Although the level of mental health care supply di↵ers across countries, a distinctive feature
of mental health care everywhere is its dependence on government. While the supply of
psychiatric services usually correlates with the supply of general health services, their payers
di↵er substantially. The available cross-national indicators reveal that public expenditures
8

I have opted out of quantifying that relationship here, since the Dutch, German, and Belgian outliers
would render the calculation of the Pearson’s correlation, for example, unreliable.
9
Again, the caveat about service integration applies here as well: these graphs only speak to the supply
of di↵erent mental health services, not to the coordination of services within systems, nor even the site
of mental health care provision. For example, Sweden supplies few specialized mental health care facilities
relative to other countries, and instead provides much mental health care through its primary care providers.
Anders Anell, Anna H Glenngärd, and Sherry Merkur, “Sweden: Health System Review,” Health Systems
in Transition, 2012, http://www.euro.who.int/ data/assets/pdf file/0008/164096/e96455.pdf.
10
In a break from past assessments from mental health care provision, analysts increasingly underscore the
normative value of inpatient care. Most closely associated with Graham Thornicroft and Michele Tansella,
the “balanced care model” advocates for both hospital and community-based care. The former is a backup
to the more regular use of first line mental health services.
Graham Thornicroft and Michele Tansella, “Components of a Modern Mental Health Service: A Pragmatic
Balance of Community and Hospital Care,” British Journal of Psychiatry 185, no. 4 (October 2004):
283–90, https://doi.org/10.1192/bjp.185.4.283; Graham Thornicroft and Michele Tansella, “The Balanced
Care Model: The Case for Both Hospital- and Community-Based Mental Healthcare,” British Journal of
Psychiatry 202, no. 2 (April 2013): 246–48, https://doi.org/10.1192/bjp.bp.112.111377; see also Tyrer,
Peter, Steven Sharfstein, Richard O’Reilly, Stephen Allison, and Tarun Bastiampillai. “Psychiatric Hospital
Beds: An Orwellian Crisis.” The Lancet 389, no. 10067 (January 2017): 363. https://doi.org/10.1016/S01406736(17)30149-6.; For an influential American take, see Sisti, Dominic A., Andrea G. Segal, and Ezekiel J.
Emanuel. “Improving Long-Term Psychiatric Care: Bring Back the Asylum.” JAMA 313, no. 3 (January
20, 2015): 243. https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2014.16088.
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Figure 4: Mental health outpatient and day care facilities per 100,000 population in 15
high-income democracies, 2011

Figure 5: Scatterplot of psychiatric beds and community care facilities per 100,000 population in 15 high-income democracies, with line of best fit, 2011
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Figure 6: Percentage of mental health expenditures by the government health ministry as
a percentage of the total health budget and psychiatric beds per 100,000 population in 15
high-income democracies, 2011
are better predictors of psychiatric bed supply than of general bed supply (by about 40
percent, compared to only 6 percent, respectively), as shown in Figures 2.1.3 and 2.1.3).11
In other words, the more money that the government spends on mental health, the larger
the supply of mental health care services. By contrast, there is no clear association between
the percentage of government funds spent on general health care and the supply of those
services. Generally speaking, mental health services are funded by the public purse, even in
countries where other health services are privately financed. The public sector is the main
provider of psychiatric services in part because its clients rarely have the funds to a↵ord
their own care.
11
The correlation between psychiatric beds and public mental health spending di↵ers slightly depending
on the indicator used: 0.37 using the WHO measure of psychiatric beds (presented here), and 0.40 using
the OECD measure (graphed the Appendices). Nonetheless, both are strong correlations. This association
is yet another reminder that the deinstitutionalization paradigm is not the only lens through which one
can interpret data on psychiatric beds. Rather, the rates of psychiatric bed supply also are byproducts of
trends in health spending, as well. Section A2 of the Appendices on page 193 also presents Figure 2.1.3 with
private, instead of public, spending. Note that, while data in Figure 2.1.3 the WHO Mental Health Atlas,
all data in Figure 2.1.3 are from: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. “Health.”
Database. OECD.Stat, 2017. http://stats.oecd.org/#. The WHO only collects data on psychiatric, not all,
hospital beds and spending.
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Figure 7: General government health expenditure as a percentage of total health expenditure
and hospital beds per 100,000 population in 15 high-income democracies, 2011

2.2. What is deinstitutionalization?
2.2.1. Conceptualization and measurement
Until now, the term “deinstitutionalization” has been deployed somewhat casually. But
in order to understand the outcomes described above, it is fundamental to consider the
historical process that led to them, especially since all 15 countries claim to have experienced
the same process. Moreover, the international policy consensus suggests that, while actors
agree on the term’s theoretical meaning, its practical application is less straightforward.
This section considers the semantic implications of the term, and attempts to define and
measure it more explicitly.
To begin, analysts must choose whether to use the language of “deinstitutionalization” in the first place. In humanistic and social science theory, institutionalization most
often refers to the normalizing, routinizing, or codifying of various aspects of social life.
Meanwhile, in the empirical analysis of social policy, the term can apply to multiple areas,
such as the historic deinstitutionalization of workers out of poorhouses, or of children out
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of orphanages; and even the institutionalization of the elderly into care homes.12
Even among scholars of mental health, the term lacks universal acceptance. Critical
scholars concerned with the evolution of social control techniques have opted for language
with a stronger charge. The influential writings of Andrew Scull, for example, employ the
term “decarceration” to refer to a broader “state-sponsored policy of closing down asylums,
prisons, and reformatories.”13 At the same time, scholars writing about non-Anglo countries
often find that this anti-institutional bias does not represent the experiences of other countries. Writing about the French experience, Henckes “questions the deinstitutionalization
model as an explanation of transformations of the structure of the French psychiatry system
in the post-war period,” noting that not all societies “call[ed] into question the psychiatric
hospitals themselves.”14 Importantly, and contrary to many of the assumptions of the literature on English-speaking countries, not all societies deinstitutionalized by eliminating
mental hospitals.
Nevertheless, the term “deinstitutionalization” remains the language of choice for
both the majority of academics and journalists commenting on the psychiatric experience.15
12

In fact, deinstitutionalization is vital to welfare state formation. Consider Karl Polanyi’s seminal analysis
of the Speenhamland system in early industrial England. The Great Transformation reveals how shifting
welfare provision from the institutional (“indoor relief”) to the non-institutional (“outdoor relief”) eventually
resulted in the dual protection and regulation of labor for capitalist development. Similar trends would
take o↵ in North America, where students of American social history would come to emphasize the role
of both institutionalization (e.g., Rothman) and deinstitutionalization (e.g., Katz) in welfare capitalism.
Over the coming decades, deinstitutionalization would take many forms. Lerman identifies three types of
deinstitutionalization in 20th century America alone: the deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill from
state hospitals, that of the developmentally disabled from specialized state schools, and that of neglected
and delinquent youth from orphan asylums and training schools.
Michael B. Katz, In the Shadow of the Poorhouse: A Social History of Welfare in America, 10th anniversary
ed., rev. and updated (New York: BasicBooks, 1996); Paul Lerman, Deinstitutionalization and the Welfare
State (New Brunswick, N.J: Rutgers University Press, 1982); Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The
Political and Economic Origins of Our Time, 2nd Beacon Paperback ed (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2001);
David J. Rothman, The Discovery of the Asylum: Social Order and Disorder in the New Republic, rev. ed,
New Lines in Criminology (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 2002).
13
Andrew Scull, Decarceration: Community Treatment and the Deviant - a Radical View, 2. ed (Cambridge: Polity Pr, 1984), 1.
14
Nicolas Henckes, “Narratives of Change and Reform Processes: Global and Local Transactions in French
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Thus, while it is necessary to acknowledge the aforementioned limitations of the term, my
focus on mental health policy prompts me to use this familiar and resonant language -two important criteria for concept formation.16 And while elements of my analysis can be
generalized to similar process in other areas of politics and policy, I do not take up that
task here.
Most analysts share an understanding that this process involves a shift in the primary locus of mental health services from one type of institution (namely, a mental hospital,
or asylum) to the community. What they mean by a “shift” and “community,” however,
varies. The shift can involve either the reduction of the number of institutional residents or
a reduction in the number of institutions themselves.17 The meaning of community-based
care has evolved over time, too. When deinstitutionalization began to acquire political
significance in the 1970s and 1980s, scholars began pointing to an increased reliance on
“non-traditional” or “non-institutional” mental health care facilities.18 Today, these facilities range from outpatient psychiatric centers, to non-medical social services such as day
care and vocational rehabilitation services, to housing facilities such as group homes and
halfway houses.19 The varied meanings and usages of the term “deinstitutionalization” fail
to provide a portable standard for comparison across countries.
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Basic
Definition

Table 1: Schematic of the concept of “deinstitutionalization”
A society’s movement down a continuum, in which the mentally ill
become less likely to reside in an establishment that provides both
psychiatric and custodial care than in the past

Prevalence of
The degree of
establishments that
permanence with which Relative likelihood of
residence in these
Dimensions provide both psychiatric people with mental
establishments
services and custodial illness are
care
institutionalized

Indicator Number of mental
example hospitals

Length of stay in
mental hospitals

Proportion of
residents in mental
hospitals per 100,000
population today,
compared to 1935

In an attempt to remedy this problem, I draw on Goertz’s guidelines for concept
formation.20 At a “basic” level, degrees of institutionalization refer to whether the mentally
ill in a given society are more or less likely to reside in an establishment that provides
both psychiatric and custodial care. Deinstitutionalization, therefore, refers to a society’s
movement down a continuum, in which the mentally ill become less likely to reside in these
establishments than in the past. Three components of this definition, and their respective
indicators, should be highlighted and discussed in greater detail: the psychiatric-custodial
establishment, the length of residence, and the relative likelihood of residence. Table 1
o↵ers a schematic to guide this overview.
The presence or absence of the psychiatric-custodial establishment is perhaps the
most visible marker of institutionalization. The decoupling of psychiatric and custodial
care developed over the latter half of twentieth century, making these establishments appear obsolete to contemporary observers. While many specialized psychiatric hospitals still
provide medical care, rarely do they serve a custodial function as well. Importantly, this
dimension assumes that the society in question has a tradition of caring for the mentally
ill in asylums. The repurposing or decline of the asylum constitutes this critical dimension
of deinstitutionalization. The most obvious indicator of this dimension measures the estab20
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lishments themselves -- but looking only at the availability of mental hospitals says little
about whether they serve a custodial function, in addition to medical function. Substitute
indicators, such as utilization rates (e.g., admissions) and capacity (e.g., beds) have the
same problem, perhaps even more so, since these measures sometimes reflect the activity of
both mental hospitals and psychiatric wards of general hospitals.
Since these indicators do not convey very much information about how mental health
care has changed within the hospital, the length of residence dimension attempts to capture
changes in the function of the hospital, specifically regarding its custodial work. This
component refers to the degree of permanence with which people with mental illnesses
are institutionalized. Substitutable, constitutive indicators of this dimension include the
average length of stay in a psychiatric institution and measures of long-term residents
(sometimes called “inmates”). Note that inpatients can be distinct from residents. The
former can include those who stay in a mental hospital temporarily (even just one or two
days), while the latter connotes a long-term care arrangement.
Finally, the dimension of relative likelihood ties it all together. It shows that long-stay
residence in the psychiatric-custodial establishment is changing over time. It captures, first,
the likelihood that a person with mental illness resides in a mental hospital, and second,
whether that person is any more or less likely to do reside there today than in the past.
Indicators of the e↵ect of this phenomenon must capture the proportion of the population
at that point in time that could be institutionalized, relative to a historical baseline. An
ideal indicator is the percentage of residents living in mental hospitals today, relative to
those living in mental hospitals in 1935, before deinstitutionalization began, with one key
condition.
Concepts and measures of deinstitutionalization should consider the psychiatric needs
of the population, too. Yet epidemiologists have difficulty estimating these needs, in part
because they are often partially (sometimes entirely) constructed – as sociologists long have
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emphasized.21 The evolving classification of psychiatric disorders make this patently clear.22
With this in mind, one must make the reluctant presumption that the population eligible
for psychiatric care remains more or less stable over time, such that measures relative to the
population as a whole can be employed. Major international observers implicitly agree with
this approach. The World Health Organization has found that neuropsychiatric conditions
account for about 30 percent of the global burden of disease in every society, even though
the provision of services for these conditions varies across countries.23 The assumption that
needs remain stable as supply changes sets the backdrop for the following section, which
compares observations of measures of supply across the 15 countries of interest.
2.2.2. Historical patterns
In search of these indicators, I surveyed the national statistical yearbooks for the full universe of cases (the 15 countries identified earlier) from 1935 to 1990, and used more recent
data from the WHO and OECD to fill the series to the present. The Second World War
was a major turning point in the history of social welfare: the spirit of reform, combined
with an economic boom, made for considerable policy changes, especially in the area of
mental health. The development of social insurance funds, the increasing medicalization of
psychiatry, and the return of war veterans facing profound psychological distress prompted
reforms in the asylum. Because this flurry of activity occurred after the war, the series
begins in 1935 to obtain a baseline measure of institutionalization.24 Ending the series
as recently as possible captures the e↵ects of the welfare retrenchment since the economic
crises of the 1970s -- which also prompted reductions in psychiatric care supply.25 Data on
21
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psychiatric hospitals and residents, for example, were much more prevalent in the earlier
period than in the later period, when countries started to replace those numbers with data
on psychiatric beds and inpatients.
Unfortunately, data on the length of residence dimension was much less available.
Only six of the countries provided any such data, and their measures varied from presentations of total days of treatment (Sweden, until 1982; the Netherlands, from 1967-1988, and
Denmark, from 1942-1980) to the average stay in weeks (New Zealand, until 1972) or daily
occupation of beds (the UK, from 1950 -1983). Switzerland provided the most granular
data, counting the length of stay for patients in di↵erent length of stay categories (e.g.,
11 months, 1 year, 2-4 years, and so on) until 1970. In spite of these di↵erent reporting
practices, the observations help to paint a general picture of deinstitutionalization across
the 15 countries.
Figure 8 presents the ideal measure of deinstitutionalization for the available data.
It supports the claim that all countries have deinstitutionalized, for long term residence in
mental hospitals became less common by the 1980s for a range of countries. But changes
to the function of the mental hospital did not render it obsolete. On the contrary, as
Figure 9 shows, some countries in fact increased the quantity of mental hospitals over this
period (e.g., the Netherlands, France), while others reduced it dramatically (e.g., Canada,
Finland).
The apparent incoherence between the supposed period of deinstitutionalization and
the variable trends in service provision merits more attention. Figure 2.2.2 plots the evolution over time of the most comprehensive measure of mental health care supply available:
psychiatric beds.26 Not surprisingly, there has been a general decline in the psychiatric bed
capacity of the 15 countries (this speaks to the general shift in psychiatry away from institutional care) – but importantly, the extent of that decline varies. Moreover, a country’s
contemporary bed capacity is not a simple functional outcome of its historic bed capacity.
26
The OECD’s collection of historical data on this measure (beginning in roughly 1970) helps to fill this
series.
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. “Health.” Database. OECD.Stat, 2017.
http://stats.oecd.org/#.

28

Figure 8: Residents of mental hospitals per 100,000, relative to a 1935 baseline, available
countries and years
Some of the countries with the most institutionalized pasts have seen some of the largest
declines in their bed capacity (e.g., Australia, Finland, the United States), while countries
that were less institutionalized now have some of the highest bed rates (e.g., Belgium, the
Netherlands). Meanwhile, some countries have always tended toward the lower end of the
institutionalized spectrum (e.g., Austria, Denmark), and others toward the higher end (e.g.,
Germany).
The contemporary di↵erences in the supply of mental health services hardly arose out
of thin air. Countries that provide much mental health care today have not always done so.
Moreover, patterns of deinstitutionalization help to explain variations in levels of supply. If
contemporary supply does not match prior conditions, before deinstitutionalization, then
something must have happened during deinstitutionalization to cause a country to change
paths. The next section explores what those changes could be.

2.3. The five prevailing explanations and their limits
Why did the asylum persist more in some countries than others? Moreover, why has the
supply of public psychiatric services expanded in the most unlikely societies (where supply
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Figure 9: Mental hospitals per 100,000, 1935-present, available countries and years

Figure 10: Psychiatric beds per 100,000, 1935-present, available countries and years
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was once very low), yet decreased rapidly in countries once known for their enormous
capacity in this area? Two bodies of literature can help to answer these questions: the multidisciplinary study of deinstitutionalization and the political analyses of the distribution of
social services in welfare states. This section draws on both bodies of work to identify
potential explanations for the puzzle, and discusses their limitations.
2.3.1. Movements, medications, and money: An analysis of the prevailing explanations for
deinstitutionalization
The vast, multi-disciplinary literature analyzing the causes and e↵ects of deinstitutionalization has resulted in several analytic genres. One prominent line of inquiry comes from
historical sociologists and social theorists, who have used the history of mental health care
as a lens into broader structural transformations, and the implications of these transformations for the order of knowledge, the economy, and social relations.27 This intellectual
lineage makes it clear that mental health policy cannot be reduced to an isolated topic –
rather, it o↵ers compelling evidence that the development of psychiatry is inseparable from
the most significant social transformations. A second set of studies draws on anthropological
and ethnographic techniques to look closely at the e↵ects of these changes on lived human
experiences.28 It is thanks to these studies that readers can begin to fathom what these
changes have meant (and continue to mean) for people undergoing mental distress, and for
the societies in which they live. Finally, historians have tended to study the contingent aspects of the process, especially with regard to unique expressions of deinstitutionalization.29
27

Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason, Vintage Books
Ed., Nov. 1988 (New York: Random House, 1988); Françoise Castel, Robert Castel, and Anne Lovell,
The Psychiatric Society, European Perspectives (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); Robert
Castel, The Regulation of Madness: The Origins of Incarceration in France, U.S. ed, Medicine and Society
1 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).; Scull, Decarceration.
28
D. L. Rosenhan, “On Being Sane in Insane Places,” Science 179, no. 4070 (January 19, 1973): 250–58,
https://doi.org/10.1126/science.179.4070.250; Paul Brodwin, Everyday Ethics: Voices from the Front Line
of Community Psychiatry (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013); Nancy Scheper-Hughes, Saints,
Scholars, and Schizophrenics: Mental Illness in Rural Ireland, 20th anniversary ed., rev. and expanded
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); Alfred H. Stanton and Morris S Schwartz, The Mental
Hospital: A Study of Institutional Participation in Psychiatric Illness and Treatment (Basic Books, 1954).
29
Elizabeth Lunbeck, The Psychiatric Persuasion: Knowledge, Gender, and Power in Modern America
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1994); John Foot, The Man Who Closed the Asylums: Franco
Basaglia and the Revolution in Mental Health Care (London; Brooklyn, NY: Verso, 2015); Grob and Goldman, The Dilemma of Federal Mental Health Policy; Grob, The Mad Among Us; Rothman, The Discovery
of the Asylum.

31

Their commitment to accurate historical interpretation is a necessary counterweight to the
e↵orts of those with more abstract or theoretical intellectual aims.
Less common, though not wholly absent from the corpus, are comparative analyses.
A recent volume edited by Kritsotaki, Long, and Smith draws on the local and national
experiences of deinstitutionalization in a variety of countries to reconsider important themes
in the literature.30 As a group composed mostly of historians, they do not seek to o↵er
a systematic explanation for the di↵erences they explore. Attempts to develop that kind
of an explanation instead fall to comparative sociologists and social policy experts. In
1997, Goodwin gauged the utility of a standard typology of welfare states in accounting
for di↵erent patterns of deinstitutionalization. He finds that each of the “three worlds
of welfare capitalism” played predictable roles in the formation of mental health policy
in the postwar period, but concludes by noting the unexpected behavior of cases within
each regime type since then.31 A few years later, Carpenter advocated for the extension
of Goodwin’s analysis: “A critical application of welfare regime analysis, sensitive to the
specifics of national cultures and mental health policy contexts and their contested character
o↵ers potentially rich theoretical veins that have yet to be fully exploited.”32 Carpenter’s
broad call to investigate the other factors that influence mental health policy, with both
empirical rigor and a theoretical eye, is one that this dissertation heeds.
In order to develop a systematic political explanation for these di↵erences, it is first
necessary to synthesize the existing explanations for deinstitutionalization, and to pay special attention to the reasons why deinstitutionalization might have led to greater reductions
in the mental health care supply in some countries than in others. Two vital caveats must
be mentioned before proceeding. The first was noted on page 27, and bears repeating here:
needs do not predict supply. Consider again the statistic from the World Health Organi30
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zation: neuropsychiatric conditions account for about 30 percent of the global burden of
disease across all 15 cases. If needs mapped onto supply, then one might expect mental
health services to constitute about the same proportion of health services in any given
country. This is plainly not the case, since the supply of psychiatric beds in some countries
is more than fivefold that of others (e.g., Belgium and New Zealand, Figure 2.1.1) and
expenditures on mental health in some countries is more than triple that of others (e.g.,
France and Finland, Figure 1)
Second, while I evaluate the persuasiveness of each explanation on its own, the outcomes observed are necessarily the result of multiple causes. As Pilgrim and Roger have
argued, mental health policy has multiple tiers worth exploring (local, national, global).33
Nonetheless, the search for the core reasons why countries di↵er could reveal that one
factor was more important than the others in shaping country di↵erences. This section
thus reviews each of the prevailing explanations for deinstitutionalization – the three M’s:
movements, medications, and money - in turn.
Movements

It would be difficult to transform a policy paradigm in a democratic society

without at least some public support for the shift. It should come as no surprise, then,
that some have hypothesized that certain professional and social movements prompted the
decline of inpatient psychiatric services. The internal debates of psychiatric associations,
particularly with regard to therapeutic orientation and disease classification, have undoubtedly shaped the trajectory of mental health policy.34 At the advent of deinstitutionalization,
for instance, many psychiatrists – inspired by the reformist postwar climate -- espoused new
disciplinary subfields such as biological psychiatry, social psychiatry, and dynamic psychiatry. Each of these groups questioned, in di↵erent ways and to di↵erent degrees, the utility of
33
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the asylum, and helped to persuade the mental health establishment to deinstitutionalize.35
At the same time, anti-psychiatrists outside of the political establishment were gaining momentum, too. Again, variants of this movement took di↵erent approaches -- but in
general, anti-psychiatrists supported radical social scientific critiques of institutional psychiatric power, and often directly mobilized their supporters in the Sixties’ counterculture.
The list of these thinkers is long. Thought leaders in America included Erving Go↵man,
Alfred H. Stanton and Morris S. Schwartz, and Thomas Szasz; their counterparts in the
British Commonwealth included R.D. Laing and David Cooper; while non-Anglo takes included the work of Franco Basaglia and even Franz Fanon.36 A steadily intensifying media
spotlight on some of the most deplorable mental hospitals, accruing legal battles over involuntary commitment procedures, and revolutionary overtones of the 1960s helped many
of these ideas spread.37
The question, therefore, is whether the countries that experienced these movements
most vividly were those that deinstitutionalized most rapidly. While it is certainly true
that both reformist and anti-psychiatric spirits were lively in the United States and Britain
(two countries at the bottom and middle sections of the deinstitutionalization spectrum,
respectively), one cannot attribute say, Swedish or Danish deinstitutionalization to these
movements. To the best of my knowledge, there were no major anti-psychiatrists in these
countries, nor were the reforms initiated within their psychiatric associations any di↵erent
35
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from those experienced elsewhere.
In short, these movements were decidedly transnational. Psychiatrists and social critics traveled often to conferences abroad, promoting wide reception of their ideas, regardless
of national boundaries. Consider, for example, the role of the World Health Organization
in hosting these discussions. In the 1950s and 1960s, representatives from over 27 countries
regularly traveled to Geneva to develop a unified mental health program. In his analysis
of this group’s influence, Henckes notes that “the [WHO] Expert Committee [on Mental
Health] probably played a key role up to the end of the 1960s in generating a transnational narrative of the reform of mental health systems. Indeed, this was a major stake for
psychiatry in most western countries after the Second World War.”38 The meetings were
especially well attended by delegates from the countries in this study, which composed over
half of the Expert Committee (91 of 161 members).39 Although the Expert Committee
was phased out by the 1970s, new working groups brought representatives from nearly all
of the countries in this study to discuss pressing issues in mental health in the subsequent
decades. One prominent example was the international Working Group on the Future of
Mental Hospitals, some of whose delegates (from Italy, Belgium, the United States, and
the Federal Republic of Germany) attended despite the fact that the WHO did not cover
their participation expenses.40 Clearly policy-makers and reformers were keen to exchange
policy ideas with their international counterparts. Opportunities to do so were rife at these
meetings.
Psychiatric reformers and revolutionaries often relocated to other countries, too.
Sometimes the did so by choice, as was the case of David Cooper, who traveled from
South Africa to Britain and then France, and Swiss-born Adolf Meyer, a president of the
American Psychiatric Association (1927-1928) who became one of America’s most influential reformers. In other instances, their migration was forced. As Roelcke, Weindling, and
Westwood explain in their historical study of international psychiatry: “a massive transfer
38
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of intellectual, and in particular, of personal resources occurred from the 1920s onwards,
and sharply increased after the political change in Germany in 1933.”41 Now the question
becomes why social movements developed in response to the circulation of these intellectuals
and the di↵usion of their ideas in some countries, but not in others.
Social science theories of policy change have found that social movements crop up
when “political opportunity structures” open the door to their influence.42 This position tends to be associated with state-centered approaches, but it can be interpreted more
broadly to mean that economic, socio-institutional, and other structural conditions enable
social movements.43 Put simply, movements take root where they find fertile ground. It
is unsurprising that both radical anti-psychiatric and more moderate reformist tendencies
thrived in the United States and Britain, whose fragmented governing structures can leave
many areas open to pluralist influences.44 Such conditions help movements of “conscience”
become politically “convenient” – to borrow from Rothman’s classic text on the history of
psychiatry.45 A comparative political analysis, then, can explore what convenient factors
enabled rapid deinstitutionalization in some countries (even those without powerful movements of conscience, as in Austria), but constrained it elsewhere (despite the presence of
actors sympathetic to reformist or anti-psychiatrist tendencies, as in Belgium).46
Medications

A second hypothesis proposes that technological change – in this case,

biomedical and chemical advances -- reduced inpatient psychiatric capacity. Developed by
41
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the French pharmaceutical company Rhône Poulenc in 1950, chlorpromazine (also known
under the trade names Thorazine and Largactil) was the first drug to treat psychosis. Chlorpromazine enabled the clinical improvement of thousands of patients, allowed hospitals to
reduce coercive restraint, and even improved the feasibility of outpatient treatment.47 But
ironically, the drug made little di↵erence on hospitalization trends in its home country,
France, where the use of these drugs coincided with the rise of psychiatric residents, in part
because many psychiatrists believed that the drug was best administered within the walls
of the asylum. Figures 8, 9, and 2.2.2 are reminders that France was not the sole country to
experience these trends. But even in rapidly deinstitutionalizing countries, chlorpromazine
had little e↵ect on the actual closure of hospitals, as Gronfein’s statistical work and Scull’s
historical analysis document in detail.48 Moreover, the notion of “community care” predated the development of these drugs. The family-based foster care system for people with
mental illnesses in Geel, Belgium dates at least to the 13th century.49 In the modern period,
discussions of “extra-asylum psychiatry” and “open services” began as early as the First
World War.50 Although chlorpromazine could facilitate outpatient service delivery, it was
not responsible for its initial implementation. Thus, like the social movements described
above, the universal di↵usion of this technology failed to prompt consistent responses from
providers and policy-makers.
Money

For many Anglo-American readers, deinstitutionalization is practically synony-

mous with the economic conditions, political leadership, and public policies of the 1970s
and 1980s. The arrival of Thatcherism and Reaganomics, combined with the economic
shocks of the early 1970s, pivoted the British and American economic strategies toward the
rapid reduction of social expenditures, including in the area of mental health. Once again
Rothman’s dictum proved true: deinstitutionalization was attractive both as a matter of
47
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conscience (its emphasis on self-actualization cohered well with their worldviews), and as
a matter of political and economic convenience. The Thatcher government made this clear
in its “Making a Reality of Community Care” report:
“The policy of successive governments has been to promote community based
services allowing the reduction of long-stay hospital provision. This is generally
considered better in most situations. It also is more economical in many cases:
a frail elderly person living in their own home with day and domiciliary support
would typically cost public funds some £135 per week; the same person would
cost about £295 per week in a NHS [National Health Service] geriatric ward.”51
Too much of the literature, though, has focused on the British and American cases. These
are countries whose politics have biased them toward limiting social spending, as studies of
welfare state types, the influence of Right partisanship, and fragmented political and legal
institutions have made clear.52 Moreover, even the work that focuses on these cases notes
that their deinstitutionalization processes began much earlier than the 1970s.
Most prominent in the scholarly literature is this third hypothesis: favorable economic
conditions in the post-war period expanded the social insurance programs that would facilitate life outside the asylum, and the unfavorable economic conditions that followed in
the 1970s and 1980s prompted governments to close costly inpatient mental health services.
Scull’s study draws on these countries to develop a more general claim that the expansion
of the welfare state raised the “opportunity cost of neglecting community care in favor of
51
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the asylum treatment,” as the latter (inpatient care) was far more costly than former (outpatient care). At the same time, as the welfare state socialized production costs of other
welfare goods and services, a fiscal crisis ensued. The result was an “intensification of noninstitutional techniques” in the late 1960s and 1970s.53 Indeed, the universal expansion
and contraction of the welfare state meant that not a single country in this dissertation
deviated from the general trend toward deinstitutionalization. Still, the central question of
this dissertation – as to why some countries reduced these public psychiatric services more
than others — remains.
2.3.2. Demand and (partisan) supply: An analysis of the prevailing explanations for the
distribution of social services
Researchers have examined the comparative politics of nearly every area of social policy,
including pensions, health care, childcare, disability and education. Yet no comparative
welfare state scholar has made a serious e↵ort to explain the political development of mental health policy.54 Recent publications are evidence of this deficit. The Oxford Handbook of
the Welfare State includes eleven chapters that summarize the literature on various welfare
policies; there is no chapter on mental health policy.55 Meanwhile, a recent special issue of
the Journal of European Social Policy looks back on 25 years of scholarly research in this
area (since the publication of Gøsta Esping-Anderson’s Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism).56 The issue draws attention to a number of important substantive and methodological
gains, yet no article considers whether or how the deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill
contributed to the social and economic dynamics of the contemporary welfare state.
But even if studies specific to mental health are lacking, the mental health sector
53
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has much in common with areas of the welfare state that have received some, but should
receive more, attention. The development of contemporary mental health systems o↵ers a
lens into a wider development: the rise of social services. Today, about 40 percent of social
expenditures in advanced economies are devoted to health, child, and elderly care, while
other public services such as education and transportation continue to expand as well.57 Yet
the most prominent analyses of welfare systems are based on the conventional areas of social
protection such as pensions, unemployment, and sickness insurance, known collectively as
social transfers. This arm of the welfare state, the social transfer state, remains important,
but it is a mistake to think that its other arm, the social service state, works the same way.
The current prominence of social services therefore warrants more scholarly attention.
A combination of interrelated demographic and economic factors contributed to this
development. The aging of the postwar generation has not only strained existing pension
schemes, but it also has raised demand for elderly care services -- not least because of the
unavailability of female familial caregiving. The mass entrance of women into the labor force
left a vacuum in domestic care work, prompting many public and private service providers
to replace women’s unpaid labor with paid alternatives. The rise of compensated care
arrangements for young children, older adults, people with disabilities, and other vulnerable
groups therefore is tightly connected to the evolution of family structures.
Likewise, the increased supply of social services cannot be separated from the more
general service transition. Industrial economies are less dependent on manufacturing than
they were thirty or forty years ago; and accordingly, workers are more likely to work in
a shop than in a coal mine. Note how the rise of low-skill jobs in areas like retail sales,
catering, and cleaning also has contributed to the rise of social service work: retailers can
sell either clothing or medical goods; caterers can service both weddings and nursing homes;
and cleaners can tend to both offices and the private homes of working mothers. Simply
put, service economies go hand-in-hand with the development of social services, regardless
57
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of whether they are publicly funded.
While the distribution of social services sometimes matches existing typologies of
welfare states, there are some important deviations, both within and across countries.58
For example, all of the Nordic countries spend heavily on social services, but Denmark
and Sweden spend more on health than other social services, whereas Finland and Norway
spend more on social services than on health.59 Deviations of health services from welfare
regime theory in all three types of welfare states are especially well-documented.60 Perhaps
one of the best-known examples is that of the British National Health Service: a universal,
general tax-funded, state-operated health system, which bears a closer resemblance to the
Scandinavian social democratic approach to social provision than the liberal approach that
governs the rest of the British welfare state. But other social service areas, too, are departing
from the predictions of regime theory. Castles notes how, since 2001, patterns of social
service expenditure in some of the continental countries (Germany, France, even Portugal)
now follow Nordic patterns, while others (Belgium, Austria, Italy) continue to adhere to the
Christian democratic framework.61 Given the paucity of specific attention to mental health
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services, the following section considers how welfare staet scholars explain variations in the
supply of social services more generally.62

2.3.2.1

Demand

Scholars often analyze the politics of the welfare state by referring to “demand-side”
and “supply-side” pressures. Although one should be wary of importing the language of the
market to the study of politics, this framework usefully dissects the complex array of factors
that determine levels of social service provision. Demand-side theories successfully predict
the generosity of cash transfers, but not social services. Neither can these theories explain
why the supply of some welfare goods and services exceeds the level of client demand.
Users of mental health, education, and immigrant social services, for example, are poor,
62
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vulnerable, or otherwise unempowered – yet some governments still provide large quantities
of these services.
The conventional theory of demand-side welfare state formation (primarily on West
European politics) proceeds as follows. To begin, users seek low-cost, high quality goods
and services, and deploy the political tools at their disposal to obtain them. For example,
they may join trade unions or vote for Left parties that support welfare generosity, but
whether these intermediary organizations are e↵ective conduits for their demands depends
on how political institutions structure class conflict. Political systems that favor “Left
power resources” are associated with more welfare supply.63 This is not to say that the
middle classes and employers are averse to welfare.64 In fact, a related school views the
relationship between labor, business, and the state as institutionally complementary, which
in turn shapes a society’s political economy, including its system of social protection.65
Demand-side theories that focus on class conflict are excellent predictors of welfare benefit
generosity. Yet these theories are concerned primarily with the demand for cash transfers
in the postwar period – not services, which have expanded dramatically since that time.66
Moreover, critics of these conventional demand-side theories have pointed to their
invalidity during periods of financial strain. In his analysis of two Anglo-Saxon welfare
states, the UK and the US, Pierson finds that a “new politics” of the welfare state retrenched
63
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each coutnry’s social policies to di↵erent degrees.67 The clients of welfare services (not trade
unions) mobilized to maintain them. As Pierson argues,
“a power resources perspective cannot explain patterns of retrenchment in
the US and Great Britain. Reagan and Thatcher’s records reveal two key features: Their overall impact had been modest and their success had varied widely
across programs. A power-resources perspective would predict neither of these
outcomes.”68
Instead, he argued that “large public social programs are central features of the political
landscape, and with them have come dense networks of interests groups and strong popular
attachments to particular policies. The structure of these programs shapes the prospects
for reform.”69
Pierson, and the subsequent body of literature his work produced (particularly in
American politics), thus renewed scholarly attention to the theory of “policy feedback,”
which posits that some public policies privilege certain social groups over others. These
privileged social groups then sustain demand for those public policies.70 Consider the examples of the U.S. Medicare and Social Security programs, which provide financial security
to the aged. This support has empowered interest groups that represent the elderly (exemplified by the American Association of Retired Persons), who turn pressure government
to maintain and expand programs like Medicare and Social Security. These policy-client
relations result in powerful, “positive” feedback loops.71
67

Pierson, Dismantling the Welfare State?
Ibid, 28.
69
Ibid, 8.
70
Andrea Louise Campbell, “Policy Makes Mass Politics,” Annual Review of Political Science 15, no. 1
(June 15, 2012): 333–51, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-012610-135202; Suzanne Mettler and Joe
Soss, “The Consequences of Public Policy for Democratic Citizenship: Bridging Policy Studies and Mass Politics,” Perspectives on Politics 2, no. 1 (March 2004): 55–73, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704000623;
Note, however, that one of the theory’s earliest proponents predates these works by almost a century: E.E.
Schattschneider, Politics, Pressures and the Tari↵;: A Study of Free Private Enterprise in Pressure Politics,
as Shown in the 1929-1930 Revision of the Tari↵, (Prentice-Hall, 1935).
71
Pierson briefly addresses the role of program employees in a footnote of an article: “The providers of public services also had a major stake in sustaining expenditure and were usually well organized. . . [footnoted :]
In this respect, organized labor (public employee unions) continues to be of significance, although not in
the way posited by power resources theorists. Union interests are now linked primarily to the employmentgenerating e↵ects of specific public programs rather than to the broad consequences of generous public
provision for the bargaining position of workers.”
Paul Pierson, “The New Politics of the Welfare State,” World Politics 48, no. 02 (January 1996): 143–79,
https://doi.org/10.1353/wp.1996.0004, 151.
68

44

But what if pre-existing policies do not empower or otherwise advantage the client
population? Studies of “negative” policy feedback show how the chances of program maintenance for low-resource clients are limited.72 Only highly-resourced clients manage to sustain
the policy design in their favor. Nonetheless, in some countries, the supply of social services
is guaranteed even for the politically weak. Like non-voting age school children or people
with restricted citizenship rights, adults with severe mental illnesses do not benefit from
the kinds of postwar social programs that benefit pensioners; and thus are much less likely
than pensioners to advocate for program maintenance and expansion. Since demand-side
explanations can account for neither demand for services, nor for demand from vulnerable
groups, I turn to supply-side explanations next.
2.3.2.2

(Partisan) supply

Most commonly in the study of political economy, supply-side factors refer to the ways in
which political competition is structured, and more specifically, the various ways in which
Left governance determines outcomes.73 An influential study on the politics of public ser72
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vices in the welfare state, Gingrich’s Making Markets in the Welfare State, finds that the
partisan orientation of political leadership and the preferences of service providers determines the content of marketizing reforms in welfare states. Left leaders opt for market
reforms that empower the state, while Right leaders opt for reforms that limit the state
and empower the private sector.74 But in the case of mental health, some providers evidently did little to steer the social democratic welfare expansions of the 1950s and 1960s
toward mental health care, while others evidently overrode the partisan priorities of Right
governments in the 1980s.
Relatedly, the di↵erent welfare e↵ects of various electoral systems have received attention from both political scientists and economists.75 Lijphart’s formulation that consensus
democracies create “kinder, gentler” societies with higher levels of welfare provision has become an enduring convention in the field.76 Immergut shows how the number of government
“veto points” also structures political competition.77 Societies with more veto points allow
minority groups to block major redistributive policies more easily than societies with fewer
veto points. These types of formal institutions, however, are not the only rules that govern
political competition, as informal institutions also play a role.78 Lynch, for example, shows
that the degree of particularistic or programmatic competition incentivizes politicians to
either maintain occupationalist policy program structures or enact citizenship-based ones,
respectively.79 By structuring demand for welfare services, patterns of political competition
have an e↵ect on their provision. Still, the variation in public services is not immediately
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explained by these theories -- Britain is a consensus democracy with a generous national
public health service; Swiss veto points have not prevented the construction of an expansive
national rail system; and similar programmatic politics in Scandinavia have led to di↵erent
distributions of social services across those societies80
Some recent scholarship has devoted attention to the political activity of service
providers themselves.81 The novelty of this literature, however, does not mean that service providers are new actors in politics and markets. Certainly, scholars of “New Public
Management” are right to note how neoliberal ideology has come to influence public managers.

82

But economists, particularly those working in health care, have long argued that

suppliers benefitting from information asymmetries induce demand. It is important to separate the ideology of New Public Management from longstanding capitalist realities. Only
recently have some public providers begun to import the approach, language, and ideology
of neoliberal private providers into the public sector. Yet public social service providers
have always operated within broader market constraints. The incentives to lower costs,
increase efficiency, and maximize revenues existed prior to the neoliberal turn – yet many
social service providers advocate for increasing the supply of services, even when demand
for these services is politically and economically feeble. The next chapter explains why.
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system and the social insurance system may be (see Estevez-Abe and colleagues), these explanations tend
to be more concerned with social benefits than social services. Like demand-side power resources theories,
supply-side theories that focus on corporatism and the formation of skills are, by definition, concerned with
the traditional risks associated with entry to and exit from the labor market – not with the new social risks
that require welfare services.
T. Cusack, T. Iversen, and P. Rehm, “Risks at Work: The Demand and Supply Sides of Government Redistribution,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy 22, no. 3 (September 1, 2006): 365–89,
https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grj022.
81
Notably the work by Gingrich discussed previously; see also Terry M Moe and Brookings Institution,
Special Interest: Teachers Unions and America’s Public Schools (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution
Press, 2012).
82
Christopher Hood, “A Public Management for All Seasons?,” Public Administration 69, no. 1 (March
1991): 3–19, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9299.1991.tb00779.x.

47

Chapter 3

Public Workers and the Welfare
State
To better understand the why some countries provide more public mental health
services than others, both mental health scholars and comparative political economists
should look to the role of public employees. The professional experts that protagonize
the deinstitutionalization literature, psychiatrists, are only one component of the mental
health workforce. Other crucial workers include the nurses, social workers, and facility
caretakers whose livelihoods depend on the form and financing of services. Moreover, the
influence of the public psychiatric workforce is part of a set of larger trends in public sector
employment and unionization. The steady growth of government in the latter half of the
twentieth century has made it one of the largest employers in advanced economies, yet
many political analysts continue to view organized labor as an actor external to the state.
Public unions, however, operate within the state itself. This chapter theorizes when and
how the economic interests of public workers gain political influence and explains why a
paired comparison of the political development of French and American mental health care
can explain the di↵erence in mental health care supply.
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3.1. A novel theory
Services, regardless of whether they are public or private, face numerous pressures to reduce
costs. Competition can arise from related services, as well as from automation (particularly
in industries where advanced technologies, such as biomedical devices and pharmaceuticals,
are concerned). The inability of this sector to compete with wage increases in more productive sectors can lead service producers to trim costs.1 In the subset of services that are
public, these pressures are compounded by the e↵ects of political initiatives to de-regulate
certain industries and strategies of cost containment to reduce social expenditures. Those
producers that serve vulnerable populations are constrained, too, by the weakness of organized demand. Each of these factors, in turn and in sum, push wages and employment
levels downward – yet not all services yield to them. Where organized labor has the right
to strike, bargain, and advocate, workers mobilize to preserve their employment and wage
equality with other sectors.2
Theoretically, public managers are more likely than private managers to placate the
demands of their employees. Although managers typically prefer to raise revenues and
maximize profits at the expense of employee protections or wages, a public manager is bound
personally to the protections she puts in place. Her livelihood, like that of her employees,
depends on the quality of public employment (especially when exit to the private sector
is not easy). The shared interests of public labor and management, then, challenges the
assumption of antagonism that founds the study of industrial relations.3 Unlike private
managers, government managers may make decisions about hiring and firing, workplace
protections, and production capacities, but they do not “own” government workers. A
distal and murky principal-agent relationship characterizes the public sector, as principals
could include elected officials, taxpayers, or even the impersonal state. This means that the
interests of public managers are often closer to their employees than is the case for private
1

William J. Baumol and William G. Bowen, Performing Arts - the Economic Dilemma.
It is important to underscore that a favorable legal environment triggers and protects worker activity.
The right to organize, in particular, is a necessary background condition. For evidence of the role of
public unionization in increasing the costs of government, see Sarah F. Anzia and Terry M. Moe, “Public
Sector Unions and the Costs of Government,” The Journal of Politics 77, no. 1 (January 2015): 114–27,
https://doi.org/10.1086/678311.
3
See for example, Karl Marx, “Wage Labor and Capital,” Neue Rheinische Zeitung, April 1849.
2
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managers.4
The alignment of public managers’ and workers’ interests increases the supply of
public services. Employees know that their livelihoods depend on public funds, so they
are likely to advocate for sustainable public funding increases. Supporting, for example,
generous government insurance coverage of a social service or a long-term commitment
to train public service workers is more likely to protect service employment than raising
individual cost sharing, such as out-of-pocket fees. Managers then use the political and
policy tools at their disposal, as well as the power of their expertise, to meet these demands.
Their success leads to revenue increases, and empowers the public workforce further.
When public managers and workers do not form a political coalition, the supply of
public services – especially those for low-resource populations – declines. Only the very
few (the very a✏uent) can a↵ord to pay for costly, labor-intensive social services without
government assistance. The unadjusted costs of an hour of psychotherapy each week can
exceed average housing costs in many societies. Without public funding, these services
become prohibitively expensive, and therefore inaccessible, to the populations who often
need them the most. Shifting costs to users and privatizing services results in a negative
feedback, as reductions to public services reduces the vitality of the public sector workforce.
Two scope conditions bind this theory. First, the argument is limited to the social
service state (that is, the arm of the welfare state concerned with providing social services,
such as education, health, and long-term care). The social benefit state (the arm concerned with cash transfers, such as pensions, unemployment, disability insurance) is less
labor-intensive, and so it is unlikely to produce the political economy just described. By
transferring financial resources directly to clients, the social benefit state eliminates the
public worker as middleman. Public workers instead gain more influence under the social
service state, which deploys their labor directly.
A second scope condition concerns the clients themselves. While public workers are
4

Although the relationship between workers and managers is particularly complicated in the public sector, both the increasing stratification of workers and the service transition under advanced capitalism has
challenged it in the private sector, too.
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bound to influence almost all areas of the social service state, they are most potent in those
services that cater to low-resource clients. Low-resource clients lack the political, social,
and economic tools to become an influential lobbying group on their own. Other examples
of low-resource clients include non voting-age children, non-citizen immigrants, or even the
poor.5 Absent a powerful consumer interest group, the only remaining group with a clear
stake in the political game is that which represents the workers who depend on the service
for their employment (e.g., teachers, rail workers).
Many hypotheses flow out of this theory, but this study focuses only on one: where
public managers can express their interests independently of private managers, they are
more likely to form a coalition with public sector workers, and use their influence and
expertise to obtain stable, sustainable revenues from government. This will help to maintain
and eventually expand public social services. The longer they do so, the more power they
can build. This becomes critical as incentives to reduce costs develop. If public sector
supervisors organize together with private sector supervisors, their shared representatives
must contend with the positions of each camp. This means that their representatives
must make choices, specifically with regard to whether to support the interests of public
employees. An organization with a mixed attitude is unlikely to become a strong promoter
of public services. The diagram sketched in the introductory chapter is replicated on the
next page, this time in more detail and with its application to the empirical study of mental
health policy development in France and America, which is discussed next.

3.2. The research design
A classic analytic tool of comparative politics – the structured, paired comparison – can
test this hypothesis.6 Case analysis suits the research question for several reasons. When
5

A society’s electoral and party system largely determines the degree to which the poor can express their
political interests, as Jusko has demonstrated.
Karen Long Jusko, Who Speaks for the Poor? Electoral Geography, Party Entry, and Representation,
Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics (Cambridge New York, NY Melbourne: Cambridge University
Press, 2017).
6
Dan Slater and Daniel Ziblatt, “The Enduring Indispensability of the Controlled Comparison,” Comparative Political Studies 46, no. 10 (October 2013): 1301–27, https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414012472469;
Sidney Tarrow, “The Strategy of Paired Comparison: Toward a Theory of Practice,” Comparative Political
Studies 43, no. 2 (February 2010): 230–59, https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414009350044.
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Figure 11: E↵ects of public management-labor coalition-making on the supply of public services (detailed diagram of theoretical argument)

it comes to studying highly-aggregated, structural outcomes, a comparative and historical
approach allows the researcher to both unpack their individual parts and examine their
whole.7 Moreover, commencing a project with questions about complex, system-level effects allows the researcher to shift her full attention to the exploration of causes. Careful
consideration of the “causes of e↵ects” is a characteristic strength of case study research, for
it unveils multi-level, evolving, and often unquantifiable causal factors and mechanisms.8
If this study is to unpack the political influence of public employees, it must consider the
shifting preferences of multiple actors (workers, managers, policy-makers) and their multiple
representatives (trade unions, associations, government agencies) on various policy issues
(inpatient care, outpatient care, public investment in psychiatric services). The same is
true of historical developments (e.g., the growth of the public sector workforce, ideological
change) and important cross-national di↵erences (e.g., patterns of policy-making, demographic di↵erences). Case studies make it possible to examine each of these complex factors
in close detail, and assess their overall causal role more holistically.
Furthermore, the default alternative of statistical analysis does not suit the study.
First, the dependent variable is a national-level outcome across a limited sample of countries
(N=15), and thereby immediately forecloses (or at the very least strongly discourages) statistical testing. Even the most sophisticated statistical regression or inferential econometric
technique would produce weak and unconvincing results. Some researchers might opt to
enlarge the sample of cases by examining subnational variations, but this approach leads
away, not toward, the study of contemporary, cross-national policy di↵erences. Contemporary welfare states are shaped by the foundational rules imposed by the center. Although
decentralized policy-making has proliferated in recent years, local discretion only arises in
relation to national-level policy design. Ultimately, local welfare policies depend on the
permission, priorities, and incentives of the central government. This is not to say that a
variation of the theory is irrelevant to sub-national policy developments. If, for example,
7
James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, eds., Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences, Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics (Cambridge, U.K.; New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2003).
8
James Mahoney and P. Larkin Terrie, “Comparative-Historical Analysis in Contemporary Political Science,” in Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology, ed. Henry Brady, Janet M. Box-Ste↵enmeier, and David
Collier (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
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public managers in a local jurisdiction organize independently from their private sector
counterparts, they will work toward raising revenues for local services, as the example that
opened Chapter 1 recounts. The opposite will occur in localities where public and private
managers organize together.9 This study thus o↵ers an account of national policy di↵erences
that will help to situate further analyses of sub-national variation.10
In order to gain the most analytic leverage out of the case studies, I must select
countries that represent the full range of variation of the dependent variable, which I have
conceptualized as an ordinal outcome (ranging from low to high supply) composed of three
interrelated factors (inpatient care, outpatient care, and public investment) (see Figure 1).11
Countries on the lower end of the spectrum spend fewer public funds on mental health care,
and provide less in the way of both inpatient and outpatient care. The opposite is true
of countries on the higher end of the spectrum. Thus the most distinct (and meaningful)
outcomes occur at the highest and lowest ends, suggesting that a comparison of a typical
“positive” and a typical “negative” case would reveal important causal di↵erences that
are broadly representative of other countries with similar outcomes, as Gerring’s work has
noted.12 Juxtaposing a “positive” case against a “negative” case also protects against the
selection bias associated with studying outcomes on one end of the spectrum alone.13
“Selecting on the dependent variable” has its pitfalls – the most important of which I
9

Such was the case of postwar Massachusetts, described in Chapter 6 (see subsection 6.1).
A statistical analysis of temporal variation is even less appropriate, given the causal role of a historical
process (deinstitutionalization) and its feedback e↵ects on contemporary outcomes.
11
Since these e↵ects are ordinal, and because I have selected the cases according to Mill’s method of
“concomitant variation,” the hypothesized causes are both ordinal and probabilistic. As Mahoney writes,
“the method of concomitant variation is not a deterministic method, an less than perfect association can
be attributed to stochastic processes, measurement error, or additional causal factors.” In other words, the
causal sequence is likely (but not guaranteed) to produce the outcomes identified. Other factors could play
a role in deviant cases.
James Mahoney, “Nominal, Ordinal, and Narrative Appraisal in Macrocausal Analysis,” American Journal
of Sociology 104, no. 4 (January 1999): 1154–96, https://doi.org/10.1086/210139, 402; John Stuart Mill, A
System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, Being a Connected View of the Principles, and the Methods
of Scientific Investigation, 4th ed. (London: J.W. Parker, 1856).
12
Gerring advocates that these cases be “onliers” – or that they lie directly on the regression line for the
best possible representation of typicalness. Although the cases selected fall on the line of best fit in Figure
1, the addition of other variables could change its slope. I thus take the line in the figure as a general guide
only.
John Gerring, “Techniques for Choosing Cases,” in Case Study Research (Cambridge, 2014), 86–150.
13
Barbara Geddes, “How the Cases You Choose A↵ect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias in Comparative Politics,” Political Analysis 2 (1990): 131–50.
10
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intend to avoid.14 Chapter 2 already selected a sample of cases that satisfy the “possibility
principle” outlined by Mahoney and Goertz:
“only cases where the outcome of interest is possible should be included
in the set of negative cases; cases where the outcome is impossible should be
relegated to a set of uninformative and hence irrelevant observations.”15
Movements, medications, and money threatened the supply of public mental health services
in similar ways across all 15 countries. Still, the countries had very di↵erent starting points
(see Figures 8, 9, and 2.2.2). Hence here I return to the possibility principle to select cases
from the sample for comparison – this time, in search of cases with similar initial conditions,
or two countries where the possibility of expanding or contracting public mental health services was comparable prior to the onset of deinstitutionalization. France and the United
States meet all these selection conditions, both with regard to their dependent variables as
well as the possibility principle. The paired case comparison therefore combines two qualitative methodological techniques: systematic process analysis (to test alternative hypotheses
within cases) and pattern matching (to contrast the causal processes that distinguished
outcomes across cases).
Another motivation for the selection of France and the United States as cases is
that the comparison contributes to the deinstitutionalization literature. Barring a few
notable exceptions, attention to French deinstitutionalization has been sparse, particularly
in English-language research.16 The United States, by contrast, has been the subject of
intense scrutiny. In fact, much of how scholars view deinstitutionalization is the product of
research on the American case.17 Studying America in comparative perspective probes the
assumptions that underlie the theoretical generalizations that it generated, and tests them
14

For descriptions of this frequently invoked aphorism, see the references below.
James Mahoney and Gary Goertz, “The Possibility Principle: Choosing Negative Cases in Comparative Research,” American Political Science Review 98, no.
04 (November 2004): 653–69,
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055404041401, 653.
16
An exception is Henckes, “Narratives of Change and Reform Processes”; an article based on a Frenchlanguage thesis: Henckes, “Le Nouveau Monde de La Psychiatrie Française: Les Psychiatres, l’État et La
Réforme Des Hôpitaux Psychiatriques de l’Après-Guerre Aux Années 1970.”
17
See, for example, Phil Brown, The Transfer of Care: Psychiatric Deinstitutionalization and Its Aftermath (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985); Michael J. Dear and Jennifer R. Wolch, Landscapes of
Despair From Deinstitutionalization to Homelessness. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014). Scull,
Decarceration.
15
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elsewhere. Moreover, the comparative analysis allows me to bring back a novel explanation
to the United States, and test its validity there. In this way, the inclusion of this “influential
case” is an important step towards “re-conceptualizing” it.18
3.2.1. The supply of mental health care in France and America
Specific health insurance benefits, financial instruments, and provider incentives shape the
supply of mental health care in France and the United States. This section explains these
contemporary di↵erences, whose historical development I analyze in Chapters 5 and 6. As
Table 2 shows, state provision and financing plays a much larger role in the French system
than in the American system. Public outpatient care in France, for instance, is nearly triple
that of the United States. Trends in provision are matched by trends in spending: a larger
share of mental health revenues come from public funds in France (80 - 94 percent) than in
America (60 percent), and France devotes considerably more of its health budget to mental
health care (13 percent, compared to just 3 percent in the U.S).. Note how the higher
proportion of public spending in France is also related to the higher volume of care there.
Bed density, for instance, is much higher in France (6.3 per 1,000 persons) than in America
(2.8 beds per 1,000 persons).
These di↵erences anchor the paired comparison. Nevertheless, Table 2also shows
how both countries depend more on the public sector than on the private sector to finance
psychiatric care (as per the prediction of Figure 6). The French government finances 76.6
percent of general health care, but it pays a far greater share of mental health bills (up to 20
percentage points more). Similarly, the American government finances 49 percent of general
health care, but it pays a greater share of mental health bills, too (about 10 percentage
points more).19 The vulnerability of mental health clients helps to explain these di↵erences.
Because high-resource clients compose part of the demand for general health services, these
services can rely on private revenues (including out-of-pocket payments) to sustain supply.
18

John Gerring, “Case Selection for Case-Study Analysis: Qualitative and Quantitative Techniques,” in
The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology, ed. Janet M. Box-Ste↵enmeier, Henry E. Brady, and David
Collier (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
19
Elias Mossialos, Ana Djordjevic, and Robin Osborn, “International Profiles of Health Care Systems,” (The Commonwealth Fund, May 2017), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/fundreports/2017/may/international-profiles-health-care-systems, 59.
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But this is not the case with mental health, where clients often lack the financial, cultural,
and educational resources to generate and sustain demand for services.
3.2.1.1

The French system

Most of Chapter 5 will focus on the development of “sectorization,” or in the words of one
influential government report, the basic organizing principle (principe de base) of psychiatry
in France.20 Derived from the early use of the phrase “public sector” (secteur public) to
describe the project, the sectors partition the country into over 1,200 geographic catchment
areas for populations of up to 70,000 people. Each must provide multi-disciplinary mental
health care, though the precise mix of services depends on the perceived needs of the population and local politics.21 Nonetheless, sectors include a public psychiatric outpatient care
centre (centre médico-psychologique) that o↵ers ambulatory mental health care, coordinated
by a public hospital.22 Figure 3.2.1.1 on page 59 (a table reproduced from a government
report) shows the distribution of the various types of public mental health services, relative
to their private not-for-profit and for-profit equivalents.23 The diversity of facilities, as well
as their concentration in the public sector (see “établissements publics”), is striking.
Note that public psychiatry is not the only provider of services for people with mental
disabilities and conditions in France. The private sector is not entirely absent, at least not
in the case of inpatient care. Private, for-profit psychiatric hospitals handle over 20 percent
of cases, and yet private providers compose less than 5 percent of the supply of outpatient
psychiatric care.24 Moreover, psychiatric services are supplemented by a range of “medicalsocial” services (services médico-sociaux ), such as housing, educational support, professional
training, and sheltered workshops. The degree of coordination between public psychiatric
20

Eric Piel and Jean-Luc Roelandt, “De La Psychiatrie Vers La Santé Mentale,” Rapport de Mission
(Ministère de l’Emploi et de la Solidarité Ministère délégué à la santé, July 2001).
21
The term “multi-disciplinary” refers to the care provided by a variety of practitioners, including psychiatrists, psychiatric nurses, psychologists, and social workers.
22
A public hospital, in 90 percent of cases.
Karine Chevreul et al., “France: Health System Review,” Health Systems in Transition, 2015.
23
“Les Établissements de Santé,” Panamoras de La DREES Santé (Ministère des Solidarités et de la Santé,
Direction de la recherche, des études, de l’évaluation et des statistiques, 2016), http://drees.solidaritessante.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/pano-etab-sante-2016.pdf, 106
24
See Figure 3.2.1.1; Chevreul et al., “France: Health System Review.”
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As a percentage of total revenues
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As a percentage of all psychiatric beds
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As a percentage of all utilization of outpatient psychiatric care. Note that the French data measures the number of encounters (nombre d’actes) among public,
private not-for-profit, and private for-profit outpatient centers (centres medico-psychologiques) for adults in 2016. Data on the U.S. calculates the percentage of
the adult population over 18 that received outpatient specialty mental health treatment by treatment setting between 2005-2009. Public providers are outpatient
mental health clinics or centers, and private providers are the offices of a private therapist, psychologist, psychiatrist, social worker, or counselor. A small
percentage (0.1 percent of the total population) are treated in partial day hospital or day treatment program (not shown).
e
Data on France are drawn from “Les Dépenses de Santé En 2015 – Édition 2016, Résultats Des Comptes de La Santé,” Panamoras (Ministère des Solidarités
et de la Santé, Direction de la recherche, des études, de l’évaluation et des statistiques, 2016), http://drees.solidarites-sante.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/cns2016.pdf; “Les
Établissements de Santé,” Panamoras de La DREES Santé (Ministère des Solidarités et de la Santé, Direction de la recherche, des études, de l’évaluation et des
statistiques, 2016), http://drees.solidarites-sante.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/pano-etab-sante-2016.pdf.; WHO, “Mental Health Atlas.”
f
Data on the United States are drawn from: Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, “Mental Health, United States,
2010.” (Rockville, MD: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Substance Abuse and Mental Heal th Services Administration, 2012),
https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/MHUS2010/MHUS2010/MHUS-2010.pdf; Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, “National Expenditures for Mental Health Services & Substance Abuse Treatment, 1986-2009,” HHS Publication No. SMA-13-4740. (Rockville, MD 20857: U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 2013), https://store.samhsa.gov/shin/content/SMA134740/SMA13-4740.pdf; “Health, United States, 2016, With Chartbook on Long-Term Trends in Health” (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Health Statistics, May 2017), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus16.pdf; (Note also that
these documents yielded a di↵erent value for the mental health budget than WHO, “Mental Health Atlas.”)
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Table 2: Role of the public sector in French and American mental health care

Figure 12: Supply and utilization of psychiatric services in France, 2014
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services and these public or not-for-profit medical-social services varies, partly because of
the di↵erences in their client populations,25 and partly because of the competition between
them.26 Chapter 5 will discuss these conflicts in more detail, when it reviews the political
development of disability insurance in France.27
Still, sectorization is the primary provider of mental health care. To understand why
public services are so prominent in French mental health care, it is critical to understand
the financial infrastructure that incentivizes them. French health insurance funds (managed
by the Caisse Nationale de l’Assurance Maladie, or CNAM) entitle all residents to a basket
of pre-approved health care services, including psychiatric services. The funds are mostly
financed by employer and employee payroll taxes (64 percent), but other revenues also play
a significant role.28 Services rendered at public institutions require an up-front payment of
20 euro, while private providers require more (at least 25 euro). This di↵erence is even more
exaggerated in mental health care services: 15 euro for public providers and at least 39.70
euro for private providers.29 However, CNAM reimburses 70 percent of public sector fees and
30 percent of the established (conventionné) private sector fees. Beneficiaries with chronic
conditions (a↵ections de longue durée, or ALD), including psychiatric conditions, qualify
for full reimbursement of the established fees.30 Together, these financial arrangements
incentivize public psychiatric care and reduce out-of-pocket costs for consumers of their
services.
In terms of health care outcomes, sectorization helps to promote high access to mental
25

Psychiatric services care for more people with mental illnesses than medical-social services. In the latter,
the proportion of adults with mental health related disabilities is less than a third, see Table 5.3 in Chevreul
et al., “France: Health System Review.”
26
For example, both the sectors and medical-social services provide housing.
27
See section 5.3.1, especially.
28
A national earmarked income tax (16 percent); taxes levied on tobacco and alcohol, the pharmaceutical
industry, and voluntary health insurance companies (12 percent); state subsidies (2 percent); and transfers
from other branches of Social Security (6 percent) make up the rest of the financing.
Mossialos, Djordjevic, and Osborn, “International Profiles of Health Care Systems.”
29
Fees were recently raised, see Agence France-Presse, “Sécurité Sociale:
Le Forfait Hospitalier va Augmenter de 18 à 20 Euros En 2018,” 20 Minutes, September 28, 2017,
https://www.20minutes.fr/economie/2141087-20170928-securite-sociale-forfait-hospitalier-va-augmenter-1820-euros-2018; Service-Public.Fr, “Remboursement d’une Consultation Médicale,” Service-Public.Fr, June
4, 2018, https://www.service-public.fr/particuliers/vosdroits/F1069.
30
Service-Public.Fr, “Ticket Modérateur, Forfait et Franchises (Sécurité Sociale),” Service-Public.Fr, May
1, 2017, https://www.service-public.fr/particuliers/vosdroits/F165.
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health care in France. The utilization of psychiatric services there is higher than in many
of its peer societies, including Great Britain and Denmark.31 But even within France,
mental health care is considered more accessible than other forms of health care. The
major government agency for health statistics (Direction de la recherché, des etudes, de
l’évaluation et des statistiques, or DREES) rates access to psychiatrists higher than access
to pediatricians. In urban areas, psychiatrists are more accessible than ophthalmologists
and gynecologists.32 Considering that these other specialties are less stigmatized than
mental health care, these findings challenge the notion that taboo alone hinders access to
psychiatry.
Finally, the prominence of sectorization has made public psychiatry a relatively attractive area for prospective workers. Young psychiatrists entering the public sector will
earn just as much as other public sector physician specialists, while those that enter the
private sector will earn just 60 percent of what their peers in other disciplines earn.33
Moreover, public psychiatrists may top up their income by providing private services on
the side, though traditionally, the largest share chooses to work exclusively for the government.34 As a result, psychiatrists are well represented in the public sector. Consider
that only 33 percent of surgeons and 17 percent of radiologists work in public hospitals –
in psychiatry, this number is upwards of 40 percent.35 The sectorization policy’s emphasis
31
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32
Laura Castell and Céline Dennevault, “Qualité et Accès Aux Soins: Que Pensent Les Français de Leurs
Médecins,” Études et Résultats: (Direction de la recherche, des études, de l’évaluation et des statistiques
(DREES), October 2017), http://drees.solidarites-sante.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/er 1035.pdf, Graphique 3.
33
Salaries of public sector physicians (including psychiatrists) average 57,600 euro annually. Salaries of
private psychiatrists are higher (84,470 euro annually), but still well below the average earnings of other
private sector physicians (133,460 euro annually).
Castell and Dennevault, “Qualité et Accès Aux Soins: Que Pensent Les Français de Leurs Médecins,” 74;
“Portrait Des Professionnels de Santé – Édition 2016” (Direction de la recherche, des études, de l’évaluation et
des statistiques (DREES), 2016), http://drees.solidarites-sante.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/gfs-2016 mel 301117.pdf,
60
34
This, despite the fact that they charge high rates for their talk therapy services.
“Portrait Des Professionnels de Santé – Édition 2016,” 61
35
Edouard Couty, “Mission et Organisation de La Santé Mentale et de La Psychiatrie: Rapport
Présenté à Madame Roselyne Bachelot-Narquin, Ministre de La Santé et Des Sports” (Ministère
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77; Daniel Sicart, “Les Médecins Au 1er Janvier 2013,” Document de travail, Série Statistiques (Direction de
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on multi-disciplinary care, moreover, means that non-physicians, such as psychiatric nurses
and clinical assistants, are more likely to find employment in the public sector than in the
private sector, too.
3.2.1.2

The American system

Chapter 6 will contrast the growth of sectorized public psychiatry in France with the reduction of public sector psychiatry in the United States, with special attention to the
decline of public mental hospitals and the failed expansion of public Community Mental
Health Centers (CMHCs). The supply of public mental hospitals in America once exceeded
that of France, peaking at just over 300 state and county mental hospitals in mid-1950s.36
Only 241 of these hospitals still exist today – despite massive population growth between
these years.37 As Fisher and colleagues point out, between 1972 and 1990 (the heyday of
deinstitutionalization), the number of state and county psychiatric beds declined by 70 percent.38 Moreover, the American deinstitutionalization movement attempted its own version
of French sectorization by building a network of 1,200 CMHCs that would provide public and not-for-profit outpatient care services. Only a fraction of these centers, however,
were built and sustained. Today, the majority of psychiatric inpatient care is provided in
other settings, such as general hospitals (N=1,319), private psychiatric hospitals (N=258),
military hospitals (N= 143), and correctional facilities (about half provide 24 hour mental
health care).39 The latter is often a last resort that compensates for the lack of chronic
psychiatric care capacity in the general health system. Private, for profit clinics provide the
vast majority (70 percent) of outpatient care.40
sante.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/seriestat179.pdf.
36
William H. Fisher, Je↵rey L. Geller, and John A. Pandiani, “The Changing Role Of The State Psychiatric
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Compared to France, financial arrangements in America do little to incentivize the
development of public psychiatric services. None of the health system’s core insurers pay
for much mental health care. First is Medicare, the public insurance for the aged and
the disabled.41 Although this program only covers about 16 percent of the population,
it plays a large role in the determination of market prices and care standards. Its poor
reimbursement of psychiatric services, therefore, sets a low standard for other payers.42
Next are private health insurers, which cover about two-thirds of the population. Until
the recent (and fragile) passage of the A↵ordable Care Act in 2010, no minimum basket of
benefits was required of these private insurers.43 The new law requires some new health
plans to cover mental health services at “parity” (at the same rate as other specialty health
care services), but regulations concerning this provision are difficult to implement at the
state level.44 Third is Medicaid, a joint state-federal public insurance program financed
by general taxes. As an insurance program for the poor and disabled, it takes on much of
the mental health burden.45 Over a quarter of mental health spending is attributed to this
41
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program. Still, federal law restricts Medicaid payments for services provided in “institutions
for mental disease” (IMDs, generally defined as having more than 16 psychiatric beds) to
adults age 21-64.46 Finally, other social insurers and discretionary funds fail to compensate
for the deficiencies of mental health care coverage in the health system. In addition to
explaining the political development of these health insurance exclusions, Chapter 6 also
will discuss how the disability insurance program (Social Security Insurance) discourages
public inpatient psychiatry by denying benefits to individuals living in public insitutions
and how the block-grant structure of the CMHC program has prevented its expansion.
As a result, access outcomes in the United States also di↵er from those of France.
The lack of public provision in the American mental health system results in poor access
to care. Most outpatient visits (57 percent) only involve the dispensing of medications, not
therapeutic or rehabilitative services.47 Moreover, the limitations of public mental health
financing mean that private psychiatry is not only dominant in America, but also that its
accessibility is limited to the most a✏uent of patients: those who can a↵ord to pay the
full cost of these services. Out of pocket payments for mental health services are quite
high: about 11 percent of total spending.48 Less a✏uent Americans are more likely to find
themselves in prisons or homeless shelters than in psychiatric hospitals or clinics: psychiatric
adults with substance use disorder.
Julia Zur, MaryBeth Musumeci, and Rachel Garfield, “Medicaid’s Role in Financing Behavioral Health Services for Low-Income Individuals” (Kaiser Family Foundaiton, June 29,
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conditions a↵ect about half of incarcerated individuals and about a quarter of chronically
homeless individuals.49 As a result, only about one-third of Americans with mental health
problems receive treatment.50
In contrast to France’s large public psychiatric workforce, the American psychiatric
workforce has few incentives to expand. In most states, the percentage of the state population facing a high shortage of mental health professionals is over 20 percent. The number of
psychiatrists is relatively low in America (14.4 per 100,000 persons, compared to about 23
in France). Rates of advanced practice psychiatric nurses are even lower (3.3 per 100,000).
Rates of psychologists, counselors, and clinically trained social workers are higher (30.9,
54.4, and 82 per 100,000, respectively), but shortages remain.51 Those few practitioners
who do provide mental health care, however, rely heavily on private payments. Since negotiated rates are low, only half of psychiatrists accept Medicare and private insurance,
compared to nearly all (86 – 89 percent) physicians in other specialties.52 Medicaid payments for psychiatric care are among the lowest in the U.S. health system. so provider
acceptance rates are very low as well (43 percent for psychiatrists, versus 73 percent for
physicians in other specialties).53
3.2.2. Similar possibilities
An observer of early twentieth century French and American psychiatry would not have
predicted the extreme di↵erences that we see today. Public psychiatry faced similar en49
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abling and constraining possibilities in the two countries. In both countries, sub-national
authorities (departments in France, states in America) managed the system of state-owned
asylums. From a legal perspective, the French system appeared more centralized, thanks to
an 1838 law that made it compulsory for every department to provide an asylum54 —but
scholars debate the extent to which the law was enforced.55 That the requisite construction
of asylums did not begin in earnest until the 1850s (the commencement the Second Empire)
is grounds for the debate.56 The American constitution’s Tenth Amendment left issues of
health under the jurisdiction of state governments.57 These similar political economies had
two important implications: first, that mental health was by and large a public service, with
little expectation of developing private sector correlates;58 and second, that the significant
amount of local control initially kept the central authorities estranged from this policy area.
While public practice dominated psychiatry in both countries, private practice dominated other health care services. Private sector doctors criticized any e↵ort to expand public
ownership of medical care. They comprised the majority of the American Medical Association (AMA), as well as the majority of the syndicates affiliated with the Confédération
des Syndicats Médicaux Français (CSMF). Indeed, the preferences of the major medical
organizations reflected the largely privatized nature of general health care. As Starr has
documented, the AMA reliably mobilized against attempts to “socialize” American medicine
since the group’s founding in 1847.59 Over the past century, its political activities have included convincing President Franklin Roosevelt to exclude health insurance from his Social
54
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Hôpitaux Psychiatriques de l’Après-Guerre Aux Années 1970,” 25; Ben Ansell and Johannes Lindvall, “Mental Asylum History 1800 - 1939, England, France, Sweden, USA, Australia, Japan, Germany, Spain, Canada,
Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Ireland, Belgium, Austria, Switzerland, Italy, Finland and New Zealand.”
(Draft text, n.d)., accessed May 1, 2017.
55
Jan Ellen Goldstein, Console and Classify: The French Psychiatric Profession in the Nineteenth Century
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001); Prestwich in Roy Porter and David Wright, The Confinement
of the Insane: International Perspectives, 1800-1965, Reprint (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2011); Edward Shorter, A History of Psychiatry: From the Era of the Asylum to the Age
of Prozac (New York: Wiley, 1997).
56
Henckes, “Le Nouveau Monde de La Psychiatrie Française: Les Psychiatres, l’État et La Réforme Des
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Security legislation in 1935, launching the country’s most expensive lobbying campaign in
history against President Harry Truman’s universal insurance plan in the late 1940s, derailing President Bill Clinton’s health care plan in the early 1990s, and disrupting President
Barack Obama’s health legislation two decades later.
In France, the CSMF codified the same commitments into its by-laws. Founded
in 1928 as an attempt to formally unify two medical associations, the group adopted a
“charter” (charte) pledging its commitment to “liberal medicine,” defined according to
several key principles: (1) “respect absolu du secret professionnel ” (or absolute respect for
patient privacy); (2) “libre choix du médecin par le malade” (free choice of provider) ;
and critically, (3) entente directe entre le médecin et le malade (ou sa famille) suivant les
conditions de la pratique ordinaire.60 This last condition essentially establishes a strong
preference for direct price-setting between patients and providers, and has sustained the
group’s preference for fee-for-service payments to the present day. In both cases, the strong
orientation of practitioners toward market-based medical care would come to threaten the
sustainability of a largely state-owned mental health service.
Despite the opposition of the private medical establishment, public authorities began to take an interest in expanding public mental health care in both countries after the
Second World War.Both French and American policy-makers had similar visions for public
mental health: outpatient clinics would help to extend the continuum of care o↵ered by the
public hospitals, whose custodial orientation had filled them with aging patients, most of
whom were female, and almost all of them, White.61 That these patients deserved better
care was uncontroversial. Catchment areas of similar sizes would establish the territorial
60
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boundaries of each clinic.62 Termed “sectors” in France and “community mental health
centers” in America, the concept was popularized through the e↵orts of international organs and networks such as the World Health Organization. Attending the regular meetings
of the WHO’s international gatherings of experts in the 1950s and 1960s were a number of
American and French participants, including Charles Menninger, Robert Felix, and Paul
Sivadon – figures who, the following chapters will show, became major players in the development of mental health policy in their countries. The Committee not only invited these
leaders to meet in Geneva, but it also provided funds for participants to visit the psychiatric
hospitals and clinics of other countries. Sivadon toured America through these grants, as
did Maurice Despinoy, whose enthusiasm about the Anglo-American concept of the “day
hospital” led to its integration into the French sectorization policy.63 It is hard to imagine a
more obvious opportunity for policy di↵usion. Yet any ideational cross-pollination at these
meetings evidently did not result in their homologous maturation in the two countries, as
Part II will show.
3.2.3. A note on sources and their interpretation
The next section of this study relies on extensive historical material to demonstrate why
France and the United States pursued di↵erent paths of psychiatric deinstitutionalization,
even though the two countries shared these similar initial conditions. It is important, then,
to first say a word about the history of psychiatry, which I have consulted at length in order
to better understand the cases. The historiography of this area often is split into two camps.
Histories that lean Whiggish, on the one hand, have tended to emphasize the idealistic
intentions of mental health policy leaders in shaping its development.64 Diverse critical
histories, on the other hand, emphasize the social control functions of the mental institution,
and especially, its superintendents.65 This text attempts to avoid casting judgment on the
62
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intentions of individual actors. Instead, it identifies how their political and institutional
environment shaped these intentions. Doing so shifts attention away from actors’ moral
and therapeutic inclinations and toward their rational economic preferences.
The shift also leaves me with the task of recounting the under-studied political,
administrative, and institutional history of psychiatry in France and America. To do so,
the following chapters draw on many under-utilized and under-analyzed primary sources.
Prior to this study, many of the sources produced by professional and, especially, labor
organizations (such as trade press, newsletters, and memoirs written by their leaders) had
not received very much academic scrutiny.66 In addition, extensive archival research in the
two cases’ national and local archives bring a wealth of reports, administrative memoranda,
and meeting minutes to scholarly attention. These are supplemented by research conducted
at national and industry-specific libraries in order to obtain and study out-of-print secondary
sources. Readers can assess my interpretations of these sources by consulting the detailed
bibliographic information, and often the fully quoted material, in the footnotes, figures, and
appendices.
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Part II

The Political Development of
Mental Health in France and
America
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Because of the profession’s private sector tilt, the [American Psychiatric] Association is, in some senses, the “enemy.”
- Ed Wolf, AFSCME strategist67

Attempting to keep a clear head, we decided to join the protest... [and] resume
the strike.
- Jean Ayme, former president of the Syndicat, remembering May 196868
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68
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Chapter 4

Public Alienists in France and
America, 1800-1950

Psychiatrists in the nineteenth century France and America shared much in common. In
both countries, alienists (aliénistes) – a term for those who managed asylums and cared
for their patients – were products of the large state-building enterprises of their respective
post-Revolutionary periods. Not only did the new public institution of the asylum provide
a secure income for these sons of the emerging petite bourgeoisie, but being an alienist also
o↵ered an identity rooted in science, rationality, and impartiality – core values of newly
enlightened, Republican governments. Both the Association of Medical Superintendents
for American Institutions for the Insane (hereafter, the Superintendents) and the Société
Médico-Psychologique (SMP) emphasized the complementarity of scientific thought and
public service, often to the exclusion of private, “quack” physicians of the mind.1
Yet by the tumultuous nineteenth century’s close, the identities of these two organizations had diverged. This chapter begins by tracing the early emergence of statist alienism
and that of its later competitor, private and academic neurology, in both countries. It then
1
Other common abbreviations for the Association of Medical Superintendents for American Institutions
for the Insane include AMSAII and the Superintendents’ Association, and are used here sporadically.
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turns to the late nineteeth century organizational decisions that set the stage for the digressions of French and American deinstitutionalization in the twentieth century. As Table 3 on
page 84 summarizes, the American Superintendents opted to align themselves with their private sector competitors by inviting them to become members, but public alienists in France
isolated themselves further from the private sector by forging a more exclusive association
(the Association amicale des médecins des établissements publics d’aliénés). Although neither of these choices could have been predicted earlier, the events of the early twentieth
century quickly reinforced them, as the last part of the chapter shows. Despite their similar
origins, the organizational o↵spring of the Superintendents and the SMP – the American
Psychiatric Association and the Syndicat des médecins des hôpitaux psychiatriques – could
not look more di↵erent. The APA eventually came to represent more private psychiatrists
than public hospital superintendents, while the Syndicat became more committed to the
public sector than ever before. Public mental health workers (and therefore services) would
obtain significantly more support for their cause from the Syndicat than from the APA in
subsequent decades. This in turn explains why French deinstitutionalization expanded the
supply of public mental health services while American deinstitutionalization reduced it.
The analytic emphasis of this chapter thus departs from existing accounts of the
psychiatric profession in several ways. Highlighting the importance of the public sector
and its management to nineteenth century alienists recasts their professional conflicts with
neurologists, office-based practitioners, and academic researchers as economic concerns, not
merely professional ones. Moreover, the cleavages between their sectoral alignments may not
have appeared to be the center of the controversy at the time, but they were fundamental
to how di↵erent types of psychiatrists perceived themselves and their interests. Finally,
placing their organizations at the center of the analysis reveals how critical the design of
political representation was to the overall development of their professions, from the early
twentieth century until today.
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4.1. Emergence
For much of the 19th century, psychiatrists in both the United States and France were
closely tied to the public sector. Perhaps this is most evident in their shared enthusiasm for
“moral treatment,” a form of psychiatric therapy that sought to humanize the patient by
rejecting the chains, violence, or otherwise neglect that had characterized the treatment of
the mentally ill in the past. Although it was first developed by the Parisian alienist Philippe
Pinel, the approach soon became synonymous with populist, revolutionary medicine on both
sides of the Atlantic.2 This orientation helped to cement the dependence of moral treatment
(and therefore alienists) on state sponsorship, albeit in di↵erent ways:
In France, clashes between clerics and alienists over moral treatment resulted in different clinical expressions of the method. Religious hospitals emphasized the method’s
spiritual elements, while public asylums emphasized its material dimensions. The association between French alienists, science, and the state was formalized in 1838, when a powerful
segment of the July Monarchy’s (1830-1848) political elite, the Doctrinaires, passed a law
requiring that every department designate an asylum for the care of the insane (Loi du 30
juin 1838 ).3 Critical of clerical influence on political, social, and economic a↵airs, the Doctrinaires were eager to find ways to weaken all Church institutions, including its hospitals.
They anticipated the new departmental asylums to compete with religious hospitals, and
e↵ectively doubled the number of government-employed alienists.4 Finding favor among
the Doctrinaires,5 the proliferating alienists formed their first professional association a few
2
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years later, the Société Médico-Psychologique (SMP), and aligned it firmly with the public
sector.6
Meanwhile, the lack of Church welfare infrastructure in the United States prompted
American alienists to turn to government for help constructing moral asylums.7 Spearheaded by Dr. Thomas Kirkbride of the Pennsylvania Hospital for the Insane, a detailed
architectural plan laid out requirements of these massive institutions: a lot of at least 100
acres (to enhance both the security and pleasure of patients), brick or stone building materials (for fire safety), and large windows (for sunlight and “an abundance of pure air”).8 The
Superintendents’ Association was formed in 1844 in part to help lobby for the plan.9 By
1851 the organization had passed 26 resolutions supporting the initiative. Highly successful
at the state level, the plan led to the construction of 77 new asylums between 1860 and
1890.10 The Superintendents almost won a national campaign, too. The Bill for the Benefit of the Indigent Insane (championed by reformer Dorothea Dix) was a landmark e↵ort
proposing that the federal government provide land for the construction and maintenance
of insane asylums 11 The bill passed both houses of Congress, but was ultimately vetoed by
6

The limited rights of association in post-Revolutionary France obstructed the development of this group.
Although discussions of the SMP’s founding began as early as 1843, the socio-political turmoil of the 1848
revolution delayed its full implementation. The group dates its formal establishment to 1852, at the onset
of the Second Empire (1852-1870), after the dust had settled from the brief, interim Second Republic (18481852).
Goldstein, Console and Classify, 339, 34.
7
Rothman observes how that the lack of military and clerical infrastructure (army hospitals, monastaries,
etc) in America forced the superintendents to “start from scratch.”
Rothman, The Discovery of the Asylum, 135-6.
8
See McGovern: 1985, especially chapter 5, for a more detailed discussion on the architectural implications
of moral treatment.
9
Kirkbride, a founding member, had not yet developed the plan in full, but his first task was to do so.
10
Constance M. McGovern, Masters of Madness: Social Origins of the American Psychiatric Profession
(Hanover [N.H.]: Published for University of Vermont by University Press of New England, 1985), 151.
11
The resolutions passed in support of the Dix and her campaign (also at their 1851 meeting) are evidence
of the Superintendents’ public sector preferences:
”Resolved, That this Association fully appreciates the benevolent motives, the self sacrificing labours,
and the untiring perseverance of Miss D.L. Dix, in her e↵orts to ameliorate the condition of the Insane of
our country, and that we deeply regret the failure during the last and previous Sessions of Congress, of her
application to that body for an appropriation of a portion of the Public Lands, for the benefit of the indigent
insane on the several States.
”Resolved, That we do now, as we have heretofore done, most cordially recommend the passage of this
act by Congress, believing as we do, that the measure would be alike creditable to the benevolent character
of our government and people, and useful to the unfortunate recipients of the bounty.
”Resolved, That Miss Dix, be encouraged by our advice and sympathy, to continue to her application in
behalf of this object until her e↵orts are crowned with success, and the Secretary be requested to furnish
her with a copy of this resolutions.”
Association of Medical Superintendents of American Institutions for the Insane, “Proceedings of the Sixth
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President Franklin Pierce in 1854.12
As the two governments employed more alienists, so too did alienists depend more
on government. Indeed, the growth of the modern state apparatus and its links to the
care of the insane in this period has not gone unnoticed. The state attempt to maintain
social order in otherwise volatile times is an important area of historiographical agreement,
particularly among scholars who employ critical and Foucauldian lenses. Goldstein has
observed how the need for surveillance and control motivated the Doctrinaires to pass the
1838 law. Rothman argues that American e↵orts to institutionalize the insane were part
of a larger trend in the turbulent Jacksonian period (roughly 1825-1848) to institutionalize
deviant populations, including prisoners, the poor, orphans, and delinquents.13 Related
arguments have been redounded by the likes of Castel, Grob, Scull, and of course, Foucault
himself.14
Psychiatrists’ association with government institutions strengthened their commitment to the state, but other factors helped, too. As in France, American psychiatrists
eventually distanced themselves from spiritualism, favoring a kind of scientific rationalism
that cohered well with the promise of a rational, bureaucratic state, free of perceptions
of ine↵ective care or political interference.15 In addition, statistical analysis became an
Annual Meeting of Medical Superintendents of American Institutions for the Insane,” Journal of Insanity 8
(1851): 82–93, 90.
12
This set a longer-term precedent for federal non-participation in social welfare more broadly – one that
would not be broken until the emergency New Deal legislation in 1935. In the area of mental health, the
precedent held for nearly a century, until the passage of the 1946 National Mental Health Act.
13
Rothman, The Discovery of the Asylum, xiii-xviii.
14
Scull, Decarceration. Gerald N. Grob, Mental Illness and American Society, 1875-1940 (Princeton, N.J:
Princeton University Press, 1983); Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in
the Age of Reason, Vintage Books Ed., Nov. 1988 (New York: Random House, 1988); Robert Castel, The
Regulation of Madness: The Origins of Incarceration in France (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1988).
15
As in France, spiritualist approaches threatened the utility of the American psychiatric profession, even
if the promoters of this approach lacked the prominent institutional base that the clerical asylums across the
Atlantic o↵ered. Unlike France, however, there seems to have been a much greater emphasis on maintaining a
non-partisan image. A resolution passed in 1848 affirmed its nonpartisanship by stating “That any attempt,
in any part of this country, to select such [medical superintendents] through political bias, be deprecated by
this Association as a dangers departure from the sound rule which should govern every appointing power,
of seeking the best men irrespective of every other consideration.”
Association of Medical Superintendents of American Institutions for the Insane, Propositions and Resolutions of the Association of Medical Superintendents of American Institutions for the Insane (Philadelphia: Collins Printer, 1876), https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=hvd.32044009558859;view=1up;seq=9,
23; For a discussion of how the Superintendents treated spiritualism, see McGovern McGovern, Masters of
Madness, 143-44.
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important tool for both groups, for it helped to establish both the profession’s intellectual
abilities as well as its general usefulness to public administration. At its founding, the Superintendents actively pursued pioneer research e↵orts in this area – so much so that the
organization’s first few meetings were devoted almost entirely to the subject of “curability
statistics” (the metric by which institutions estimated their success).16 When the founder
of the SMP noted that its success “depended on the approval of the government,” he made
the publication of “statistical research conducted according to a uniform plan” an organizational priority.17 The use of such novel tools of governance furthered alienists’ identities
as scientific bureaucrats.18
4.1.1. Membership in the alienists’ organizations compared
Despite these similar political and intellectual affinities, the two organizations are not truly
comparable until the late 1800s, when the laws of association were finally relaxed in France,
permitting the SMP to organize more openly. For most of the nineteenth century, professional associations in France were all but illegal. The Le Chapelier Law of 1791, a product
of the first phase of the French Revolution (1789-1799), forbade guilds and outlawed the
right to strike, in the interest of promoting free enterprise and banishing the Ancien Régime
practice of corporate favoritism.19 But even beyond guilds, the Napoleonic Code (e↵ective
as of 1804) stipulated government surveillance of any association with more than twenty
members.20 It was not until the latter part of the century that these rules were relaxed, first
with the 1864 Loi Ollivier, which de-criminalized association, and the 1884 Loi WaldeckRousseau, which authorized working-class unionization. Physician unionization was finally
16

For a more thorough discussion of the value of curability statistics to the self-image of the superintendents, see McGovern, Masters of Madness, 3-10.
17
Baillarger cited in Ian Robert Dowbiggin, Inheriting Madness: Professionalization and Psychiatric
Knowledge in Nineteenth-Century France, Medicine and Society 4 (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1991), 78.
18
To be sure, both Dowbiggin and Goldstein emphasize that how French psychiatry’s scientism had its
roots in philosophical positivism (and the rejection of the alternative philosophies that were prominent in
France at the time). Less attention has been paid to these deeper intellectual undercurrents in histories of
American psychiatry, but it would be difficult to argue that the work presented in the American Journal of
Insanity is not implicitly informed by a similar scientific paradigm.
Goldstein, Console and Classify; Dowbiggin, Inheriting Madness.
19
For a discussion of how medical groups benefit from this kind of favoritism prior to the Revolution, and
its legacy on nineteenth century politics, see Goldstein, Console and Classify, especially chapter 1.
20
Goldstein, Console and Classify, 339.
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permitted via a more comprehensive law passed in 1892.21 Only then was the SMP able to
host regular, public meetings, and form an organization more similar to the one discussed so
frequently in letters and reports from their peers abroad.22 Thus, in 1878, the SMP obtained
formal approval from the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce to create the Congrès des
médecins aliénistes et neurologistes de France et des pays de langue française (or Conference
of French and Francophone Alienists and Neurologists),23 an organization that met annually
to discuss issues of importance to both the scientific and administrative dimensions of the
profession.24
Article 3 of the 1878 French decree specified that members of the Congrès include
the SMP (its founders), as well as alienists and asylum directors, and “all those interested
in questions related to mental alienation.”25 The last clause was a preventive measure
against any accusation of corporatism (rights of association, after all, had only just begun
to liberalize), and allowed for the inclusion of some neurologists.26 Nevertheless, these
21

Wilsford, Doctors and the State, 104.
Even a casual look at the cumulative index to SMP’s journal, the Annales Médico-Psychologiques,
during this period makes the frequency of contact between the two organizations clear. Leading figures from
the AMSAII (e.g., Dr. Isaac Ray) and innovative states, (e.g., Pennsyvlania, Massachusetts) even receive
their own entries. See Baillarger, Cerise, and Lunier, Annales Médico-Psychologiques: Table Générale et
Alphabétique 1843-1878. (Paris: Victor Masson et Fils, 1868), http://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.hw1wgn.
23
A speech cited later in this chapter (from the meeting in Nancy in 1896) identifies a conference first
established by alienists in 1890, and then later opened to neurologists. But I have not found any material
on the supposed alienists’ “Congrès des médecine mentale.” Instead I focus on the wealth of material
concerning the development of the Congrès des médecins aliénistes et neurologistes de France et des pays de
langue française. Note that, in any event, the latter precedes the former by over a decade.
Congrès des médecins aliénistes et neurologistes de France et des pays de langue française, “Septième
Session Tenue à Nancy Du 1er Au 5 Août 1896. Volume II: Comptes Rendus.,” 1897, BIU Santé,
http://www.biusante.parisdescartes.fr/histoire/medica/resultats/?p=25&cote=110817x1896x02&do=page,
7-8; For the official decree of the formation of this latter Congrès, see Thirion, Rapports Du Congrès
Internationale de Médecine Mentale Tenu à Paris Du 5 Au 10 Août 1878., 11 (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale,
1880), https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=nyp.33433011464751;view=1up;seq=13, 1.
24
Like their counterparts across the Atlantic who counted both Americans and Canadians amongst their
membership, the Congrès was also transnational. It often hosted conferences across borders, in cities that
included Paris, Geneva, and Brussels. The fact that the Congrès met in these cities, as well as in France’s
smaller capitals such as Bordeaux and Toulouse, is a sign of its preoccupation with provincial concerns.
Unlike its host organization, the SMP, this was not only a learned society, but also one attentive with
managerial and the everyday policy issues that concerned practitioners. Fox draws a similar conclusion
about the creation of conferences in other scientific fields.
Fox in Gerald L. Geison and Shelby Cullom Davis Center for Historical Studies, eds., Professions and the
French State, 1700-1900 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984), 92.
25
Thirion, Rapports Du Congrès Internationale de Médecine Mentale Tenu à Paris Du 5 Au 10 Août
1878, 3.
26
At its founding a few decades prior, the SMP insisted on multidisciplinarity to avoid trouble with the
authorities. Homogeneous professional groups smelled of corporatism, which was forbidden at the time.
Goldstein, Console and Classify, 342.
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conditions helped ensure that most members either supervised a public asylum, or served
as its chief medical officer. By 1895, the group was able to independently issue their own
by-laws, which explicitly described the group as “a conference of alienist physicians.”27
Alienists, of course, were the government supervisors of insane asylums.
Americans, more enthusiastic about associational life than the French, were even
more clear in their resolution “that the medical superintendents of the various incorporated
or other legally constituted institutions for the insane now existing on this continent... are
constituted members of the Association.”28 The term “medical superintendent” emphasized
both the public managerial and clinical responsibilities of its members.29 Although a few
physicians from the “other legally constituted” (i.e., non-state) institutions requested to
join the organization, McGovern finds that “only one ever served on a committee and
only three ever delivered a paper at annual meeting.”30 The unregulated nature of private
institutions threatened the Superintendents’ reliable and bureaucratic image.31 When Dr.
Robert Jarvis delivered a paper in 1860 on “The Proper Functions of Private Institutions or
Homes for the Insane,” one discussant, Dr. D.T. Brown, admitted that “there was a very
great prejudice, on the part of the gentlemen connected with large institutions, against
those of a private character.”32 Another, Dr. MacFarland, remarked, “there could be no
27

Congrès des médecins aliénistes et neurologistes de France et des pays de langue française, “Sixième
Session Tenue à Bordeaux Du 1er Au 7 Août 1895. Volume II: Comptes Rendus.,” 1896, BIU Santé,
http://www.biusante.parisdescartes.fr/histoire/medica/resultats/?p=14&cote=110817x1895x02&do=pagee,
xiii.
Article 1er. – Un Congrès de médecins aliénistes se réunit chaque année dans une des villes de France.
Peuvent y adhérer, non seulement les médecins français, mais aussi les médecins des pays de langue
française.
28
“Resolved, 1. That the medical superintendents of the various incorporated or other legally constituted
institutions for the insane now existing on this continent, or which may be commenced prior to the next
meeting, and all those who have heretofore been medical superintendents and members of this Association,
or who may be hereafter appointed to those stations, be and they hereby are constituted members of the
Association.
“Resolved, 2. That in future every regularly constituted institution for the insane on this continent may
have a representative in this Association, that as heretofore, this shall be the medical superintendent where
such officer exists; but in those institutions where there is a di↵erent organization, it may be either of the
regular medical officers how may find it most convenient to attend.”
Association of Medical Superintendents of American Institutions for the Insane, Propositions and Resolutions of the Association of Medical Superintendents of American Institutions for the Insane., 9.
29
McGovern notes that lay heads of asylums existed, but were few and far between.
McGovern, Masters of Madness, 89.
30
McGovern, Masters of Madness, 136-7.
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McGovern, Masters of Madness, 138.
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Brown in “Discussion of Dr. Jarvis Paper (Proceedings of the Fifteenth Annual Meeting of the Association of Medical Superintendents of American Institutions for the Insane),” Journal of Insanity 17–18 (1860),
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mistaking the drift of sentiment, on the part of the Association, as being clearly against
institution of strictly private character.”33 In short, the membership of the Superintendents
Association mirrored that of the Congrès.
4.1.2. Neurologists and the private sector alternative
The organizations shared a significant challenge, as well: the development of neurological
research and practice. Associated with private, office-based therapy for the upper classes,
neurologists emerged as the private sector competitors of public alienists, forcing both the
Superintendents and the Congrès to reconsider their political commitments to public institutions for the poor. Although the thrust of the neurological challenge centered on its
intellectual and therapeutic distinctiveness from psychiatry, neurologists’ sectoral preferences were equally consequential, if sometimes hidden in their rhetoric.
The specialty of neurology was born in France, where elite Parisian medical researchers such as Jean-Martin Charcot pioneered the study of “névroses,” or neuroses.34
The center of the discipline remained there until about the 1860s, after which it moved to
German and Swiss institutions. That shift, however, motivated the French government to
devote even more resources to the discipline, for the Franco-Prussian War “produced [sic.]
an almost universal conviction that France had declined militarily because she had ceded her
scientific hegemony to the Germans,” as Goldstein argues.35 The political premium placed
on neurological research only enhanced the discipline’s elitist, academic orientation.36
35; For the paper, see Edward Jarvis, “On the Proper Functions of Private Institutions or Homes for the
Insane (Read before the Association of Medical Superintendents of American Institutions for the Insane),”
Journal of Insanity 17–18 (1860): 19–31.
33
MacFarland in “Discussion of Dr. Jarvis Paper (Proceedings of the Fifteenth Annual Meeting of the
Association of Medical Superintendents of American Institutions for the Insane),” Journal of Insanity 17–18
(1860), 43.
34
I will use the terms neurosis, nervous diseases, and neurology interchangeably to refer to both the mild
psychiatric conditions diagnosed among the upper classes in both countries, as well as the research devoted
to these diseases and other somatic conditions of brain and the nervous system. These are distinguishable
from the diagnoses of insanity, psychosis, and other forms of social deviance more often associated with the
practice of institutional psychiatry among the lower classes (which I will refer to as such). While there is
considerable fluidity between these (no doubt contested and constructed) categories, this analysis focuses on
their main sectoral orientation (private practice). For discussions of the kinds of conditions encompassed by
neurology in the United States, see Grob, The Mad Among Us, 132, and in France, see Goldstein Goldstein,
Console and Classify, 333-7.
35
Goldstein, Console and Classify, 348; Barton, The History and Influence of the American Psychiatric
Association, 49.
36
Moreover, not much practical psychiatric training was available to elite young physicians. Although
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War and the neurological profession also were linked in America. An academic interest
in the e↵ects of Civil War gunshot wounds to the brain and nerve tissues soon helped
generate a following among postbellum researchers in the United States. Barton documents
that, “during the four years of war, 2,600 cases of insanity were identified.”37 The uptick in
prevalence quickly led to the development of university activity in this area. As in France,
neurological research and practice in the United States was concentrated outside of asylums,
especially in New York City, the equivalent of Paris in American medical education at the
time.38 That the discipline had European roots and rejected the “pietistic Protestantism”
of moral treatment in the asylums furthered the elitism of its researchers.39
Like most cutting-edge medical research, the actual practice of neurology primarily
benefited the upper classes. Nervous diseases in both countries were constructed as mild
conditions, unthreatening to the social order and permissible among the upper classes.40
New York neurologists profited from the increasing a✏uence of the city’s residents, and
began to open offices to treat their ailments privately. In France, the treatment of mild
névroses took place in maisons de santé – lay private institutions where aristocratic families interned their mentally ill relatives.41 The 1838 law had enshrined their separate status
and protected the maisons in order to avoid handing “a virtual monopoly over a private
market” over to the alienists.42 Behind the new discipline’s scientific and clinical advancethe 1838 French law stipulated that each public asylum have a medical intern, French medical schools,
known for their conservatism, did not teach the subject. Any student interested in psychiatry would enroll
in enseignement libre (independent instruction) outside of the faculties, which kept “an elite of highly
motivated students apprised of new developments in medical science” – in the mind sciences, this was
inevitably concentrated on neurology.
Goldstein, Console and Classify, 346, translation hers.
37
Barton, The History and Influence of the American Psychiatric Association, 54-55.
38
McGovern, Masters of Madness, 158; Grob, The Mad Among Us, 50-51
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Grob, The Mad Among Us, 132; Barton, The History and Influence of the American Psychiatric Association, 187.
40
This is not to say that nervous conditions were not diagnosed amongst the lower class in France. Goldstein cites a study by Briquet, published in 1859, that found that “popular classes were more susceptible to
hysteria than their betters.” For her discussion of how this study helped to supply more clientele to asylums,
but after a series of intellectual battles, ultimately failed to associate the study and practice of neurology
with the public sector.
Goldstein, Console and Classify, 333-336.
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Goldstein, Console and Classify, 338.
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Goldstein (2001) finds that competition from clerical asylums was far more significant than competition
from lay maisons de santé in the legislative debates of 1838. Still, readers who are skeptical of France’s long
commitment to private practice medicine can look to the rhetoric surrounding these clinics for evidence of the
liberal and individualist tradition. In her analysis, Goldstein writes, “Certain deputies, quick to discern this
latter implication, rallied to the defense of economic freedom. As Minister of the Interior Montalivet later
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ments, therefore, were important material di↵erences in its clientele and social purpose, as
compared to alienists’ poor patients and unscientific, custodial responsibilities.43
Most sensitive to these di↵erences were the alienists. The 1894 address of neurologist S. Weir Mitchell at the 50th annual meeting of the Superintendents’ Association is
an infamous example.44 His scathing critique that “asylum life is deadly to the insane”
cut deep into the organization’s self-image, and the conclusion that “your hospitals are
not our hospitals; your ways are not our ways” widened the chasm between the two disciplines.45 Similar tensions developed in France.46 In a speech delivered to the Congrès only
two years after Dr. Weir Mitchell’s to the Superintendents, M. Stéhelin, a departmental
prefect, discussed his take on whether the joint organization of alienists (those responsible
summarized their argument: “It was said in the Chamber of Deputies, ’You are attacking private industry.
There are [mixed] maisons de santé already formed which have lunatics. You will deprive them of their means
of existence; the madman is an object of speculation like any other commodity.’ In fact, the provision was
eventually defeated - not by the deputies but by the peers, and not on laissez-faire economic grounds but as
violating the so-called ’liberty of families.’ A family, it was contended, had the right safeguard its reputation
and to conceal the shameful secret of the insanity of one of its members; and this could be accomplished only
by placing that person in an institution of ambiguous definition rather than in an institution universally
recognized as a madhouse... The legislators thus evinced some concern to protect the private, profit-making
sector from excessive state regulation. And in this regard, the peers successfully resisted the pressure exerted
by the alliance of the government and the psychiatrists.”
Goldstein, Console and Classify, 300-301
43
McGovern makes a similar argument about the way in which the intellectual underpinnings of neurological research and practice led to the rejection of public institutional psychiatry in America:
“The neurologists’ concern with the brain and central nervous system led them to the conclusion insanity
was rooted in anatomy, not society, and that the asylum superintendent’s attempt to reform behavior
was merely treating symptoms, not causes. Believing that superintendents paid little attention to the
new scientific principles of neurology, and rejecting the psychiatrists’ methods and theories, neurologists
depicted institutionalization as unnecessary, if not harmful, and attacked the superintendents as ’autocrats,’
or ’monarch[s]’ reigning over the ’great palace’ of ’pills,’ mu↵s,’ and ’and cu↵s’ and their association as a a
’national confederation’ of ’isolated despotisms.”’
McGovern, Masters of Madness, 158.
44
Scholars of virtually every academic persuasion and orientation – from critical (Rothman, Conscience
and Convenience, 295-297) to Whiggish (Grob, From Asylum to Community, 61) to feminist (Lunbeck, The
Psychiatric Persuasion, 27) to biographical (Barton, The History and Influence of the American Psychiatric
Association, 46) – have discussed the importance of Weir Mitchell’s speech to the history of American
psychiatry.
Weir Mitchell, “Address before the Fiftieth Annual Meeting of the American Medico-Psychological Association, Held in Philadelphia, May 16th, 1894.”
45
The Superintendents responded by noting, meekly, that that their profession served an important societal
function. In the words of one member, Walter Channing, the medical superintendent’s “real specialty is
insane-hospital management. . . giving rest and succor to as many of a wretched and neglected as a niggardly
and ignorant public will allow.”
Quoted in Rothman, The Discovery of the Asylum, 297.
46
To be sure, the line between neurology and psychiatry was blurrier in France than in America, but I do
think that there were general tendencies with which we can associate each type of practice.
See Henckes, “Le Nouveau Monde de La Psychiatrie Française: Les Psychiatres, l’État et La Réforme Des
Hôpitaux Psychiatriques de l’Après-Guerre Aux Années 1970,” 25-26.
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for “maladies mentales,” or mental illnesses) and neurologists (those responsible for “maladies nerveuses,” or nervous conditions) was worthwhile: “Dividing the army of workers
concerned with nervous conditions and mental illnesses is completely artificial,” he said,
for “They go hand-in-hand. They have the same objectives, the same tendencies, the same
methods, the same goal. They should not be separated.”47 This plea was not merely the
diplomatic gesture of a well-intentioned observers to resolve an intellectual dispute, but
rather the statement of an educated official who understood the policy consequences of its
irresolution. In fact, M. Stéhelin’s speech was so perceptive that it may have exacerbated
the tensions betwen public alienists and private neurologists. The next page of the proceedings recorded a historic meeting, in which the public alienists would make a pivotal
choice.

4.2. A pivotal choice
Both French and American alienists had to determine whether to beat or join their rivals.
At that historic meeting of the Congrès in 1896, the French opted for the former:
“After [M. Stéhelin’s speech], a number of alienists met to hear an announcement of Dr. Parant, on the subject of creating a Union of French Alienists. It
was resolved to entrust the task of preparing its statutes to a Commission of
four members, to be discussed at an upcoming conference.”48
47

Est-ce un bien? Je le crois fermement. La division en deux groups séparées de l’armée des travailleurs
s’occupant des maladies nerveuses et mentales est tout a fait artificielle. Elle ne repose sur aucune idée
générale. Elle est en opposition avec la nature même des choses. Scientifiquement, elle est irrationnelle
Pratiquement, elle aurait pour résultat, si elle était rigoureusement maintenu, de fragmenter l’étude des
maladies qui sont unes et ne peuvent bien être connues que si on les envisage dans l’ensemble de leurs
manifestations dans la série entier de leur évolution. ..[he continues to o↵er some examples of how the two
disciplines can learn from one another] . . . .Pour ces raisons, il est indispensable de compléter les unes par
les autres les recherches des neurologistes. Elles sont absolument solidaires. Elles marchent de pair. Elles
ont les mêmes objets, les mêmes tendances, les mêmes méthodes, le même but. Elles ne doivent pas être
séparées.
Congrès des médecins aliénistes et neurologistes de France et des pays de langue française, “Septième
Session Tenue à Nancy Du 1er Au 5 Août 1896. Volume II: Comptes Rendus,” 9.
48
“Après la séance, un certain nombre de médecins aliénistes se sont réunis pour entendre une communication de M. le Dr Parant, au sujet d’un projet d’Union des médecins aliénistes de France. Il a été décidé
de confier à une Commission de quatre membres le soin de préparer un projet de statuts à discuter dans une
des premières séances du Congrès.”
Congrès des médecins aliénistes et neurologistes de France et des pays de langue française, “Septième
Session Tenue à Nancy Du 1er Au 5 Août 1896. Volume II: Comptes Rendus,” 13.
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Table 3: Evolution of organizations representing public psychiatric supervisors, United States and France
United States
France
Name
Membership
Name
Membership
19th C.
Association of Medical
Alienists (de facto,
Société Médico-Psychologique Alienists (idem), some
Superintendents for American
public psychiatric
(1852), and their conference, neurologists (de facto,
Institutions for the Insane
supervisors)
Congrès des médecins aliénistes
private/university
(1844)
et neurologistes de France et des
practitioners)
pays de langue française (1878)
Turn-of-the- American Medico-Psychological
Alienists and
Association amicale des
Alienists
century
Association (1892)
private/university
médecins des établissements
(divergence)
practitioners
publics d’aliénés (1907)
20th C.
American Psychiatric
All physicians in
Syndicat des médecins des
Hospital psychiatrists
Association (1921)
psychiatric practice hôpitaux psychiatriques (1947)
(de facto, public
psychiatric supervisors)

The brief announcement reveals much about the state of the profession. Compared to the
American organization, the broad contours of the Congrès had allowed more neurologists
to slip into meetings. So concerned were the alienists with these rival intruders that they
began to pursue a strategy of isolation. After a brief period of hibernation, the e↵ort
was resuscitated feverishly in 1907.49 Just before that year’s annual meeting, the directors
of private maisons de santé had formed their own group “in defense of their professional
interests,” rendering “the situation today not the same as in 1895.”50 The century’s turn
had spurred the alienists to create their own group. Formalized with 18 statutes, the
Association amicale des médecins des établissements publics d’aliénés (or Friendly Society
of Public Asylum Physicians, hereafter, the Amicale) announced itself with an eight-page
spread in the profession’s leading journal, the Annales médico-psychologiques.51
The Americans, however, took the more conciliatory route. At their own “epochmaking” meeting in 1892, the Superintendents’ Association changed its name to the American Medico-Psychological Association (AMPA).52 Its announcement in the American Journal of Insanity di↵ered pointedly from that of the Annales:
“This change of name implies a more enlightened conception of the objects of
the Association. With its scope thus widened and its scientific side thus emphasized, the venerable association galvanized itself into new life and paved
the way for the further declaration that ’the object of this Association shall
be the study of all subjects pertaining to mental disease, including the care,
treatment and promotion of the best interests of the insane.”53
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Aliénés. 5–6 (1907): 221–27.
50
Un membre de l’assemblée fait remarquer que la situation n’est plus aujourd’hui la même qu’en 1895.
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As many other scholars have observed, the emancipatory jubilation of this announcement
signaled an embrace of the medicalization of insanity, the scientific study of psychiatry, and
the willingness to share authority over the field with neurologists.54 But the expansion
of membership also had real consequences for AMPA’s sectoral preferences. Although it
continued to restrict voting rights to current and former medical superintendents (“active
members”), it extended Associate membership to assistant asylum physicians, and importantly, a free honorary membership to “physicians, and others who have distinguished
themselves by their attainments in branches of sciences connected with insanity.”55 The
result was a slow but steady shift in both the composition of attendees at annual meetings,
and the subjects discussed. With the participation of elite neurologists, clinicians with private office practices, owners of boutique sanatoriums, directors of private colonies, and even
assistant physicians (whose careers were not yet tied to state hospitals), the association
distanced itself from both its managerial identity and from public practice.56 Soon, private practitioners were attending meetings to recruit psychiatrists out of public practice.57
The organization had fully embraced this practice, and these new members, by the time it
adopted its new name, the American Psychiatric Association (APA) in 1921.58
Several factors contributed to the weakening of the Superintendents’ Association.
Most importantly, the economic crisis of the 1870s left states strapped for cash and unable
to a↵ord the expensive requirements of moral treatment asylums.59 Facing the decline of
public funds on the one hand, asylums also saw the growth of the hospital population on
the other. The massive immigration wave of the late 1800s, comprised mostly of Europeans
escaping famine and war in their home countries, contributed to the overcrowding of state
54
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hospitals.60 Like the increasing rates of older patients su↵ering from senile dementia, as
well as alcoholics and opium addicts, immigrants contributed to hospital’s rising number of
chronic patients. As the quality of asylum care declined, public criticism increased. The first
major campaign was Elizabeth Packard’s, whose commitment to an Illinois asylum by her
husband led her to sue him upon her release.61 In 1866, after winning a jury declaration on
her sanity, she launched a campaign to advocate for the involuntarily committed, especially
women, in several states. By the early 1900s, former inmates like Cli↵ord Beers were
launching national e↵orts to shift psychiatric care away from asylums entirely.62 A national
organization, the National Association for the Protection of the Insane and Prevention of
Insanity, was even mounted to in direct oppositions to the Superintendents.63 Investigations
of asylums by public authorities, such as charity boards, followed.64 The images painted by
these critics of crippled, decrepit, and unkempt public asylums have remained in the public
imagination to this day.
Public pressures strained French alienists as well. Their asylums, too, lacked sufficient
public funds and faced intense overcrowding.65 While the “Packard A↵air” was brewing
America, the “Sandon A↵air” was brewing in France. This massive anti-psychiatric newspaper campaign accused alienists of infringing on civil liberties and denounced them as
60
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“miserable slaves of power, police assassins.”66 Fueling the campaign were the Liberals, the
one-time allies of the alienists, now turned against them.67 Moreover, the ruling party of
anticlerical Bonapartists looked askance at secular hospitals, preferring to support religious
institutions. If anything, one might have expected the French alienists, whose Congrès
already included some neurologists, to turn against the state in protest of the latter’s hostility.68
Neither did labor market frustrations motivate either group of alienists’ respective
decisions in any significant way. Although the costs of entering private practice had declined
in France, the legal requirement that allocated at least one full-time alienist to every department made public practice a dependable and protected source of employment.69 Similarly,
American alienists were well-paid through the early 20th century. At an AMPA meeting in
1917, one observer puzzled over the lack of interns in New York state hospitals:
“I remember very well upon entering the hospital service in New York a number of
years ago, that the salaries were very small, something like $25 per month, but now medical
interns [sic.] start at $1000 per annum and maintenance, and yet nearly all of the hospitals
66

Regnault cited in Goldstein, Console and Classify, 353; see 352-5 for a more thorough discussion, translation hers.
67
As the opposition party in the Bonapartist period, Liberals were the intellectual descendants the Doctrinaires.
68
When the Republicans came into power in the Third Republic, psychiatrists benefit from the election
of officials committed to secular, state-sponsored solutions to public welfare problems. However the fervor
of these officials was similar to the the enthusiasm of Progressive era reformers in America. The National
Association for the Protection of the Insane and Prevention of Insanity, for example, strongly sympathized
with public practice, see:
Goldstein, Console and Classify, 61-7.; National Association for the Protection of the Insane and
the Prevention of Insanity, Papers and Proceedings of the National Association for the Protection of
the Insane and the Prevention of Insanity, at the Stated Meeting Held in New York City (New York:
G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1882), https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=hvd.hwqrdy;view=1up;seq=5, 31.; “E.
C. Seguin Estate Records, 1898.,” Columbia University Archival Collections, accessed July 19, 2018,
http://www.columbia.edu/cu/lweb/archival/collections/ldpd 6638474/.
69
In her analysis of the development of the French psychiatric profession during this time, Goldstein argues
that there were “two poles -- the state, and the individual doctor in the market economy. For the medicine
aliéniste, the statist pole perforce predominated, almost to the exclusion of the other pole, throughout the
19th century because of the massive scale of the facilities required, both by the state and by the scientific
canon, for the incarceration and treatment of lunatics. When only the asylum model was available, doctors
who wanted to enter the private practice of medicine mental were forced to make the high capital investment,
impossible or unpalatable to many of them, required to found a maison de santé. By the opening years of
the new century, however, the appropriation of the démi-fou - an individual who could pass for an ordinary
citizen, who certainly did not disturb the public peace, and who could live at home while making periodic
visits to the psychiatric doctor – placed the second pole, setting up in private office practice, within the
reach of the average aliéniste.”
Goldstein, Console and Classify, 338.

88

su↵er from lack of physicians.”70
In other words, the physician shortage in public hospitals was not the result of undercompensation. The Superintendents’ decision to include private practitioners in their organization, therefore, is not merely a function of the pay disparity between public and private
practitioners at this time.

4.3. Divergence and reinforcement
Over the following decades, private practice would continue to grow in the two countries.
As the APA opened its doors to the fast-growing private sector segment of psychiatry,
private providers overtook public providers as the dominant group in the organization.
By 1940, a third of the APA was composed of private practitioners. By the mid-1950s,
their membership had escalated to 80 percent.71 The majority of the APA, therefore, was
“neither knowledgeable about nor sympathetic toward their institutional brethren.”72 The
interests of the organization’s public sector members, having no association of their own to
join, became secondary.
Private practice was also growing in France as well, but the Amicale maintained
its independence from private practitioners. During the Second World War, the group
was forced to rename itself the Professional Association of French Psychiatric Hospital
Physicians (Association professionnelle des médecins des hôpitaux psychiatriques français)
to comply with the demands of the Nazi Occupation. Shaped by the experience of repression,
public psychiatrists revived the Amicale during the Liberationon July 30, 1947.73 Their new
name underscored their politicization: the Syndicate of Psychiatric Hospital Physicians
(Syndicat des médecins des hôpitaux psychiatriques). Now a militant trade union, the
Syndicat continued the public psychiatrists’ commitment to exclusivity.74
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The events of the nineteenth century may not have predicted the American profession’s inclusion of private psychiatry and the French profession’s exclusion of it, but the
developments of the twentieth century soon reinforced these outcomes, particularly after
the turbulence of global warfare had passed. This timing is important. Although the
structure of political competition later conditioned the power of public psychiatrists, these
developments did not determine their original choices (nor the earliest deinstitutionalization
reforms, for that matter).75 In France, associational and labor rights gradually expanded.
Public sector unionization, in particular, exploded after the Second World War.76 In fact,
the Syndicat’s Liberation-era militancy was part of a larger trend among public sector workers to take advantage of the democratic transition and organize – even if the Syndicat never
affiliated with the unions representing civil servants.77 No such opportunity was o↵ered
to their counterparts in America, where the rights of public sector workers developed in a
staggered way across the states much later, and to a more limited degree. That the overall
trade union movement had su↵ered under the Taft-Hartley Act in 1946 only weakened the
public unionization movement further, even if much of the bill did not directly apply to
government workers or their supervisors.78
To accompany the di↵erences in labor organization in each country, France and the
United States also developed distinct systems of medical organization. Today, they typify to
two di↵erent organizational models.79 In the United States, medical labor is unified. Physicians individually choose whether to affiliate with the primary representative of the medical
psychiatrists agreed with Daumezon. But his idea nonetheless failed to sway the Syndicat’s leadership, who
were adamant about protecting their sub-specialty. Forming a “French APA” would require the Syndicat
to represent the interests of public practitioners alongside neurologists and other physicians in the mind
sciences, such as those in private practice and in universities.
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profession, the American Medical Association (AMA), and/or a specialized representative
(in the case of psychiatrists, the APA).80 The French medical profession, by contrast, is
much more fragmented. Smaller, often specialized trade unions (syndicats) choose whether
to affiliate with the Confederation of French Medical Trade Unions (Confédération des syndicats médicaux français, or CSMF). The confederal structure of French medical labor,
therefore, results in highly factionalized physician interests – often at very granular levels.
A single medical discipline can be broken down into multiple syndicates (representing, for
example, academic physicians, sub-specialities, salaried physicians, medical students, etc)..
Although professional societies can represent each of these sub-categories in America, large,
unified, umbrella associations (such as the AMA and APA) are more often the main voice
of physician interests. While the CSMF is also the main voice of physicians on issues of
general health policy in France, its defers to the relevant syndicate on specialized issues.
As these di↵erent forms of medical and labor organization developed, the choices of
the psychiatric organizations in each country ossified. Many private sector psychiatrists
elected to join both the APA and the AMA, kindling the political affinity of the two organizations.81 The inability of public psychiatrists to organize in the public sector further
dampened their political voice. When more public workers gained organizational rights in
the latter half the century, the APA’s “private sector tilt” had made it the “enemy,” as one
union strategist noted and Chapter 6 will show later.82 The French Syndicat, in contrast,
never joined the CSMF, although eventually a few syndicates representing private psychiatry did. Instead, the Syndicat benefit from its exclusive claims to public mental health
policy-making. Its advocacy for the the development and protection of the public mental
health workforce, as Chapter 5 shows next, set the stage for deinstitutionalization in France
and increased the supply of public mental health services.
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Chapter 5

Deinstitutionalization in France,
1960-1985
The term “deinstitutionalization” (désinstitutionalisation) is rarely used in France.1 To
describe the process that shifted mental health care from the inpatient setting to the outpatient setting, most analysts refer instead to “de-hospitalization” (déhospitalisation) or
simply, “sectorization” (sectorisation). This latter term refers to the French policy of supplying diverse care services across geographically-delimited catchment areas. The semantics
are telling. Much to the contrary of what the Anglophone literature expects of deinstitutionalization, mental asylums were not closed in France, but rather they were re-conceptualized
and expanded to encompass a wide-ranging set of public services. Existing studies of deinstitutionalization have missed cases like this one, where the mobilization of workers induced
policy-makers to expand mental health services in lieu of closing asylums. The independent organization of public supervisors (the Syndicat) served as a critical conduit for public
workers’ petitions.
The coalition of public workers and their managers transformed an initially insignificant administrative document into one of the world’s largest public mental health systems.
The three main sections in this chapter trace the three positive feedback loops that progres1

See Section 2.2.1.
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sively empowered public sector workers and their managers. As the figure on the following
page illustrates, the French government conceded more expenditures, and more public services, to the mental health workforce each time. A within-case process analysis weighs this
explanation against the five alternative explanations for reducing public psychiatry raised
in Chapter 3.2 The “French way” of deinstitutionalizing the mentally ill produced more,
not less, mental health care – despite the presence of social movements critical of psychiatric
care, anti-psychotic medications automating mental health work, and economic incentives
to close hospitals; and also despite the absence of non-psychiatric trade unions and Left
partisans sympathetic to expanding mental health services.3
In the first feedback loop (section 5.1), the Syndicat and the Ministry of Health
co-authored a government document in 1960 that proposed the concept of sectorization,
and secured generous public funds for the project. Still, the absence of a large mental
health workforce slowed the document’s implementation for over a decade. The second
feedback loop (section 5.2) began in May 1968, when the Syndicat managed to significantly
expand the public psychiatric workforce and acquire additional political and administrative
levers to pursue sectorization. As the number of public mental health workers increased,
so too did their representative trade unions, their trade press, and various forms of public
protest articulating their demands. It was not difficult for mental health workers to procure
higher expenditures from government during the post-war economic boom, when economic
conditions were favorable – but the arrival of economic crisis brought new challenges. In
the third feedback loop (section 5.3), the labor-management coalition redoubled its e↵orts
to protect public mental health services from (Socialist) President Mitterrand’s “turn to
austerity.” At the Syndicat’s recommendation, the French government capitulated in 1985
with a major reform of the mental health system that raised the pay and protections of
sectorized workers, and codified the sectorization project into law.
2
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Figure 13: E↵ects of public management-labor coalition-making on the supply of public services, as applied to the case of French
deinstitutionalization (each decade approximates one feedback loop)

5.1. The founding myth: The circular of 1960
Most observers trace the origins of psychiatric sectorization to an administrative circular
issued in 1960.4 For confirmation, look no further than the title of a recent 469-page
government evaluation report: “Organization and functioning of psychiatric care resources,
60 years after the circular of 15 march 1960.”5 But the circular, though intellectually
significant for its novel proposals, was hardly landmark legislation. In fact, the circular
never even appeared in the Journal officiel, the daily gazette of the French Republic that
publishes all official legal and regulatory changes. Nonetheless, any analysis of the French
approach to deinstitutionalization, and its consequently extensive system of state-funded
outpatient and inpatient psychiatric care, must begin with this “revolutionary” text.6 While
the claims on its real authority may be exaggerated, perhaps even mythical, the circular
marks the first time that public managers successfully persuaded government authorities to
allocate new funds to the mental health sector in the postwar period. To understand the
importance of managers (and not other factors) in shaping this outcome, it is first necessary
to review the circular’s content – and the role of an earlier decree in justifying its financial
heft.
5.1.1. Content – and a financial mechanism for implementation
To be sure, the circular signaled an attitude change at the Ministry of Public Health.7
Writing to various departmental actors (prefects, directors of health departments, administrative directors, and public and private psychiatrists with administrative responsibilities),
4
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the document noted how new therapies and methods – such as the development of open
services, the growth of new medical and paramedical professions, and the modernization
of hospitals – had helped to reduce patients’ length of stay at psychiatric hospitals. These
developments had not only shifted the nature of hospitalization, but they also had begun
to transform the nature of the hospital itself. No longer an “asylum” devoted purely to
“dangerous” people, the hospital could now play a di↵erent role in the community. Its new
responsibilities spanned a spectrum of services ranging from the preventive to the rehabilitative.8
To respond to this evolution, local authorities were to take stock of their psychiatric
resources and design a program in line with the Ministry’s new mental health policy vision.
With the intention of “separating the patient from his family and his environment as little as
possible,” a unified, but diverse, team of mental health professionals would care for the needs
of a catchment area of about 67,000 persons.9 Departments would constitute an overarching
“sector” (Secteur ) that coordinated these teams and their catchment areas (“sub-sectors,”
sous-secteurs).10 However, it was the chief psychiatrist (médecin-chef en psychiatrie), in
conjunction of the director of the local health department, who would determine the specific
arrangement of services, in accordance, the Ministry presupposed, with population needs.11
Those departments that lacked a chief psychiatrist (a not infrequent occurrence) would
assign that task to another official.
The document recommended, but did not mandate, that each sector include several
types of services. At the top of the list was the psychiatric hospital, for rate of psychiatric
beds in France (2.1 per 1,000) lagged behind the WHO standard (3 per 1,000).12 Building
additional inpatient capacity would redress this problem. Note that the standard reflected a
global trend: despite reductions in length of stay, psychiatric admissions had increased. This
8
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artifact reminds contemporary readers that the obsolescence of residential psychiatric care
did not require the closure of the asylum at the time. In addition, the circular recommended
an outpatient mental hygiene center (dispensaire d’hygiène mentale), preferably integrated
into a community center that served other social needs (centre polyvalente). Finally, the
circular suggested adding a day hospital (hôpital de jour, a service inspired by the United
States and other countries), a rehabilitation center (foyer de post-cure), and a protected
employment workshop (atelier protégé) to each sector.
In principle, these services could be either private or public. But in fact, the Ministry
assumed that non-profit organizations would jump at the opportunity to enter the new
market:
“Day hospitals, re-habilitation centers, protected employment workshops are
projects that above all will interest private, not-for-profit organizations, acting in
conjunction with mental hygiene physicians at psychiatric hospitals.” Nonetheless, the circular continued, “nothing prevents local public authorities interested
in the project from pursuing the project themselves.”13
Moreover, the circular envisioned the sector as a sort of private-public partnership, whereby
private clinical psychiatrists and neuropsychiatrists based in universities could “harmonize”
their services with public and not-for-profit actors.14
The role of government funds, by contrast, appeared obliquely. To support the implementation of its proposals, the Ministry suggested that actors draw on the public monies
made available by the decree of May 20, 1955.15 Purportedly, this document expanded
the availability of central government funds for mental hygiene dispensaries from a mere
20 percent to a whopping 80 percent of operational costs – an expansion that the Ministry claimed had precedent in a decree issued in 1954.16 Following the enactment of a law
13
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targeting the treatment of alcoholism, the Ministry had developed the dispensary program
to tend to the unwelcome disruptions of various “social ills” (fléaux sociaux).17 Indeed,
much of the Ministry’s initial attention to mental health was motivated by the special case
of alcoholism, but it soon expanded the definition of “social ills” to encompass the many
other conditions treated in psychiatric hospitals, such as psychosis.18 Several addendum
documents made it clear that the funds could serve multiple purposes.19
Even though the Ministry recognized that the funds had “completely changed” the
financial situation of the dispensaries, they were of little immediate consequence.20 Instead,
this obscure financing mechanism would play a radical role in expanding public sector psychiatry a decade later. In e↵ect, the (unintended) founding document of French sectorization
is not the Circular of May 15, 1960, but the Decree of May 20, 1955. This is because the
financial heft of the circular lay in this earlier decree.
5.1.2. The role of the Syndicat and alternative explanations
The circular, though signed by the then-Minister of Public Health, Bernard Chenot, was
in fact the product of the developing, if fraught, relationship between the Syndicat and
the civil servants at the Ministry.21 One starting point for their collaboration might be
Article 1; Precedent: “Réforme Des Lois d’assistance. Décret N° 53-1186 Du 29 Novembre 1953. Décret
N°54-611 Du 11 Juin 1954,” Journal Officiel de La République Française, no. 1016 (1954): 1–29; The
documented correspondence is: Colette Laspalles to Isabel M. Perera, “Question #13394947,” April 2018.
17
“Loi N° 54-439 Du 15 Avril 1954 Sur Le Traitement Des Alcooliques Dangereux Pour Autrui.,” Journal
Officiel de La République Française, 1954, 3827–29; For similar language in American rhetoric see, for
example, Dr. David Vail’s statements at the January, 1965 conference of state mental health authorities in
Grob, From Asylum to Community, 247)
18
For documentation of the Ministry’s interest in alcoholism, see the documents of the Commission des
Maladies Mentales (Archives Nationales) from the early 1960s.
19
“Décret N°55-687 Du 21 Mai 1955 Portant Règlement d’administration Publique Pour La Détérmination
de La Part Départements et Des Communes Dans Les Dépenses d’aide Sociale.,” Journal Officiel de La
République Française, 1955, 5219–20, Annexe.
“Circulaire N° 133 Du 4 Octobre 1955. Application Du Décret N°55-571 Du 20 Mai 1955. Dispensaires
d’Hygiène Mentale (Direction de l’Hygiène Sociale, 2e Bureau),” Bulletin Du Ministère de La Santé Publique
et de La Population, 1955, 395–96.
20
“Circulaire N° 133,” 395
21
Note that not all in the Syndicat immediately supported the sectorisation policy. An article written in
the early 1960s in l’Information Psychiatrique, “Contre le Secteur,” attests this reality. However, by the
mid-1960s, over 80 percent of the attendees at an affiliated scientific conference (Les Journées Nationales de
l’ Evolution Psychiatrique, 1965-1967) approved a White Paper adopting the sectorization policy, and with
it, the growth of their profession to 4,000 psychiatrists.
Denis Leguay, “Le Système de Soins Psychiatriques Français: Réalités et Perspectives” (Ce session, Mulhouse: Congrès de psychiatrie et de neurologie de langue française, 2002), 11
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1946, when the Syndicat’s General Secretary, Dr. Georges Daumezon, announced to the
union’s general assembly that relations with the Ministry had become more “encouraging”
in the previous year, following a period of negligence.22 Henckes has argued that it was
Daumezon’s dynamism that encouraged the Ministry set up a study group on mental illness: the Commission for the Study of Mental Health Problems (Commission d’Études des
Problèmes de la Santé Mental e) the following year.23 The study group, though based at
the Ministry of Health, also included representatives from the Ministries of the Interior,
Justice, as well as Labor and Social Security. Numerous members of the Syndicat were also
appointed to the Commission, with leading roles played by Dr. Daumezon and his more
militant colleague, Dr. Lucien Bonnafé, a communist.24
In 1949, the Ministry re-named the study group the National Commission on Mental
Health (“Commission nationale des maladies mentales,” hereafter the Commission), integrating it into one of the nine commissions of the newly re-organized High Council for
Public Hygiene (Conseil supérieur d’hygiène publique).25 Worth noting is the Ministry’s
22

Georges Daumezon, “Rapport Moral (Assemblée Générale Du 26 Mai 1946),” L’Information Psychiatrique, 1947, 152–3.
“Le ministère, en mars 1945, était encore mal remis d’évènements qui l’avaient désorganisé de 1940 a 1944.
Après une période d’ambition organisatrice jusqu’en novembre 1945, brusque changement d’orientation.
Ceux qui suivent de près l’évolution de cette situation toujours mouvante savent que les Hôpitaux Psychiatriques sont bien le domaine qui a été le moins touché par les bouleversements récents.
“Nous devons signaler les encouragements que nous a accordés M. Cavaillon, les précieuses introductions
que nous a ménagées M. Hauzemann; l’aimable accueil que nous avons trouvé à l’Entre’ aide Sociale (ex
Assistance) avec M. Bouscatel; la collaboration confiante trouvée aux directions du personnel avec M. Nermond; la compréhension témoignée par le Directeur de l’Hygiène sociale, M. Aujaleu, Nous avons trouvé
chez Mlle Cherechewksi, M Labois, Mlle Kahn et leurs collaborateurs, une attitude de cordiale collaboration
qui a été des plus fructueuses.”
23
Nicolas Henckes,
“Reforming Psychiatric Institutions in the Mid-Twentieth Century:
A Framework for Analysis,” History of Psychiatry 22, no.
2 (June 2011):
164–81,
https://doi.org/10.1177/0957154X11401867;For the documents that established the study group, see
“Informations et Variétés,” L’Information Psychiatrique, 3, 24, no. 4 (1948): 111–14.
24
“Informations et Variétés;” For examples of the growing influence of these members of the Commission, see Commission d’études des problèmes de santé mentale, “Procès-Verbal de La Séance Du Mardi
28 Octobre 1947,” 1947, AN 19950173/1 (Commission Meeting of October 28, 1947), Archives Nationales;
Commission d’études des problèmes de santé mentale, “Section Technique: Séance Du 21 Décembre 1948,”
1948, 19950173/1 (Commission Meeting of December 21, 1948), Archives Nationales; Commission d’études
des problèmes de santé mentale, “Section Technique: Séance Du 1er Mars 1948,” 1949, 19950173/1 (Commission Meeting of March 1, 1948), Archives Nationales; as well as the following report: Dr. (Jean) Lauzier,
Dr. (Lucien) Bonnafé, and M. Godeau, “Conditions Techniques Auxquelles Doit Répondre Un Hôpital
Psychiatrique: Rapport Présenté Le 19 Octobre 1948 Devant La Commission d’étude Des Problèmes de La
Santé Mentale,” 1948, 19950173/1 (Commission Meeting of October 19, 1948), Archives Nationales.
25
See the Décret du 23 mars 1948 organisant le “Conseil permanent d’hygiène mentale.” cited in Ayme,
Chroniques de la Psychiatrie Publique, 35; For a discussion of the Commissions integration into the High
Council, see Jean-Christophe Coffin, “‘Misery’ and ‘Revolution:’ The Organisation of French Psychiatry,
1900-1980,” in Psychiatric Cultures Compared: Psychiatry and Mental Health Care in the Twentieth Century:
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motivation for this reform. The following is drawn from the minutes of the Commission’s
first meeting:
“[The presiding civil servant] then briefly repeated the reasons for which he
believed it necessary to fuse the Commission for the Study of Mental Health
Problems with the High Council for Public Hygiene. ... Moreover, it seemed
necessary to enlarge the composition of the Commission on Mental Health that
mostly included doctors of Psychiatric Hospitals.”26
The reformation of Commission, therefore, was partially an attempt to contain the growing
influence of the Syndicat. The Ministry even went so far as to nominate a representative
from a rival trade union as President of the Commission. Dr. Heuyer, a specialist in pediatric neuro-psychiatry, recently had founded the Syndicate of Nervous System Psychiatrists
(Syndicat des médecins français spécialistes du système nerveux ), a CSMF-affiliated group
that represented neurologists and private sector psychiatrists.27 Daumezon worried that
the Syndicat’s relations with the Ministry had been “practically broken.”28
But in the late 1950s, a change in government reshu✏ed the Ministry, and with it, the
civil servants responsible for mental health policy. Several of them, including Dr. Eugène
Aujaleu, Pierre Jean, and Marie-Rose Mamelet, sympathized with public sector psychiatry.
(Aujaleu received his medical training in public hospitals, and Mamelet was the daughter of
a mental hospital administrator).29 Moreover, the Ministry appointed Syndicat member Dr.
Comparisons and Approaches; [International Workshop “Cultures of Psychiatry and Mental Health Care in
the Twentieth Century: Comparisions and Approaches”, Held at the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and
Sciences (KNAW) and the University of Amsterdam, 18 - 20 September 2003], ed. Marijke Gijswijt-Hofstra
and International Workshop Cultures of Psychiatry and Mental Health Care in the Twentieth Century:
Comparisons and Approaches (Amsterdam: Amsterdam Univ. Press, 2005), 225–47, 234.
26
Commission des Maladies Mentales, “Séance Du 24 Mai 1949,” 1949, AN 19950173/1 (Commission
Meeting of May 24, 1949), Archives Nationales, 2.
“...Il passe ensuite la parole à M. le Dr. AUJALEU qui rappelle brièvement les raisons pour lesquelles il a
cru devoir procéder à la fusion de la Commission d’Etudes des Problèmes de Sané Mentale au sein du Conseil
Permanent d’Hygiène Sociale. Il n’est pas possible, souligne-t’-il, d’imposer à des services qui disposent d’un
e↵ective de personnel insuffisant, le Secrétariat de plusieurs Commissions s’occupant de questions analogues.
D’autres part, il paraissait nécessaire d’élargir la composition de la Commission de Santé Mentale, qui
comprenait ; en grande majorité, des médecins des Hôpitaux Psychiatriques. C’est pour ces deux motifs que
la fusion s’est avérée nécessaire.”
27
For a trenchant critique of the group from the Syndicat’s perspective, see Ayme, Chroniques de la
Psychiatrie Publique, 43.
28
Daumezon cited in Ibid, 41.
29
Aujaleu was the general director of the health division, Jean his deputy, and Mamelet an editor at the
Ministry. Later, both Jean and Mamelet would head the Bureau of Mental Illnesses.
Dr. Daumezon in Lion Murard and François Fourquet, eds., Histoire de La Psychiatrie de Secteur Ou Le
Secteur Impossible? (Paris: Recherches, 1975), 185-189; For more on the authors’ backgrounds, see Section
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Hubert Mignot as “Technical Counselor” (conseiller technique) to the Bureau of Psychiatry.
Together, the group drafted the circular.
Mignot “insisted that [the circular’s] implementation comply with the principle of
sectorization,” a concept that first appeared in a syndical memo in 1947.30 Since then, the
proposals in this memo had filtered into the Ministry through reports written by members
of the Syndicat sitting on the Commission.31 Of special note is the Commission’s 1955
report on the equipment of psychiatric hospitals, which advocated for the construction and
equitable territorial distribution of public psychiatric hospitals.32 But private and academic
neuro-psychiatrists protested this approach.33 As a result, the final text of the circular
was something of a compromise between elite university and public sector psychiatrists.34
IV of this book.
30
Mignot in Ayme, Chroniques de la Psychiatrie Publique, 51-2; For the memo, see “Memorandum syndical
concernant l’assistance aux malades mentaux,” 1947 Journées Psychiatriques, cited in Henckes, “Le Nouveau
Monde de La Psychiatrie Française: Les Psychiatres, l’État et La Réforme Des Hôpitaux Psychiatriques de
l’Après-Guerre Aux Années 1970,” 786.
“....insistant sur le fait qu’il a été établie en tenant compte du principe de la politique de secteur.”
31
See the first report in Lauzier, Bonnafé, and Godeau, “Conditions Techniques Auxquelles Doit Répondre
Un Hôpital Psychiatrique;”Note that the Ministry expressed serious reservations to this proposition at the
time, see Commission d’études des problèmes de santé mentale, “Section Technique: Séance Du 19 Octobre
1948,” 1948, AN 19950173/1 (Commission Meeting of October 19, 1948), Archives Nationales.
32
The 1955 Rapport sur l’équipment psychiatrique, d’un territoire dépourvu de toute formation spécialisée
was discussed at multiple meetings, see: Dechaume, “À Propos de l’équipement Psychiatrique d’un Territoire
Depourvu de Toute Formation Spécialisée: Discussion Du 19 Décembre 1955,” 1955, AN 19950173/1 (Commission Meeting of December 19, 1955)), Archives Nationales; Commission des Maladies Mentales, “Séance
Du 28 Février 1956,” 1956, AN 19950173/1 (Commission Meeting of February 28, 1956), Archives Nationales;
Bonnafé et al., “Note Faisant Suite Aux Rapports Présentés à La Commission,” 1959, AN 19950173/1, (Commission Meeting of October 27, 1959) Archives Nationales.; Mignot, “Untitled Note Concerning Le Rapport
Sur l’équipement Psychiatrique d’un Territoire Dépourvu de Toute Formation Hospitalière,” October 27,
1959, AN 19950173/1 (Commission Meeting of November 29, 1959), Archives Nationales.
33
A notable excerpt of the ensuing debate between Drs. Heuyer (representing the private and academic
psychiatrists) and Bonnafé (representing public hospital psychiatrists):
“Si on construit de nouveau établissements, la situation va rester la même. En fait, il faut faire éclater
l’hôpital psychiatrique qui n’est pas plus le centre de traitement pour tuberculeux. Certes, il existe déjà des
dispensaires, mais la consultation ne peut être considérée comme suffisante; il faut des services d’hôpitaux.
Il existe, par ailleurs, des cliniques privées conventionnées et c’est dans ces cliniques que se préfigure la
formule d’avenir du traitement des malades mentaux. Il faut souligner que l’hôpital de jour est une des
formules ...comme souligne M. Bonnafé.
La divergence de vue essentielle entre M. Heuyer et M. Bonnafé consiste dans le fait que M. Bonnafé
construit son exposé en portant d’une organisation médical théorique et non des faits, c’est a dire le malade
qui normalement s’adresse a l’hôpital pour recevoir des soins. .. M. Sivadon s’étonne que, tout en étant
d’accord sur le fond avec le rapport en discussion, M. Heuyer puisse s’élever contre les principes développés.
La seule réserve faite par M. Heuyer quant au fond, c’est qu’il existe, a côté de l’hôpital psychiatrique,
des hôpitaux des maisons de sant , et des dispensaires...mais il n’est pas toujours possible d’attendre que le
malade aille à l’hôpital et il est nécessaire d’avoir, pour le malade, des services publics psychiatriques qui,
bien entendu, ne peuvent avoir le monopole de soins pour l’ensemble des malades mentaux.”
Commission des Maladies Mentales, “Procès-Verbal de La Séance Du 29 Novembre 1955,” 1955, AN
19950173/1 (Commission Meeting of November 29, 1955), Archives Nationales, 3.
34
As Henckes writes, “At a meeting organized in November 1955, a group of psychiatric hospital physicians

101

Nonetheless, public psychiatrists heartily endorsed the final document, based, as Syndicat
member Dr. Paul Sivadon put it, “on the principles established by the Commission over
the course of these past few years.”35 Put simply, sectorization was chiefly the Syndicat’s
creation.
Although self-interest largely prompted the Syndicat’s support for the circular, it was
not their only motivation for proposing sectorization. Humanitarian reasons were significant, too. Under the Vichy regime, between 40,000 and 45,000 psychiatric patients died of
famine, which e↵ectively halved the population living in asylums from about 110,000 before the war to about 67,000 in 1945. A result of government negligence, the unintentional
tragedy nonetheless revitalized psychiatrists and others’ attention to mental health.36
Standard theories of political science could not have predicted the 1960 circular.
Elected officials representing Left parties had little to do with the project. In fact, the presidency of Charles de Gaulle in the newly minted Fifth Republic was laying the groundwork
for a social welfare system that aligned itself with neither with the dominant social democratic approaches, nor with the dominant conservative approaches, of the time.37 Moreover,
it was precisely in 1960 that de Gaulle embarked on a major health care cost containment
initiative that sought to implement negotiated fee schedules.38 Few in the health care
industry viewed the move as an opportunity for expansion.
suggested that psychiatric norms should be defined locally by practitioners actually in charge of running the
system, who would thus be given a new planning role. In response, a group of university teachers advocated
that planning the psychiatric system should rely on general norms elaborated by a small group of specialists
at the national level. Some aspects of the discussions also concerned the extension of the psychiatric system,
the role of out- patient facilities in the system and whether to give priority to rehabilitation or to medical care.
Eventually, the Ministry of Health proposed a compromise between those two visions in a circular published
in March 1960, which proposed that local health authorities should develop plans based on proposals made
by psychiatrists.”
Henckes, “Reforming Psychiatric Institutions in the Mid-Twentieth Century,” 172.
35
“M. Sivadon.. félicite le rédacteur de ce plan, base sur les principes établis par la Commission au cours
de ces derniers années.”
Commission des Maladies Mentales, “Procès-Verbal de La Séance Du 25 Octobre 1960,” 1960, AN
19950173/1 (Commission Meeting of October 25, 1960), Archives Nationales, 2.
36
For studies of these events, and their e↵ects on the psychiatric profession, see: Isabelle von
Bueltzingsloewen, L’hécatombe Des Fous: La Famine Dans Les Hôpitaux Psychiatriques Français Sous
l’Occupation, Collection Historique (Paris: Aubier, 2007); Max Lafont, L’ extermination douce: la mort de
40000 malades mentaux dans les hôpitaux psychiatriques en France, sous le régime de Vichy (Ligné: Éd. de
l’AREFPPI, 1987).
37
For notes on how the specificity of Gaullism influenced sectorization, see Murard and Fourquet, Histoire
de La Psychiatrie de Secteur Ou Le Secteur Impossible?, 201.
38
Dutton, Di↵erential Diagnoses, 29.
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The authors of the circular were bureaucrats, not partisan elected officials.

As

Henckes argues, after 1939, the issue of mental health policy had moved entirely from
the political sphere to the bureaucratic sphere.39 Henckes’s sociological analysis attributes
this shift to the evolving concept of reform in mental health, which was now influenced by
several new actors, particularly those with state-sanctioned specialized medical expertise.40
To this, I add that, as the concept of reform evolved, so too did the population it was meant
to serve. Mental health, once a subject of interest to elected officials preoccupied with controlling dangerous populations, had by now come to encompass a much broader population
in France, as in other countries. The more generalized, if nebulous, circumscription of the
“mentally ill” now included those with milder conditions, such as senility and nervousness,
and consequently reduced the electoral risks incurred by politicians who ignored this policy
area. If their constituents were no longer concerned with building hospitals to house the
dangerous individuals in the community, then neither were they. The issue of mental health
policy hence defaulted to the bureaucratic sphere.41
The priorities of the Syndicat, furthermore, guided the circular’s bureaucratic authors.
Memoirs of this period tend to explain the Ministry’s interest in the sectorization project by
pointing to the goodwill of individual bureaucrats, as well as their personal interest in the
subject. In the words of Mignot, Aujaleu’s personal bias toward public practice was critical,
for he “was someone who belonged to public medicine, who wanted to promote it and found
39

“A single example conveys the thrust of this change: whereas reform of the psychiatric system had been
discussed continuously in the French Parliament until 1939, it had no new project after the war and until the
1980s. While congressmen had led the way in the denunciation of asylums and the suggestion of alternatives
before the war, they practically deserted the field after 1945. In a way, this shift had been anticipated by
the French Minister of Health at the end of the 1930s. Reacting to another defeat in obtaining approval of a
new mental health law in the Senate, he asserted that it was time to ‘change method’ in psychiatric reform
(Conseil supérieur de l’assistance publique, 1937). Instead of devising new laws for regulating the system,
the Ministry should act directly on the mental health system through administrative rulings and the setting
up of standards. Instead of relying on an elected body of congressmen, technicians and professionals would
become the intermediaries of reform.”
Henckes, “Reforming Psychiatric Institutions in the Mid-Twentieth Century,” 168.
40
Henckes, “Reforming Psychiatric Institutions in the Mid-Twentieth Century,” 169
41
Although several pieces of legislation influenced the development of mental health policy in France, this
analysis centers on the relationship between the state and mental health workers as the primary site of
political contention. This is not only because mental health policy is largely a bureaucratic issue, as Henckes
observes, but also because the results of French legislative politics are typically anchored in bureaucratic
developments. Unlike the American Congress, the French legislature depends more heavily on the direction
and guidance of the administration when enacting laws.
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only in psychiatry people who understood it.”42 There is no question that the bureaucrats’
influence was notable. Mamelet’s office, Dr Ayme’s memoir recalls, “was the control tower
for all of psychiatry in the hexagon and outre-mer.”43 Yet despite the Ministry’s influence
across the whole of French territory, many accounts emphasize how the bureaucrats were
“conquered by the idea of the sector.”44 If public managers had not brought sectorization
to the Ministry, the circular may not have been written.
Neither was the sectorization project induced by demand-side factors.45 The National
Union of the Family and Friends of the Infirm (l’Union nationale de familles et amis de
personnes malades, hereafter UNAFAM), France’s primary mental health patient advocacy
group, was not founded until 1963, three years after the sectorization document was drafted
and circulated.46 Moreover, as President of the French League of Mental Hygiene and
Prevention (Ligue Française de Prophylaxie et d’Hygiène Mentale), Syndicat member Dr.
Sivadon played a key role in establishing the advocacy group. The League, founded in in
1921 by another public psychiatrist, Dr. Edouard Toulouse, had long maintained close ties
to the Syndicat, too.47
It is true that another patient advocacy group, La Croix Marine, predated the circular
– but its links to the Syndicat are perhaps even more explicit than those of UNAFAM.
Founded in 1952, the group sought to unite the various government actors in psychiatry
and promote novel ideas in mental health, particularly with regard to ambulatory care. Its
42

Dr. Mignot in Murard and Fourquet, Histoire de La Psychiatrie de Secteur Ou Le Secteur Impossible?,
186.
“...était quelqu’un qui avait le culte de la médecine publique, qui voulait la favoriser et qui n’avait trouvé
finalement que dans le domaine de la psychiatrie des gens pour l’entendre.”
43
Ayme, Chroniques de la Psychiatrie Publique, 52.
”Sa mansarde du 7 de la rue de Tilsitte est la tour de contrôle de toute la psychiatrie hexagonale et
d’outre-mer.”
44
Dr Daumezon in Murard and Fourquet, Histoire de La Psychiatrie de Secteur Ou Le Secteur Impossible?,
185.
“...étaient conquis par les idées de secteur ”
45
Note that mental health advocacy groups developed earlier in the United States, but as an underresourced interest group, they lacked the influence necessary for success. The preferences of the AMA and
the APA held fare more political sway. See Chapter 6.
46
The group later added “...and/or mental disability” (et/ou handicapées psychiques”) to its name.
47
Ligue
française
pour
la
santé
mentale,
“Historique,”
accessed
July
24,
2018,
http://www.lfsm.org/presentation/historique/.
UNAFAM, “L’Unafam, Son Histoire,” accessed July 24, 2018, http://www.unafam.org/L-Unafam-sonhistoire.html.
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leaders ranged from psychiatrists working in public institutions (Drs. Pierre Doussinet and
Henri Courbaire de Marcilla, the group’s founders) to the wife of a departmental prefect
(Alice Delauney, spouse of Gabriel Delauney, Puy-de-Dôme).48 Although this group often
claimed to speak on behalf of its clients, few patients were members.
There was an unmistakable enthusiasm for reform, both in theory and in practice, but
one should not exaggerate the role of new social movements and new therapeutic medications
on the circular’s development, either. The wartime occupation had popularized the theory of
“institutional psychotherapy” amongst the intellectual vanguard.49 “As the war and fascism
had made particularly evident,” intellectual historian Camille Robcis writes, “occupation
was not just a physical condition: it was also a state of mind.”50 Drawing heavily from
Lacanian psychoanalysis, as well the work of Karl Marx, Sigmund Freud, and Hermann
Simon, this new therapeutic philosophy sought to promote more social forms of treatment
– but from within the walls of the asylum. By re-structuring the social life of the asylum,
its proponents (which included Dr Bonnafé) believed they could “disoccupy” the minds of
patients.51 Conveniently, it also helped to counter anti-psychiatric critiques by justifying
the asylum in terms that were palatable to radical thinkers.52
48

Hélène Parisot and Séverine Sebille, “Fédération Croix-Marine,” Répertoire numérique
détaillé
(CNAHES-CAPEA
CAMT
/
Fonds
Fédération
Croix-Marine
-,
2003),
http://www.cnahes.org/media/5/croix-marine-repertoire.pdf; Doussinet in Jean-Paul Arveiller, Pour
une psychiatrie sociale cinquante ans d’action de la croix-marine (Ramonville Saint-Agne: Erès, 2002),
http://www.cairn.info/pour-une-psychiatrie-sociale--9782749200958.htm.
49
The experiences of the Spanish Civil War also influenced the philosophy, as one of its founders, François
Tosquelles, was an exile. An important theorist himself, Tosquelles influenced many others, including philosopher Georges Canguilhem and Surrealists Paul ´Éluard and Tristan Tzara. Moreover, both Franz Fanon
and Félix Guattari trained under institutional psychotherapists (at the Saint Alban Hospital and La Borde
Clinic, respectively).
Camille Robcis, “François Tosquelles and the Psychiatric Revolution in Postwar France: Tosquelles
and the Psychiatric Revolution in Postwar France,” Constellations 23, no. 2 (June 2016): 212–22,
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8675.12223.
50
Ibid, 212.
51
In addition to Dr. Bonnafé, Lacan himself took an interest in the policy implications of the philosophy.
See his influential 1947 article “English psychiatry and the war” (La psychiatrie anglaise et la guerre) praising
British experimental and social psychiatry in l’Information Psychiatrique, and the numerous commentaries
that have followed:
Jaeger Interview: 2015
Coffin, “‘Misery’ and ‘Revolution:’ The Organisation of French Psychiatry, 1900-1980.” 235; Murard
and Fourquet, Histoire de La Psychiatrie de Secteur Ou Le Secteur Impossible?, 183 ; Robcis, “François
Tosquelles and the Psychiatric Revolution in Postwar France.”
52
Although the term “institutional psychotherapy” arose from a particularly French environment, similar
currents were developing elsewhere. As Grob writes, “the psychodynamic orientation of the [American
psychotherapeutic] specialty ...aroused interest in other forms of environmental therapies capable of being
applied in institutional settings. Of these, ’milieu therapy’ (or therapeutic community) had the greatest
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In practice, the postwar economic boom enabled policy-makers, too, to catch the
reformist spirit, as the circular itself had acknowledged. The collective desire to “humanize”
the war-torn psychiatric hospitals suited a broader policy agenda aiming to expand social
citizenship through the expansion, re-organization, and re-building of the central state.53
Indeed, the political imperatives of the newly ratified constitution demanded it.54 Just
two years after the circular appeared, the government published the Laroque Report, an
ambitious social welfare program to significantly expand Social Security, the country’s social
insurance apparatus.55 It was a propitious time for the welfare state.
But the intellectual and political mood of the period must be put in perspective.
The circular remained a marginal document. Many reformers would had preferred a more
substantial commitment to public psychiatry from government, perhaps made via order,
decree, or even legislation. Instead, they received an unpublished set of guidelines. By their
own admission, the authors of the circular recognized that its implemenation would take
time: “It goes without saying that such an objective cannot be obtained immediately; the
material difficulties are numerous and can only be resolved little by little.”56
Finally, explanations pointing to the economic wealth of this period as a motivation
for care expansion cannot account for the fact that, in the short-term, little financial attention was paid to the sectors. Moreover, the lack of substantial political and administrative
commitment to sectorization became obvious soon enough. In 1964, a change in government
replaced the sta↵ at the Ministry once again, leading to what some analysts have called
potential to alter the lives of patients in mental hospitals...the idea that the mental hospital could act as
a therapeutic community was given concrete meaning by Maxwell Jones, a British psychiatrist who had
worked with psychologically impaired servicemen and repatriated prisoners of war... The work of Jones and
his colleagues fostered an awareness of the impact of the hospital environment on individual patients and
the possibility of employing the hospital community ’as an active force in treatment.”’
Grob, The Mad Among Us, 226. For an influential American work promoting milieu therapy, see Alfred H.
Stanton and Morris S Schwartz, The Mental Hospital: A Study of Institutional Participation in Psychiatric
Illness and Treatment (Basic Books, 1954).
53
Marcel Jaeger, Researcher and Psychiatric Nurse, interview by Isabel M. Perera, Paris, March 31, 2016;
Coffin, “‘Misery’ and ‘Revolution:’ The Organisation of French Psychiatry, 1900-1980,” 690.
54
The constitution of the Fifth Republic was ratified in 1958.
55
Pierre Laroque et al., Rapport Laroque (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1962/2014).
56
“Il va sans dire qu’un tel objectif ne peut être atteint d’emblée; les difficultés matérielles sont en e↵et
nombreuses et ne pourront se résoudre que peu à peu.”
Chenot, “Circulaire Du 15 Mars 1960,” 2.
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“a long sleep” (un long sommeil ) in the area of mental health policy.57 The Commission’s
mandate was terminated. At the peak of the economic boom known as the Trente Glorieuses, relatively few sectors were constructed, despite the generous availability of public
funds.58 A needs assessment produced in the following decade noted that fewer than half
of the anticipated sectors had been developed at this time.
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Looking back, policy-maker Jean-François Bauduret has lamented that “public psychiatry lost 12 years, and passed up a historic opportunity to rapidly reform itself thanks
to a favorable economic context and a flexible and e↵ective financial mechanism.”60 The
political dynamics of the first feedback loop explains this delay. Although public managers
conceptualized sectorization and secured some financial resources for it, the public mental
health workforce as whole remained too small in the 1960s to exert significant pressure on
government to increase expenditures. It was not until the end of the decade that workers
gained major employment concessions, with the pivotal support of their managers. The
workforce expansion that occurred during the next feedback loop, therefore, intensified the
number and costs of the sectors.

5.2. 1968 and the Syndicat
The protests of May 1968, though pivotal to the expansion of the public psychiatric workforce in France, remain ingrained in the memories of those outside of mental health as well.
Social and economic unrest over the conflict in Algeria, American imperialism (especially
57
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in Vietnam, a portion of former French Indochina), and labor issues brewed in the nascent
Fifth Republic. At the same time, the postwar baby boomers now filled university classrooms, prompting the construction of additional institutions of higher education – the most
iconic of which was the University of Nanterre, in the suburbs of Paris. This “assembly
plant for standardized education” o↵ered little in the way of university and research facilities, and even less in the way of future employment prospects.61 It is not surprising, then,
that it was at Nanterre on May 2, 1968 that the student protests first took hold, before
spreading across the Parisian region and throughout the rest of France. The students would
be joined by major trade unions, including the Communist-affiliated General Confederation
of Labor (Confédération générale du travail, hereafter CGT) and the Socialist-affiliated
French Democratic Confederation of Labor (Confédération française démocratique du travail, hereafter CFDT), and eventually, by an unprecedented number of white-collar workers
and employees of high-technology industries, too.62 By May 13, the anniversary of the Algerian rebellion that returned President Charles de Gaulle to power, an estimated 700,000
marchers protested in the streets of Paris.63
Pundits often say that little came of the largest demonstration in French history.
With an angry declaration of “reform – yes, but chaos - no” (la réforme oui, la chie-enlit non), de Gaulle responded by attempting to reorganize government and its leadership.
The following year, he invited French voters to re-affirm their commitment to democratic
“participation” via referendum, even though its purposes and promises remained unclear,
not to mention mocked by the public. The referendum was the political disaster that ended
a two-year struggle to re-assume power for de Gaulle. His replacement, Prime Minister
Georges Pompidou, chose to interpret the referendum as a conservative endorsement for
decentralization and local government – hardly the radical revolution championed by the
protestors.64
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Nevertheless, the events had important implications for sectorization.65 The student and labor activism motivated the Syndicat to participate in solidarity. When public
managers launched an extended administrative strike at the peak of the 1968 protests, government leaders made several concessions that would expand the pipeline of public mental
health workers, and augment the administrative and political levers available to hospital
psychiatrists. With more employees, the Syndicat spent the following decade using these
new levers to raise revenues in the psychiatric hospitals and sectors.
5.2.1. The administrative strike
To understand the Syndicat’s involvement in the 1968 protests, one must begin a decade
earlier, with the law that paved the way for full-time public hospital employment in France.
The Law of December 30, 1958 is better known as the “Debré Reform” for its author, Dr.
Robert Debré, a prominent pediatrician from an influential political family. The law sought
to “rationalize” the country’s complex hospital system, boost its research productivity, and
promote fairer employment for minorities by o↵ering salaried teaching positions in hospitals
located near universities.66 To top up their salaries, physician-researchers (universitaires) at
academic medical centers (Centres hospitaliers universitaires, hereafter CHU) could receive
additional payments from patients seeking private consultations, a provision that protected
the private practice so closely guarded by the CSMF.67 As a result, many universitaires took
their salary, but spent most of their time attending to privately paying patients, giving little
heed to their other clinical, teaching, and research responsibilities at the public hospitals.
Importantly, the Debré Reform also excluded psychiatric hospitals, largely to satisfy
the preferences of the Syndicat.68 At the time, a young physician interested in a psychiatric
career first would obtain a graduate certificate (Certificat d’études supérieures, hereafter
CES) in neuro-psychiatry, a discipline that combined neurology and psychiatry, before com65
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pleting their training in a psychiatric hospital. By contrast, those interested in neurological
careers would gain their supplemental training at elite universities (where most of their
patients would pay privately). At the time of the law’s enactment in 1958, the Syndicat
expressed concern that merging psychiatric hospitals with CHUs could bias students toward
neurological careers by limiting their training to the university environment. Training in
public psychiatric hospitals would become obsolete, they argued. Few students would learn
about the “specificity” of psychiatry – a notion that helped to both build loyalty to their
profession, and fill vacant positions at the mental hospitals.69 Participating in the 1958
reform e↵ectively meant surrendering this important sta↵ pipeline.
By the late 1960s, the “double remuneration” problem had become a contentious
policy issue, one that could be resolved in part by taking advantage of the student protests
in 1968. The government decided to “complete” the Debré reform by definitively splitting
private and public hospitals, forbidding those physicians in public, salaried positions from
taking any private patients. To encourage young physicians to pursue salaried careers, it
expanded the number of positions available at CHUs.
For psychiatric workers, both the student protests and the government’s willingness to expand medical employment o↵ered a unique opportunity to create new licenses
and positions in mental hospitals. The Syndicate of Psychiatric Trainees (Syndicat des
psychiatres en formation) advocated for the creation of a separate CES in psychiatry,
which would prevent them from competing with neurologists in the existing joint program
(neuro-psychiatry).70 A similar mobilization supported the e↵orts of CEMÉA (Centres
d’Entraı̂nement aux Méthodes d’Éducation Active), the group responsible for the continuing education of social workers, nurses, and other social professions.71 Although a state69
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sanctioned nursing degree (Infirmier d’hôpital d’Etat) had existed since 1920, and a special
designation for psychiatric nurses (Infirmiers psychiatriques) was made in 1955, CEMÉA
had sought to establish a more specialized Infirmier de secteur psychiatrique (ISP) license
since the arrival of the circular of 1960.
Initially, the Syndicat distanced itself from the protests, questioning whether their
interests would benefit from the generalized chaos.72 Some – including their most celebrated
radical, institutional psychotherapist Dr. François Tosquelles – entirely refrained from
participating.73 But as the events continued, the Syndicat realized its opportunity. On
May 17, the leadership released a press release to “denounce the government repression of
student demonstrations.” Criticizing first the “archaic structures of education” that had
given rise to the protests, the statement then quickly returned to its political priorities:
“in doing so, [the Syndicat] also denounces the notorious insufficiencies of public health
institutions, and of mental health institutions in particular.74
The declaration -- broad enough to protect their political independence, but militant
enough to demonstrate their support – initiated the beginning of a yearlong strike of all
administrative duties. While the members of the Syndicat continued their clinical work
72

Dans cette atmosphère enfiévrée, porteuse de changements, dans cette e↵ervescence généralisée, grosse
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as physicians, caring for the medical needs of their patients, it was in their capacity as
supervisors that they supported the students. Ceasing “all administrative activities” (tout
acte administratif ), they also assembled a national strike committee (comité national de
grève) in charge of organizing local protests that would give the strike a “spectacular and
grassroots” (spectaculaire et populaire) character. A protest along the Champs-Elysées to
the Ministry of Health would amplify their voice further in Paris.75
5.2.2. Concessions
It would not be long before the strike began to gain concessions, the first of which was a new
university degree that would significantly expand the mental health workforce. To appease
students’ requests, legislators enacted a major reform of the university system in November
1968.76 In December, Minister Edgar Fauré – whose sympathies for public psychiatry were
reportedly influenced by his wife, Lucie, a psychoanlyst, and his daughter, Sylvie, a hospital
psychiatrist – ordered the creation of a separate CES in psychiatry.77 This, however, was
not enough for the protestors. The order remained unclear about prestige of the new CES
relative to the former one, and no e↵orts had been made to accommodate the nurses’
demands for their own CES. The strike continued. It was not until May 1969 that the
CES for sectorized nurses (ISPs) was granted, nor until September of that year that the
government strengthened the CES for psychiatric physicians via decree.78 Nonetheless, the
new degrees would boost the pipeline of incoming mental health sta↵.
The prestige of the CES was a significant sticking point. A clause in the decree allowed
the universitaires to teach in psychiatric hospitals. “It is this last clause that has enraged
psychiatric hospital physicians, who remain suspicious after the many years of domination
of their discipline by CHU neuro-psychiatrists,” reported an article in Combat, a Leftist
newspaper.79 Underlying what then-Health Minister Robert Boulin called a “doctrinal and
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emotional” conflict was, of course, an awareness of its financial consequences. Under current
law, psychiatrists with research and teaching aspirations had two employment options: the
CHU, which gave them access to lucrative privately paying patients, or the mental hospital,
where patients were far less a✏uent. The clause in conflict could incentivize psychiatrists
to pursue the former option, and therefore deplete psychiatric hospitals of their doctors.
To express their opposition to the continued “parachuting” (parachutage) of the university
physicians into psychiatric hospitals, the Syndicat prolonged the strike.80
By November 1969, the government had had enough. In a press conference, Minister
Boulin announced a second concession. In e↵ort to end the strike and resolve the conflict, he
would re-open the Commission on Mental Illnesses.81 With painstaking attention to maintaining a balance of power, bureaucrats in the Ministry sought to appoint representatives on
each side of the debate. A particularly thorny issue, however, centered on the nomination of
the president: “It is customary,” the Director General of Public Health, Pierre Boulenger,
wrote to Boulin, “that the President alternate between a university physician and a hospital
physician. Professeur Dechaume (deceased) having been the last president [of the Commission], he would normally be replaced by a hospital physician.” Reviewing several alternate
candidates, Boulenger worried that each lacked either the reputation or the time to preside
the commission. Noting that the President and Vice President “should be able to relate to
those with di↵erent pedigrees and tendencies,” Boulenger instead appointed the well-liked
Dr Henri Ey to the presidency, and left the vice-presidency to a university psychiatrist, Dr.
Théophile Kammerer.82 The decision to appoint Henri Ey, “despite his age,” to preside over
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80
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the commission reveals the desperation of the Ministry. Now in retirement, Dr. Ey’s older
age would have prevented his involvement in government a↵airs (he was four years past the
age limit for public service).83 Moreover, his ill health made it more difficult for him to
participate. But Ey was a unifying figure — once a President of the Syndicat, he also had
maintained an active neurological research portfolio during his career. The appointment of
Dr. Kammerer, a university psychiatrist with strong ties to the private sector, as his deputy
would help to assuage any concerns regarding Ey’s lingering loyalty to the Syndicat.84
Although the appointments of Ey and Kammerer could smooth some tensions over
the leadership of the Commission, the question of its members was just as polemical. Particularly “delicate,” as Boulenger put it, was the question of syndical representation.85
Although he favored the participation of both para-medical sta↵ (social workers, psychologists, nurses) and non-medical sta↵ (national public servants, hospital administrators),
he worried that “if one admits them all, high-level debates would become but quarrels of
influence.”86 He suggested, then, to extend ex-officio (à titre de droit) appointments only
to select members, while those with a “special competence in mental hygiene” would be
appointed in merely “a personal capacity” (à titre personnel ). Later that year, the Ministry
published an order nominating 44 members to the new Commision, nearly all of whom (41)
were appointed in this latter, less formal, capacity. Only those organizations who had played
a prominent role in the former commission were o↵ered ex-officio status: the National Committee for the Prevention of Alcoholism (Comité nationale de défense contre l’alcoolisme),
the Autonomous Syndicate of Social Workers in Departmental Services (Syndicat national
autonome des assistants sociaux des services départementaux), and the Syndicate of Psyêtre aussi très marqués par leurs orientations, ils ne me semblent pas susceptibles de remplir des fonctions
qui demandent une certaine disponibilité et exigent une autorité indiscutée.
Le Président –et à son défaut, le vice-président – doivent en e↵et pouvoir s’imposer aux personnes de
di↵érentes formation et tendances qui feront partie de la commission, c’et pourquoi je vus propose:
Comme président : M. le Docteur Henri EY (et ceci malgré son âge)
Comme vice-président : M. le Professeur KAMMERER, de STRASBOURG
83
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chiatric Hospital Physicians (Syndicat des médecins des hôpitaux psychiatriques).87 The
strike ended shortly after this announcement.
Even still, the e↵ects of the Syndicat’s mobilization endured into the following year.
In 1970, legislators finally enacted a third concession: the Second Debré Reform.88 By
formally splitting public and private hospitals, it forbade public, salaried physicians from
accepting privately paying patients. The public designation was extended to psychiatric
hospitals, but in order to preserve the “specificity” promised to psychiatric workers, a separate hospital category was created: the Specialized Hospital Center (Centre Hospitalier
Spécialisé, CHS).89 To accommodate the projected workforce growth, the positions of assistant and adjunct CHS physicians were added.90 This new designation gave mental hospitals
significantly more authority over sta↵ training and the distribution of financial resources.
The extra elbow room would make it easier for psychiatric hospital administrators to expand
sectorized psychiatry in the coming decade.91
5.2.3. E↵ects of 1968
The e↵ects of 1968 and its empowerment of mental health workers was evident at both
national and local levels. Consider, for example, the Syndicat’s strategic use of the Commission on Mental Illnesses to re-write the terms of sectorization in favor of public mental
health workers.92 Following a quick resolution to the teaching problem (another victory for
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the hospital psychiatrists, who had gone on strike a second time, between May and October 1971), the Commission turned to other mental health policy issues by organizing seven
di↵erent thematic working groups.93 One group devoted itself entirely to the sectorization,
another to personnel.94 With few private or university psychiatrists serving on these subcommissions, representatives from public hospitals re-designed the Ministry’s objectives for
the sector. With the help of the Commission, the Ministry released several new documents.
The most authoritative was the Order of March 14, 1972, which required the departments
to participate in sectorization. It was followed by a circular – this time, published jointly
with the order in the Journal Officiel – that reminded the local authorities of the available
central government funds (from the May 1955 “social ills” decree) to support the policy.95
Moreover, the documents signaled a shift in tone. The new circular di↵ered from its
predecessor in that it emphasized sta↵ – not buildings – as the core resource of sectorized
psychiatry: “Entrusted to the sector’s chief psychiatrist is the responsibility for a team of
doctors, social workers, psychologists, nurses, etc” (emphasis in the original).96 Moreover,
the document’s annex, “Guidelines concerning the sector team,” included an expansive list
of professions that should be included in the sectors: physicians, nurses, social workers,
psychologists, even teachers and rehabilitative therapists. The interdisciplinary team would
be needed to “multiply” outpatient services. Departmental and hospital administrators were
invited to draft a timetable to prepare for the necessary (indispensables) appointments.97
Over the next two years, a flurry of additional documents and guidelines followed, the
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last of which concluded that “the years 1972-1973 represented an important stage in the
development of French mental health policy.”98
Throughout the 1970s, medical employment exploded, particularly in psychiatry. As
more psychiatrists gained the new CES, and began new positions as adjunct or assistant
CHS physicians, so too did the medical sta↵ at psychiatric hospitals. While the number of
psychiatrists in France had hovered around 1,000 in the 1950s, by the 1970s, their numbers
had reached 13,000.99 Similarly, the new CES in sectorized nursing generated a steady
pipeline of new sta↵ into the growing sectors, as well as allied mental health providers such
as social workers.
As the number of medical degrees and positions proliferated, so too did the trade
unions that represented them.100 The communist union, CGT, had close ties to public
psychiatry through the Syndicat – in its earliest years, many members had been sympathetic
to the Communist Party. However, upon its creation in 1964, a union with closer ties to the
Socialists, the CFDT, garnered broad appeal amongst public sector workers, too. Workers
who preferred the CGT, but rejected the influence of the Communist Party in it, sought
representation from the union’s o↵shoot: FO (Force ouvrière). An unaffiliated group, the
Syndicate of Psychiatry, represented a range of mental health professionals, from interns
to nurses, too. Motivated to raise wages, obtain stronger work protections, and expand
their ranks, these unions pressured hospital psychiatrists and local administrators to take
advantage of sectorization. The availability of the generous May 1955 “social ills” funds –
not yet a↵ected by the emerging oil crisis – made it easy to satisfy them. The long-ignored
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funding mechanism now became central to the maintenance an expanded mental health
services.101
The national policy changes of these years were most vividly experienced at the local
level. In his thesis on the development of sectorization in Angers, Vincent Guérin o↵ers an
example that illustrates how managers took advantage of the generous “social ills” funds
to placate their expanding sta↵.102 In January 1972, the personnel of its public psychiatric
hospital, Sainte-Gemmes-sur-Loire, went on strike. Composed mostly of nurses, the group
of protestors sought to expand their headcount (augmenter des e↵ectifs du personnel ). In
a joint report, the department’s seven chief psychiatrists (one for each sector) o↵ered their
support of the strike, denouncing the fact that it took two protest movements (the first in
1968, and now this one, in 1972) to persuade the authorities to hire personnel. To this, they
added that the events “could have been avoided if the doctors had been listened to,” and
that “a number of issues related to sectorization remained unresolved.”103 The timing of
the strike, just prior to the collapse of the Trente Glorieuses, was fortuitous. The Ministry
had just published the March 1972 order and circular, renewing attention to the May 1955
funds for social ills. The local authorities quickly complied, announcing “a happy solution
to the conflict through the adoption of exceptional measures and financial means.”104
It seems that the authorities continued to turn to this mechanism often. Over the
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following decade, the number of psychiatric personnel in the Angers public mental health
service expanded massively. Between 1970 and 1977, the number of nurses, caregivers,
and social workers (personnel soignant) grew from 744 to 992 – an increase of nearly 130
percent. During this time, the mental health service also added two chief psychiatrists,
and consequently two medical secretaries. The number of hospital interns almost doubled
(from 17 to 31). Spending on nurses alone tripled (from around 32 million francs to 92
million francs), occupying a growing majority of the department’s medical budget (from 77
percent to 87 percent).105 Moreover, the personnel boom continued even as the number of
inpatients was plummeting, from 1,959 to 1,242.106
This second feedback loop therefore runs counter to the usual expectation in political
economy that reducing demand also reduces supply. An apparent reduction in inpatient
demand had not prevented providers from inducing higher levels of supply. Neither did the
increased competition from private psychiatry motivate policy-makers and consumers to
pursue mental health alternatives outside of the public sector. Instead, the intensification
of worker demands, made possible by the events of May 1968, prompted government authorities to support public mental hospitals and sectors. At the time, the Trente Glorieuses
allowed for the “happy” disbursement of government funds, as the concessions of the local
authorities in Angers demonstrates. But the economic boom would soon come to an end.
The third and final feedback loop shows how the empowered public mental health sector
confronted economic crisis.

5.3. Resisting retrenchment
5.3.1. Pressures to reduce public mental health expenditures: economic and ideological
The oil crisis, combined with a maturing welfare state, strained nearly every dimension of
the French economy, including the mental health sector. The election of Valéry Giscard
d’Estaing in 1974 signaled a shift in electoral preferences toward economic conservatism,
but it was his prime ministers, Jacques Chirac, and especially, economist Raymond Barre,
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who sought aggressively to reduce government spending in health care. Hospital care was a
prime concern: at the time, it composed 54 percent of the state’s health insurance (assurance maladie) spending. In 1975, the government began to experiment with a fixed hospital
spending growth rate (taux directeur ), and in 1978, with global budgeting. The circular
of 29 march 1978 set the taux directeur at 9.5 percent – at the time, the general inflation
rate was 17 percent and inflation in health spending was 24 percent.107 On May 7, 1979,
the government announced a yearly two percent reduction in the taux directeur. When
the hospital association protested that the motion was illegal, they received a letter from
Prime Minister Barre himself buttressing the governments’ commitments.108 The costly
psychiatric hospitals, now inflated by rising numbers of psychiatrists, nurses, and social
workers, were not ignored, either. The government announced a reduction of 40,000 psychiatric beds as the target.109 That more young psychiatrists were entering private office
practice facilitated this objective, and increased public psychiatry’s competition from the
private sector.
The emergence of a disability rights movement among middle and upper class families
also challenged the stability of public mental health services for the mentally ill poor. Once
connected through organizations like la Croix Marine, the Syndicat and the disability rights
movement now found themselves on opposite sides of the political aisle. A law passed in
1975 encouraged the transfer of residents of mental hospitals into the not-for-profit “medicosocial” sector.110 Two articles were particularly troubling to public psychiatric workers.
Article 46 established separate services for the care of “dependent adults with chronic
medical needs,” and Article 47 promised a decree detailing the conditions under which the
state would cover “the expenses incurred in establishments receiving mentally ill persons
whose condition no longer requires care in a psychiatric hospital, but does require temporary
107
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medical supervision.”111
The demographic composition of the disability rights movement reveals much about
the nature of policy-making for the vulnerable. In these early years of neoliberalism, politicians could take advantage of the disability rights movement to reduce government spending while supporting a narrative of individualism and self-actualization.112 As a result, the
law’s provisions favored the less vulnerable, those who could a↵ord private and not-forprofit services.Rather than provide free, public services for the disabled poor, politicians
enacted legislation that favored those with financial and familial means instead. Reducing
the population of patients in the public mental health system would also reduce government
spending on that system.
Redoubling the critiques of the disability rights movement of public psychiatry were
those of the escalating anti-psychiatry movement. As in other countries, radical thinkers had
begun to develop critiques of psychiatrists and psychiatric power. Following in the footsteps
of similar networks organized by Michel Foucault, anti-psychiatric movements like that of
the Asylum Information Network (Groupe Information Asile) emerged.113 Even those who
historically had supported public psychiatry contributed to the movement. Félix Guattari
and his former supervisor, institutional psychotherapist Jean Oury, released publications
entitled “The Mental Patients in Revolt” (Les psychiatrisés en lutte) and the Insanity
notebooks (Les cahiers de la folie) to shift attention away from the psychiatrist and toward
the patient. Lucie Fauré herself edited a special issue of the journal La Nef that explored
the topic.114 Psychiatric nurses, too, o↵ered their own tough criticisms. At a syndical
111
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congress in 1974, a collective of nurses and other mental health professionals presented a
310 page report exposing psychiatrists’ demagoguery.115
5.3.2. Workers’ pressures to raise public mental health expenditures: local and national
responses from public managers
Yet despite these pressures to reduce financial support for psychiatric hospitals and services,
public sectorized workers continued to demand revenue increases from their managers. On
the ground, the Giscard reforms to Assurance Maladie had slowed hiring in psychiatric
hospitals.116 They had not, however, halted hiring in the sectors. Still profiting from
the May 1955 funds for social ills, the sectors remained jointly financed by local health
departments (commonly referred to as the Direction départementale des a↵aires sanitaires
et sociale, hereafter DDASS) and discretionary central government funds (simply referred
to as l’État, the State). Moreover, the financial responsibilities of DDASS had lowered
to just 17 percent of costs. Observers have remarked that this arrangement, by referred
to as double financement, was “particularly ’heretical,’ but of unparalleled efficiency in
developing a dynamic public health policy.”117 Two examples of mobilization of workers
and their supervisors at the local level during some of the most difficult moments of the
crisis helps to explain why.
Consider the example of the sector of Nanterre. After accepting an appointment as
chief psychiatrist of the sector in January 1972, Dr. Françoise Martinier drafted an 18-page
report to the authorities, stating firmly that
“This overcrowded sector (90,000 inhabitants) currently has an essential and
paradoxical characteristic: it is clearly under-equipped and at the same time the
existing equipment is under-used.”118
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She was referring to the moderate availability of medical infrastructure (hospitals, clinics),
but the significant lack of medical sta↵ (nurses, social workers), to deliver robust sectoral
services. Over the following year, she drafted sample organizational charts to advocate that
the authorities not only meet the theoretical staffing expectations (Figure 5.3.2), but that
they exceed them (Figures 5.3.2 and 5.3.2). Her requests, however, were ill-timed. The
recent volatility of the financial and monetary systems would be exacerbated by a major
oil crisis that October.
The local authorities were reluctant to support the expansions under the strained
conditions. On November 13, a letter from her colleague Dr. Ayme (in his capacity as
head of the psychiatric hospital in nearby Moisselles) lamented the announcement that the
departmental council (conseil général ) voted to reduce the budget for the assistant psychiatrist promised to her.119 Moreover, at an administrative meeting later that month, officials
announced a significant reduction in shifts – a decision that was “exclusively motivated by
financial concerns,” she protested; and one that constituted a major blow to the “sole or
otherwise principal resource” of the sector: its sta↵.120 Nevertheless, she persisted. She
pleaded with the DDASS director to “first maintain the present situation, and second to
study the ways in which the organization could be made more stable.”121
The supplication prompted DDASS to turn to the State. In May 1974, a letter
from Paris arrived. Its author described the availability of State funds for sectorization
“according to the agreements made regarding the Fight against Social Ills,” adding that “it
is within this framework that a solution can be sought to the various problems to which you
Textes Complémentaires” (Départment des Hauts-de-Seine, Secteur Psychiatrique de Nanterre, March 30,
1927), 2242W 105-108, Archives départementales des Hauts-de-Seine, 1 (emphasis in the original).
Ce secteur surchargé (90,000 habitants), présente actuellement une caractéristique essentielle et paradoxale: il est nettement sous-équipé et en même temps l’équipement existant est sous-employé.
119
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Figure 14: Staffing needs for the Nanterre Psychiatric Sector, as identified by the Chief Psychiatrist, 1973
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Figure 15: Staffing requests for the Nanterre Psychiatric Sector (Part I), as identified by the Chief Psychiatrist, 1973
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Figure 16: Staffing requests for the Nanterre Psychiatric Sector (Part II), as identified by the Chief Psychiatrist, 1973

have called my attention.”122 The knowledge of the financing mechanism must have helped
Dr. Martinier negotiate with local authorities, for by 1981, the sector of Nanterre employed
70 people. Noting the financial difficulties of building a sector under the Barre government,
a celebratory article in Le Monde cheered her “dynamic and active team” and the many
services provided by them. By then these included: an acute care mental health clinic, a
chronic care outpatient center, a day hospital with occupational therapy workshops, music,
culture, and sports activities, a long-term-care hospital, and a rehabilitation center.123 The
good press must have pleased the Syndicat.
While Chief Psychiatrist Martinier in Nanterre was pre-empting labor unrest by protecting and expanding sectorized employment, chief psychiatrists elsewhere were just as
involved in supporting labor unrest post-hoc. Consider now a second example: the March
1981 personnel strike at the psychiatric hospital of la Queue-en-Brie, a southeastern suburb
of Paris. Reductions in the nursing sta↵ had prompted a full strike of all the workers in the
sector. To support them, the Syndicat called for a daylong strike throughout the region of
Paris on March 21. Coincidentally, the regional assembly in Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur
had signaled its support for an intern strike there at the same time.
The Syndicat’s support for public mental health work extended to the national level,
where the economic and ideological threats were most consequential. At their 1978 conference in Deauville, 300 participants assembled to recast the union as both a scientific
and a labor organization, and to formulate a coherent intellectual response to their crit122
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ics that justified the protection of public psychiatric services.124 The papers presented
emphasized the therapeutic justification for public psychiatry, extending and rejuvenating
the concept of sectorization to refute the harshest critics. One important paper proposed
adding “intermediary structures” (structures intermediaries) – a public sector alternative
to those proposed in the 1975 disability law – to the sectors.125 In particular, “therapeutic
apartments” (appartements therapeutiques) would shift patients from the hospital setting
to a less medicalized, more community-oriented one.126 These facilities, too, were anchored
firmly the public sector.
By the end of the conference, the union had passed several newresolutions. They
denounced the disability law’s “serious risks of developing a network of institutions parallel to the public service” and renewing “its demands for ’a financial tool’ that would be
adapted to the situation.”’127 Although the 1955 social ills funds had helped to support
the expansion of public mental health services, their discretionary nature worried the chief
psychiatrists and workers alike. Local mental health politics turned on this unstable mechanism. The group also launched a widespread campaign to respond to their anti-psychiatric
critiques.128 The campaign even extended overseas. The Syndicat, whose historical ties to
the French Communist Party implied a potential sympathy for Soviet psychiatry, used international conferences to demonstrate their distance from the Soviet Union and the horrors
of psychiatric practice there.129
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In addition, an important window of opportunity opened for public managers to exert
their influence in 1982. The defeat of Valéry Giscard d’Estaing by François Mitterrand, a
Socialist, ended 23 years of governance by parties of the Right. With Mitterrand’s election,
the Socialist Party sought to finally implement the “Common Program” (programme commun), a set of Keynesian domestic policies jointly adopted by the Socialist and Communist
Parties in 1972. When the Socialists released their platform in advance of the election, they
had promised to develop sectorization.130 What is more, shortly after the election, the new
Health Minister, Communist Jack Ralite, personally attended the Syndicat’s conference in
Sotteville-lès-Rouen (October 1981). “Far from suppressing jobs,” he declared, “desegregative psychiatry must create them.”131 Proposing that more sectors should be created to
support an even smaller catchment area (50,000 people), he concluded with an invitation:
“For this reason, I entrust to Dr. Jean Demay, known to all for the work he
has undertaken in the field of public service psychiatry, a mission of reflection,
a mission of invention, to renew psychiatry the French way.”132
The opportunity to directly influence government policy was welcomed with enthusiasm by
the Syndicat and public mental health workers. “We could only rejoice at the Minister’s
speech,” the labor leader Dr. Ayme reflected; “It even went beyond what we had ever dared
to claim in terms of the size of the population served by sectors.” As for the choice of Dr.
Demay, it “deprived us of a member of the union hall in exchange for a reliable and fraternal
technical adviser.”133 The next issue of Vie Sociale et Traitements, the principal journal of
sectoral workers, published Ralite’s speech in full as its special feature.134 Mental health
277.
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a revendiquer en matière de population desservie par un secteur.....La choix de Jean Demay nous prive d’un
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workers thus applauded the new government, and the auspicious opportunities it o↵ered
them.135
Through the report, the preferences of public psychiatrists superseded those of private psychiatrists. Typically, the president of the Commission on Mental Illnesses would
expect to author a government-mandated report on mental health such as this one. But
the Commission presidency had recently rotated to a private psychiatrist, Dr. Kammerer.
By choosing Dr. Demay as the report’s author, Minister Ralite ensured that the report
would take a public sector approach to mental health provision. For most of the 1970s,
Demay had led the Commission’s sub-committee on sectorization.136 Long interested in
formalizing the project by law, he organized a three-day colloquium in 1977 to propose the
idea to a legislator.137 Moreover, the addition of his wife, Dr. Marie Demay, a pediatric
psychiatrist in the public sector, as co-author of the report contributed further to its public
sector orientation.138
Contrasting “the French way” of deinstitutionalizing with the British, American, and
Italian experiences, the Demays (and by extension, the Syndicat) proposed anchoring the
project in “public sectoral establishments” (établissements publics de secteur ).139 These
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Leguay, “Le Système de Soins Psychiatriques Français: Réalités et Perspectives,” 15; Jaeger, La psychiatrie en France, 22; Ayme, Chroniques de la Psychiatrie Publique.
136
See Archives Nationales 19910084/28, Folder: Groupe de travail secteur.
137
Leguay, “Le Système de Soins Psychiatriques Français: Réalités et Perspectives,” 15
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culture (dans les années 60-70), ont permis un vaste programme de fermeture des hôpitaux psychiatriques et
de création de centres de santé et de prévention dans la communauté. Mais là aussi la crise économique, certains abandons de patients après une longue dépendance hospitalière, des passages à l’acte de patients chassés
de l’hôpital, ont bloqué le mouvement de désinstitutionnalisation, tandis que continuait à se développer ” une
sorte de dilution de la psychiatrie dans le tissu social aboutissant à psychiatriser insensiblement un certain
nombre de secteurs de celle-ci : éducation, justice, prison... ”.
- La voie italienne : voie radicale de la loi 180, appliquée et efficace là ou elle a été préparée : 4 régions
sur 20, celles des plaines du nord où, soit le mouvement du M.A.I. (Basaglia), soit la sectorisation, avait mis
en place des alternatives hors de l’hôpital. Ailleurs, l’application aveugle de la loi (abandons de malades),
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broadly-defined community services would assume the responsibilities – and with them, the
secure payment mechanisms – historically associated with mental hospitals. To justify this
approach, the Demays looked to their country’s long tradition of “great public services,
recognized for the importance of their role and the quality of their personnel.”140 This
emphasis on personnel reveals much about the agenda driving the report.
For many years, sectoral workers had used the May 1955 social ills funds to obtain
the high revenues necessary for their employment, but the instability of the mechanism
prompted a more ambitious agenda: the “unification of personnel status” (unification du
statuts des personnels). The segregated financing of psychiatric hospitals (statutorily covered by Social Security) and non-hospital sectoral services (discretionarily covered by the
May 1955 social ills funds) had produced two classes of mental health workers: those with
secure positions inside the hospital and those with less secure positions outside the hospital.
(The timeline on page 138 helps to illustrate this division). While the Syndicat had begun
to actively support that agenda in the late 1970s, it was through the Demay Report that
they found an opportunity communicate those demands most directly.141 By transferring
all sectoral services to Social Security, the new establishments would lead to the “disappearance of the current inequalities produced by payer ... in particular regarding the cases of
certain nurses, social workers, psychologists, [and] medical sta↵.”142 This time, Vie Sociale
et Traitements released a full special issue celebrating the recommendation.143 But their
optimism would soon turn sour.
les résistances ou sabotages de lobbies professionnels, les angoisses des familles, vont peut-être aboutir à une
réforme de la loi avec le risque qu’à travers elle des lieux de chronicité soient ressuscités... dans les anciens
H.P. (projets de la Démocratie Chrétienne).
140
Ibid, 5
La tradition française a inscrit dans notre société et depuis fort longtemps l’existence de grands services
publics, reconnus pour l’importance de leur rôle et la qualité de leur personnel ; ainsi en est-il de l’Éducation
Nationale, des Services Publics de Santé, de la Justice, des divers services d’Aide et d’Action sociales.
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5.3.3. Reaching the tipping point under Mitterrand’s turn-to-austerity: protests and resolution
Economic pressures to reduce mental health expenditures reached a tipping point in 1983.
The Common Program had failed to meet the standards required to maintain the European Monetary System so poorly that Mitterrand scrapped the agenda altogether.144 In a
landmark shift known as the “tournant de la rigeur,” the president’s branch of the Socialist
Party turned toward austerity and away from the Communist and more radical wings of
their governing coalition. Moreover, the government’s tone toward mental health changed
substantially. When it outlined its policy goals in the Ninth Economic Plan (1984-1988), it
unveiled a massive reduction target for psychiatric beds that rivaled the aggressiveness of the
Reagan and Thatcher administrations abroad: the closure of 13,000 beds and the conversion
another 28,000.145 Here was a classic case of crisis-induced deinstitutionalization.146
The Syndicat-approved Demay Report would play an important role in protecting
mental health workers from Mitterrand’s turn-to-austerity, but at first the Ministry ignored
the report. The Commission did not meet for several months. “’Rumors’ emanating from
the cabinet suggested that the minister was in favor of this ’hibernation,”’ Dr. Ayme
remembers.147 Moreover, when the Commission eventually convened, the presiding civil
144

The expansionary policies and expensive nationalization measures had deepened the national deficit and
reinforced the high inflation rate, while higher taxes had alienated business elites. The franc was devalued
three times.
Office of European Analysis, U.S. Directorate of Intelligence, “Mitterrand’s Economic Management:
Have the Lessons Been Learned?
An Intelligence Assessment,” December 1983,
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP84S00895R000200010002-6.pdf.
145
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servants made no mention of the report.148 Instead, the Ministry privileged the recommendations of another document. Published shortly before Demay, the Gallois-Taib Report
had proposed reducing psychiatric services by integrating them into the general hospital.149
The marginalization of the Demay Report, Denis Leguay argues, was “like a sort of burial
of the Sotteville speech. Was it too ambitious, [too] costly in terms of human resources?”150
Moreover, the laws of January 19, 1983 and January 3, 1984 applied three additional
austerity measures to the hospital system by: 1) extending the global budget to all CHU
hospitals, hence 2) formally imposing the taux directeur, and 3) terminating the system
of “double financement” that allowed both the State and departments to jointly finance
services.151 The first two reforms, intended for the CHUs, did not trouble mental health
workers as much as the third one. Individual social services (a hospice, a rehabilitation
center, a clinic) now received payments either from DDASS, or from the State, but not
both.152 This gave each payer greater discretion over the service, prompting the adage
“whoever pays, decides” (qui finance, décide) and preventing services from using second
payers as reinforcements.153
In the area of mental health, the State became responsible for all non-hospital sectoral
services, as the timeline (page 138) shows.154 This decision thus depleted spending on
sectoral services by almost a fifth (the 17 percent of costs typically covered by DDASS).155
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152
Reynaud, Lopez, and Coudert, Evaluation et organisation des soins en psychiatrie, 255-6.
153
Reynaud, Lopez, and Coudert, Evaluation et organisation des soins en psychiatrie, 255-6.
154
Bauduret, “Chronique Sur 35 Ans de Sectorisation Psychiatrique: 1960-1995;” Ayme, Chroniques de la
Psychiatrie Publique: 247; Leguay, “Le Système de Soins Psychiatriques Français: Réalités et Perspectives,”
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There are di↵erent interpretations of what happened next. State policy-makers claimed
that the Ministry of Finance never transferred the DDASS funds to the State, and more
specifically, to the Ministry of Health, in order to force Social Security to eventually foot
the bill.156 Alternatively, mental health professionals rebuked the State’s “forgetfulness” as
yet another austerity measure.157 In either case, the government now had reduced financial
support for community psychiatry.
It did not take long for mental health workers to respond. With nearly 85 percent
of mental health spending going to personnel, the new budgetary reductions forced department prefects to terminate contracts, reduce shifts, and forego replacements for outgoing
personnel.158 On June 28, the Syndicat, the Syndicate of Psychiatry, and the CGT Federation of the Île-de-France region organized a protest in front of the Ministry of Health.159
At its meeting the next day, Commission denounced the situation as “perfectly intolerable.” The “unilateral decisions” taken by the government had resulted in the “disruption
of the entire health care system, challenging jobs and relationships, imposing drastic decisions for budgetary reasons alone, ignoring both needs and technical requirements.”160 The
unprecedented statement exposed the political affinity between the Commission and public
sector psychiatry (a hitherto unspoken reality). Upon hearing the statement, the Syndicat
and its allies organized a massive protest for September 20th. That day, hundreds of psychiatrists, psychologists, psychometricians, nurses, and social workers protested in front of
156
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the ministries responsible for resolving the budgetary “error.”161 In that month’s issue of
Vie Sociale et Traitements, the CGT, the FO, and the Syndicate of Psychiatry published
statements condemning the lack of funds.162
That issue of the journal, though, also explored the ways in which the situation could
be used to the mental health workers’ advantage. They had been eyeing the development
of global budgeting for several years.163 Although they were critical of the government’s
use of the global budget as a tool for austerity, some wondered whether a guaranteed global
budget would o↵er non-hospital sectoral services more stability than billing per episode –
especially when “episodes” in community care included relatively inexpensive services such
as a group workshop or a short outpatient clinic visit. In a piece entitled “What the global
budget could be,” Jacques Ladsous, a special needs educator, reflected on the demerits of
the fee for service system, and in particular, its susceptibility to further retrenchment:
“All it takes is to suddenly define ’a day’ in a more precise way ... and to
demonstrate that a certain number of days were counted unduly. It would be
enough, for example, to reduce the notion of ’a day’ to the notion of ’accommodation,’ to beds or nightly bed occupancy.”164
In short, some mental health workers were equally critical of the global budget as they were
of fee for service payments. The current system, too, was subject to government austerity
measures, albeit in a di↵erent way. While the global budget could be reduced from year
to year, the fee for service system could undergo regulatory changes intended to reduce
expenditures.
161
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lits la nuit, pour faire supporter par la journée de quelques-uns tout le travail complémentaire qui s’exerce
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The Ministry seemed to have picked up on this covert apathy as an opportunity resolve
the “financial stalemate” (impasse financière).165 It returned to the Demay Report, using
it now as a template for new legislation that would satisfy both mental health workers
and, ironically, the government’s austerity program.166 The law that was subsequently
proposed, and passed, on December 31, 1985 extended global budgeting to all CHS (the
public psychiatric hospitals), and included sectorized services as part of that reform.167 The
laws thus “legalized” the sector by guaranteeing their statutory coverage by Social Security,
and in doing so, upgraded the status of sectoral workers outside the hospital.168
Through mass mobilization and the strategic use of the Demay Report, therefore,
public workers and their managers gained a significant concession from a fiscally-strained
government. In e↵ect, public sector unions traded global budgeting in the mental sector
for guaranteed employment security. The five alternative explanations identified in Chapter
3cannot fully explain this major development. Contrary to the expectations of the deinstitutionalization literature, pressure to reduce public mental health from movements, medications, and money were just as intense in France as the were elsewhere. The economic and
ideological pressures to reduce the psychiatric service supply, combined the mainstreaming
of tranquilizing medications, threatened to reduce mental health expenditures, maim the
image of public services in psychiatry, and automate public mental health work. Contrary
to the expectations of political scientists, this concession was far from a partisan gift. The
Mitterrand government, though attempting to repair its relations with labor, had made
a sharp turn toward fiscal restraint. The deal in psychiatry, furthermore, was intended to
control costs. Neither was the decision demanded by clients, whose voice was not once documented in the drafting of the 1985 law. Instead, the protection and expansion of the public
165
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mental health sector was the product of workers’ pressure on their managers to expand
revenues and protect their employment – pressured that had grown over time, and reached
their tipping point during this third feedback loop. An independently-organized group of
public managers, the Syndicat, communicated these demands to government clearly and
unequivocally.
Including sectoral services in the CHS global budget had important implications
for deinstitutionalization. Hospitals had no incentive to increase their inpatient activity.
Rather, the prospective global payment encouraged them to re-deploy care to the community setting early and often.169 The result was the accelerated development of diverse,
non-hospital sectoral services. By 1989, the country had developed over 1,000.170 Today,
France’s 1,232 sectors not only meet, they exceed, the Syndicat’s original target (1,200).171
Their success stands in stark contrast to the intentions and operations of their counterparts
in America, which Chapter 6 now will discuss.
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Table 4: Timeline of psychiatric sector financing, key dates
The “Sector”
Hospital/Inpatient Services (post-1970, CHS)
Non-Hospital/Outpatient Services
Payer
Personnel Status
Payer
Personnel Status
1960Double financement:
DDASS (insecure)
Social Security
Social Security (secure)
1983
State funds for “social ills”
fee-for-service
and Departments
(non-discretionary)
(discretionary)
1983- State funds for “social ills”
DDASS (insecure)
Social Security
Social Security (secure)
1985
only (discretionary)
fee-for-service
(non-discretionary)
1985Social Security global
Social Security (secure)
Social Security global
Social Security (secure)
present
budgeting
budgeting
(non-discretionary)
(non-discretionary)

Chapter 6

Deinstitutionalization in the
United States, 1963-1981
In August 1947, a letter of condolence arrived in Paris from New York. The recent death
of Dr. Édouard Toulouse had prompted a colleague in the Syndicat’s counterpart, the
American Psychiatric Association, to write. In it, the author lamented not only Toulouse’s
passing but also the state of American mental health services: asylums simply could not
cope with the growing number of patients (veterans, mostly, from the war). Wards designed
for 20 beds now often held 60, while the general quality of care, food, and even basic
cleanliness were dangerously sub-standard. “One should not think that this situation is
due entirely to the war and its consequences,” he explained. “For several years now, the
situation has become unsustainable. This country, so renowned for its wealth, is rather
miserly toward its public employees.”1 Nurses’ salaries were too low; and the number of
physicians and attendants were too few. Opportunities in “industry” were too attractive.
To improve the situation, a few members of the APA founded the “Psychiatric Foundation”
to “generate public awareness in psychiatry and also to obtain more generous budgets for
1
B. L., “La Prophylaxie Des Maladies Mentales Aux États-Unis,” L’Information Psychiatrique, no. 1
(October 1947): 40.
“On ne doit pas croire que cet état de choses est du entièrement a la guerre et a ses conséquences. Il y a
déjà beaucoup d’années que la situation est devenue insupportable. Ce pays si renommé par sa richesse est
assez avare pour ses employés publics.”
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large psychiatric hospitals.” Their campaign reminded the author of Dr. Toulouse’s own
activism.2
But by then, the members of the Psychiatric Foundation were but a small minority of
the APA. The Association, which had been accepting private practitioners as full members
for the past five decades, had lessened its emphasis on public care. This chapter examines
the e↵ects of the shift by following the same three-part structure as Chapter 5, guided here
by Figure 6. Three negative feedback loops progressively weakened public sector unions
and services in mental health. Unlike the previous chapter, however, this one primarily
uses cross-case pattern matching instead of within-case process analysis to examine the
hypothesis.3 The five alternative explanations for reducing the supply of public psychiatry
discussed on page 29 are present in the American case, where the supply of public mental
health services is, in fact, low. This chapter therefore examines the political position of
public workers and their managers in America relative to that of their French counterparts.
The presence of a powerful labor-management coalition explains the expansion of French
public mental health services because the political preferences of this coalition superseded
the usual pressures to reduce supply. But a similar within-case process analysis does not suit
the study of American deinstitutionalization, where these alternative explanations otherwise
appear to explain the reduced supply of public services. Cross-case pattern matching helps
to isolate the e↵ect of this coalition’s absence in the United States, and redirects scholarly
attention to the role of weakened public trade unions on the reduced supply of public services
in mental health.
The first negative feedback loop (section 6.1) begins with the “founding myth” of
American deinstitutionalization – for it has one, too. The economic growth and reformist
enthusiasm of the post-war period was, as in France, an opportunity to re-build the mental
health services that had been blighted by the war. Yet the feeble support of the APA (com2
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“Il y a quelques mois, un groupe de médecins, s’intitulant “The Psychiatric Foundation” et appartenant a
l’Association Psychiatrique Américaine a commencé une campagne semblable, dans le dessin d’intéresser le
public a la psychiatrie et d’obtenir ainsi des budgets plus généreux pour les grands hôpitaux psychiatriques.”
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bined with the forceful opposition of its ally, the American Medical Association) rendered
the Community Mental Health Centers Act of 1963 inconsequential at the national level and
ine↵ective at the local level. The APA’s inattentiveness to the public sector also had repercussions for the second feedback loop (section 6.2), which discusses how the era’s landmark
welfare legislation contained few provisions for the mentally ill poor, and even precipitated
their reckless removal from care. Meanwhile, the disorganization of public workers negatively fed back into both the availability and reputation of services. The third feedback loop
(section 6.3) begins in the same way as its corollary in the previous chapter, with the onset
of economic crisis and welfare retrenchment. In the United States, the ill-timed maturation of public unions limited their ability to reconstruct the image of public mental health,
increase the supply of services, and reverse the privatization of Community Mental Health
Centers. At no point could the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees rely on the support from the APA, whose stance toward public psychiatry remained
lukewarm at best, injurious at worst. Even a Democratic presidential administration in
the late 1970s proved unhelpful to their cause. Public employees had little influence on the
President’s Commission on Mental Health and its subsequent legislative project, the Mental
Health Systems Act of 1980. What is more, the landslide return of Republicans to power
the following year rescinded the few favorable provisions that had squeaked by Congress,
locking America’s contemporary mental health system into place. The chapter’s conclusion
contrasts the financial security obtained by French sectorized workers with the dismantling
of employment protections for American state hospital workers and the implicit termination
of the Community Mental Health Center program, in order to demonstrate how the absence
of a public labor-management coalition allowed the supply of public mental health services
to decrease in the United States.
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Figure 17: E↵ects of public management-labor coalition-making on the supply of public services, as applied to the case of American
deinstitutionalization (each decade approximates one feedback loop)

6.1. The founding myth: The Mental Retardation and Community Mental Health
Centers Construction Act of 1963
In the words of journalist and social activist Albert Deutsch, decades of depression and war
had dealt a “smashing blow” to American mental hospitals.4 Yet in response, the private
arm of the APA only allowed for limited reforms to public services and its workforce – even if
the situation was just as dire as it was in France after the war. By 1938, the daily population
of American state hospitals exceeded capacity by an average of 10.6 percent – and by over
40 percent in some states.5 Although the Public Works Administration o↵ered to remedy
this problem by funding the construction of additional facilities, nearly 90 percent of the $12
million available went to four skillful and well-sta↵ed state bureaucracies (Massachusetts,
New York, New Jersey, and Illinois).6 The subsequent re-assignments of physicians and
sta↵ to aid the war e↵ort added insult to injury, and further hollowed mental hospitals’
existing personnel shortages. A survey by a nurse employed by the American Public Health
Association found that a hospital with 6,000 patients had only 168 of its expected 538
attendants on duty. Indeed, the Second World War had so aggravated conditions inside
the asylums that even the most robust state systems su↵ered. In 1943, nearly a third of
medical positions in the New York system were unfilled.7 Cutting nonessential services
and sta↵ salaries, medical superintendents squeaked by during these years by devoting
their austere budgets to only the most necessary items, such as food. To compensate for
less ward supervision, they often lowered hygiene standards, increased their use of patient
restraint techniques, and turned to quicker somatic therapies such as insulin, metrazol,
electric shock therapy, and lobotomy.8 Many of these therapies had been imported from
European medical journals, or even by émigré psychiatrists, whose religious or intellectual
background had forced their departure from ascendant authoritarian regimes.
As in France, the close of the Second World War was an ideal opportunity for re4
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form. The military service of many American psychiatrists revived interest in stress and
neuropsychiatric conditions, while the a✏uent optimism of the post-war period prompted
bureaucratic reformers to pursue new mental health legislation.9 Additionally, the booming
media industry brought the realities of asylum life into the everyday lives of ordinary Americans. Oscar-winning films such as The Snake Pit (1948), which chronicled the tormented
stay of a psychiatric inpatient, publicized the semi-autobiographical and critically-acclaimed
novel of Mary Jane Ward (1946).10 The 1948 publication of Deutsch’s most scathing critique of asylums, The Shame of the States, coincided with the film.11 In Washington, an
enterprising civil servant, Robert H. Felix, had taken the helm of the Division of Mental
Hygiene at the U.S. Public Health Service. Inspired by the success of the National Cancer
Institute, established in 1937, Felix sought to resurrect a predecessor’s e↵orts to create a
similar institute for psychiatry and immediately drafted the legislation to do so.12 The
National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) would fund psychiatric research, support the
training of mental health personnel (both in the public and private sectors), and fund locallevel demonstration studies. Fiscal conservatives in Congress were reassured that no funds
would be used to supplant or subsidize the expensive state-based mental health systems,
while the psychiatric and medical professions (particularly those based at elite universities)
were glad of the boost in research support. President Truman signed the National Mental
Health Act into law on July 3, 1946.13
Emboldened by the new federal enthusiasm for mental health and the availability
9
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of NIMH grants, APA president Kenneth E. Appel proposed a study of the “breakdown
crisis” of overcrowded, ine↵ective, and under-resourced postwar state mental hospitals in
1953. Over the following years, the APA met with representatives of the American Medical
Associations to discuss the project. In 1955, the coalition successfully gained congressional
authorization to establish the Joint Commission of Mental Illness and Health (JCMIH). Its
purpose was to diagnose the problems of the mental health system and develop a “feasible
program” of improvement: dual aims whose pursuit would reveal the divides at the heart
of the APA.14 By then, the APA had all but removed public mental hospitals from its
political agenda. More than 80 percent of its membership was employed outside of mental
institutions.15 Neither did the Association do very much to improve the image of the state
hospital as “antiquated, outmoded, and rapidly becoming obsolete,” as one APA president
once polemically admitted.16
Public psychiatric workers did not sit on the Commission. Although the recently enacted Taft-Hartley Act primarily curtailed private sector union rights, many of its provisions
applied to the few organized public unions as well.17 Moreover, few states had extended
collective bargaining rights to their employees. From its small headquarters in Wisconsin,
the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) in fact
applauded the selection of a public psychiatrist Dr. Jack R. Ewalt, then Commissioner of
Mental Health in Massachusetts, as director of the JCMIH – even though it had expressed
significant reservations about the influence of the private “medical lobby” in the past.18
14
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Although private members of the APA generally distanced themselves from public workers,
perhaps Dr. Ewalt would be more sympathetic to their cause.
Yet Dr. Ewalt seemed intent on keeping the peace in the JCMIH by acting as a
neutral arbiter between private and public interests: “By far the larger part of total study,”
Ewalt observed in 1956, “will concern itself, inescapably, with the mentally ill who need
definitive care in a psychiatrist’s office, a mental health clinic or a mental hospital, private or
public.”19 Ewalt’s ambiguity allowed the private sector orientations of the APA and AMA
to significantly influence the recommendations set forth in their final report, Action for
Mental Health. After redoubling the establishment’s commitment to research, the NIMH,
public awareness, and the non sector-specific training of personnel, the report proposed to
ban the construction of state mental hospitals with over 1,000 beds and to build a network
of community clinics to reduce the need for lengthy and recurrent hospitalization. In near
perfect parallel to the French sectorization proposal, clinics would be distributed for every
50,000 persons. Although the report did not specify the sectoral orientation of these clinics,
it did advocate for significantly more federal involvement in financing state mental health
care.
The report’s incongruent objectives were critiqued by both private and public practitioners. As Gerald Grob writes, the “the most vociferous criticism of the JCMIH came from
individuals long identified with traditional state hospitals.” Newton Bigelow, the editor of
Psychiatric Quarterly and a New York state hospital official, wrote a series of editorials enumerating his complaints, which highlighted not only the role that mental hospitals played in
caring for the chronically ill, but also pointed to the “real problem” of sta↵-patient ratios as
the cause of ill-treatment in those hospitals. At a meeting of state psychiatrists at the APA
Mental Hospital Institute in 1961, many criticized the “personal opinions and biases” of the
report.20 Prominent private psychiatrist William C. Menninger, on the other hand, complained that “the superintendents might possibly act as a very potent obstructive force.”21
Library, Archives of Labor and Urban A↵airs, Wayne State University; AFSCME; AFSCME Zander Files
Box 8, Folder 5, Walter P. Reuther Library, Archives of Labor and Urban A↵airs, Wayne State University.
19
Gerald N. Grob, The Mad Among Us, 243.
20
Gerald N Grob, From Asylum to Community: Mental Health Policy in Modern America, 1991, 212.
21
Menninger cited in Ibid.

146

Although this prediction pointed to the influence of public psychiatrists in state politics, it
overestimated their importance. More consequential was the supportive statement issued
by the privately-oriented AMA Council on Mental Health when the report was published.22
Despite the report’s unclear objectives for private and public psychiatry, the arrival
of the Democratic Kennedy administration to the White House in 1961 o↵ered Felix and
the members of the JCMIH a way to secure legislation for some of their recommendations.
In October 1963, Congress passed the Mental Retardation and Community Mental Health
Centers Construction Act – a document whose foundational status might be compared to
that of the 1960 circular in France. The symbolic value of both documents is more significant than their practical influence on deinstitutionalization. To begin, the real inspiration
for the 1963 Act was not Action for Mental Health, but rather the final report of President
Kennedy’s Panel on Mental Retardation, A Proposed Program for National Action to Combat Mental Retardation. The President’s personal concern was with this latter issue. The
bungled lobotomy of his younger sister, Rosemary, had prompted his family – in particular,
activist Eunice Kennedy Shriver and the Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr. Foundation – to support
research and advocacy in the area of intellectual and developmental disabilities.23 Although
Kennedy introduced the legislation to Congress in February 1963 as an e↵ort to address
the “twin problems” of mental illness and mental retardation, it was clear that the law’s
political momentum depended heavily on the personal motivations of the Kennedy family.
That the subject made room for the JCMIH’s requests and the “community mental health”
item on the Democratic Party’s 1960 election platform was convenient.24
Moreover, both the content and financing of the President’s “bold new approach”
to mental health policy was vague. “State, local, and private action” would stimulate the
vast array of recommendations set forth by the recent government reports.25 Research
22
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once again took priority, as the government would support the development of studies and
institutes on mental retardation and illness. Title II of the Act also supported, but did
not mandate, the construction of the JCMIH’s “public and other nonprofit community
mental health centers.”26 No provisions were made to identify the concrete responsibilities
of the “CMHCs,” nor were the funds allocated to them very large. The federal government
expected states to cover a significant portion (one to two thirds) of CMHC construction
costs, and unlike the French circular, capped the available national funds at $150 million
over a restricted three-year period (fiscal years 1965-1967).27
“The real question,” an internal memorandum in the Bureau of the Budget observed,
“is who is going to finance operating costs [of the CMHCs] once the federal subsidies are
ended.”28 The American Medical Association had campaigned intensely to prevent the
allocation of federal funds to items beyond construction, especially to personnel costs. It
was no coincidence that the authorizations paid only for the construction of facilities, an
approach already tested and vetted by the AMA.29 Funding sta↵, however, would promote
the development of a public mental health workforce.30 To be sure, not all of the AMA
opposed the staffing provisions. Initially, it was only the AMA Council on Legislative Activities that strongly criticized the allocation of public funds for CMHC personnel. The AMA
Council on Mental Health, meanwhile, was somewhat more supportive. But in June 1963,
the AMA House of Delegates – an elected general assembly that reflected the Association’s
private sector majority – voted to disapprove the bill. Conservatives in the congressional
House of Representatives seized the opportunity to delete the staffing provisions from the
26
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bill.31
Caught between their public sector minority and private sector majority, as well as
their close affiliation with the AMA, the APA did little to protest the deletion of the staffing
provisions. Its threadbare presence at the July hearing of the bill, just one month after the
AMA House of Delegates overturned a key provision, indicates just how unimportant the
issue was to the psychiatrists. It was only Dr. Ewalt who testified at the hearing, first
and foremost in his capacity as a community mental health expert. As such, he attempted
to re-frame the staffing funds as temporary support for the clinics: “I think you have to
look upon the 75 percent staffing [provisions] and subsequent decrease as a demonstration
[grant].”32 Lacking the political will to support a permanent financing mechanism for the
public mental health program, Dr. Ewalt instead advocated for short-term demonstration
grants.
The fact that Dr. Ewalt could also speak on behalf of the APA came up only after he
had made his statement, when Congressman Kenneth Roberts (D-AL) asked whether the
Association had taken an official position on this legislation. Ewalt acknolwedged that it did
support the bill, and reminded the subcommittee that the AMA had co-sponsored one of
the studies that had inspired it. But there was no attempt to underscore the importance of
the staffing provisions. His was an attitude of tacit permission. Like the French circular, the
1963 Act o↵ered a loose blueprint for the expansion of community mental health services.
The sectoral orientation of these services, and their subsequent success or failure, depended
on the local and national politics that followed.
A local example can illustrate the Act’s limited ability to develop public services,
and the opposition of private psychiatrists to it. With a formidable public administration
and a large medical sector, President Kennedy’s home state of Massachusetts seemed a
likely candidate for the development of CMHCs.33 In fact, its renowned state hospitals
31
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had made the health commissionership “the most powerful in the country.”34 That the
commissionership was held by Dr. Ewalt raised the prospects of public CMHCs in the
state.35 But the state was also known for its leading private academic medical centers,
which often drew medical superintendents out of state hospitals and into the private sector
(Ewalt himself was Professor of Psychiatry at Harvard). The state medical society and the
local chapters of both the AMA and the APA were as invested in private practice as their
national offices were. In addition, the influential Associated General Hospital Psychiatrists
represented many private psychiatrists, and became the most vocal opponents of CMHC
implementation in Massachusetts. Following the passage of the CMHC Act, the group’s
president, Dr. Robert E. Arnot, wrote a letter to the New England Journal of Medicine
expressing the private sector preferences of his organization:
“Unfortunately, psychiatry by necessity has been under government ownership and control, largely through default. Recently, however, psychiatry has
been developing under private auspices in the general hospitals, so that now a
welcome alternative to state psychiatry is o↵ered.”36
While Arnot accepted the need for outpatient mental health care, his organization strongly
opposed its delivery in the public sector. The state task force responsible for planning
the community mental health project “attempted to overcome the objections of the medical society, but without much success,” as Robert H. Connery noted in his case study of
community mental health in Massachusetts.37 Neither did public workers denounce the
opposition of private psychiatrists, for the workers lacked the collective rights to organize
and do so. Not until 1973 did the Commonwealth of Massachusetts grant public unions full
bargaining rights.38 Lacking both the support of supervisors and the pressures of workers,
the state obtained little support from the federal government for community mental health
(about 7 percent of the CMHC budget in the mid-1960s). Since the state could not spend
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34
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the CMHC funds on sta↵, the development of a public community mental health workforce
stagnated.

6.2. The Great Society and the APA
6.2.1. The 1965 Social Security Amendments, and a tax code tweak
If the privately-oriented APA disfavored the public sector in mental health policy, the Association was even less interested in bringing public mental health to the attention of policymakers in other areas of social policy. This second section considers the feedback e↵ects
of the APA’s inactivity during the construction of the postwar welfare state, when public
managers could have taken advantage of the booming economy and sympathetic partisans
to attract general welfare resources to public mental health. The absence a vocal group of
public psychiatrists was most conspicuous in three areas: the landmark 1965 Social Security
Amendments and its related legislation (this section, 6.2.1), the attempts to support the
public employment in the CMHCs (section 6.2.2), and the 1972 disability legislation (section
6.2.3). Because these three sets of new public policies neglected the public mental health
sector, the psychiatric workforce continued to privatize, the mentally ill poor experienced
further marginalization, and powerful anti-psychiatric movements developed to critique the
worsening conditions in public hospitals (section 6.2.4).
The 1965 Amendments to the Social Security Act were important to the eventual
deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill for several reasons. First, the Amendment’s central
programs, Medicare and Social Security, incentivized the hospitals’ many elderly residents
to live in the community for the first time in American history.39 The landmark policies,
though built on earlier ones (pensions for veterans were established after the Civil War, and
were expanded during the Depression), nonetheless constituted a major federal intervention
39
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in the area of social welfare – a competence hitherto assigned to states.Initial discussions
of the Amendments did not have these transformative consequences in mind. Throughout
the 1950s, reformers advocated that the federal government devote special assistance to a
specific segment of the population, the elderly, whose political appeal rested on its image
as needy but deserving. Still, opposition from the AMA, the business community, fiscally
conservative Republicans, and many “states’ rights” southern Democrats had prevented
policy activity in this area. The tables turned, however, with the overwhelming election
of Lyndon Johnson to the Presidency and the inception of his ambitious Great Society
program.
The APA seized the opportunity to advocate for the inclusion of psychiatric coverage
– for both public and private services – in the basket of elderly care benefits, and succeeded.
While the initial proposal only covered psychiatric care provided in general and state hospitals, the APA’s Dr. Robert W. Gibson, medical director at the private Sheppard and Enoch
Pratt Hospital in Baltimore, protested both the clinical and financial implications. State
psychiatric hospitals had many problems. Length of stay, for example, was much shorter
in general hospitals. More importantly, he said, “other types of facilities can often render
more appropriate treatment at far lower cost – private psychiatric hospitals, day hospitals,
outpatient departments, community mental health centers, and so on.” Citing a study that
promised an 80 percentage discharge rate of private psychiatric hospital elderly patients,
Gibson managed to convince the committee of the merits of covering psychiatric care for
the elderly in all types of institutions. The final bill granted their request.
Yet APA’s interest in Medicare coverage, which protected private practice, did not
extend into the discussions of Medicaid coverage – the second important implication of
the 1965 Amendments for deinstitutionalization. Without much protest from the APA, let
alone the AMA, this smaller health insurance program for the poor excluded payments to
“Institutions for Mental Disease.” Slipped into the 1965 Social Security Act by Representative Wilbur Mills (D-AR)(the 1960 Kerr-Mills Act) to include the blind, the disabled,
and families participating in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program.40 The
40
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program was likely to a↵ect needy patients in mental hospitals. On average, states allocated
nearly a tenth of their budgets to paying for indigent care in asylums.41 Although governors
and state administrations welcomed the opportunity to share these costs with the federal
government, few in Congress were willing to take them on. “When we get into this field it
is going to cost a lot of money,” said Senator Russell Long (D-LA) at Dr. Gibson’s hearing, questioning the cost e↵ectiveness of supporting even private psychiatric care. Congress
therefore excluded Institutions for Mental Disease payments from the basket of Medicaid
benefits, with the APA’s tacit acceptance.42
Neither did trade unions complain much about this decision. No attention was paid
to how the bill’s demographic implications might a↵ect the populations served by public
institutions. After all, “Medicaid was merely an afterthought,” as Laura Katz-Olson writes
in her political history of the program.43 AFSCME, and in fact the whole of the American
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), instead focused
its attention on the bill’s implications for aging workers. The adoption of federal pension
and health insurance programs would reduce the unions’ own obligations to provide these
benefits to their members. Even Arnold S. Zander, the founder and president of AFSCME,
wrote a letter to the Committee on Ways and Means supporting the bill and emphasizing
the needs of “thousands of retired State and local government employees who are receiving pitifully inadequate retirement benefits.” Medicaid, a smaller program for which few
AFSCME members would be eligible, appeared unimportant.
was not the intention in 1965. In fact, the Amendments restricted coverage by requiring states to share some
of the costs of the program (a financial disincentive, especially to the neediest states) and by giving them
significant leeway over the scope of coverage.
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What AFSCME did not anticipate, however, was how a small piece of pork legislation, enacted on the heels of the 1965 Amendments, e↵ectively subsidized state mental
hospitals’ competitors – the Amendments’ third important implication for deinstitutionalization. On November 2, 1966, President Johnson signed legislation “requiring the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to permit the nursing homes a modest profit
when reimbursing them for their services to Medicare patients.”44 It was first proposed
in the House in March 1965 by Representative John Byrnes, a Republican from Wisconsin
(where a recent survey had found a “serious shortage” of facilities), but retreated from the
fore as congressional attention turned to the Social Security Amendments.45 The proposal
then reappeared in the Senate in September 1966 when Senator Jack Miller (R-IA), of the
Committee on Aging, tacked it onto a bill intended control the costs of tax collection (the
IRS had recently implemented a new automatic data processing system). The addition of
Section 7, on nursing homes, to the bill would “save the taxpayers several million dollars,”
his colleague Senator Long assured.46 It would also speed up the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare’s (DHEW) regulatory e↵orts in this area.47 Only a few questions
were raised. At the House meeting, Congressman Thomas Curtis (R-MO) would have liked
more time to consider the measure, while Congresswoman Frances Bolton (R-OH), a former
nurse, wondered why the funds could not also go to nursing sta↵.48
Still, there was enough general agreement to pass the bill (with a “motion to recon44
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sider” these issues in more detail at a later time).49 Miller had consulted with the Senate
majority and minority leader, as well as the ranking Republican on the Finance Committee
and the chairman of the Special Committee on Aging. After it was sent to the House for
conference, a joint committee developed more specific conditions about the “modest profit”
available to nursing homes.50 It stipulated that profits would not only depend on services
delivered, but also on the costs spent on buildings and construction. Reimbursing on the
basis of a reasonable charge instead of a reasonable cost, moreover, would incentivize both
private for-profit and private not-for-profit services to build new nursing homes. Public
nursing homes were excluded, since they were not driven by the profit motive. Instead,
the private nursing home industry had successfully capitalized on the wave of aging policy
sweeping Congress.
It was hence the federal government’s affirmative support for private nursing home
care and private psychiatric benefits, combined with its refusal to cover care provided in state
and county mental hospitals, that motivated states to transfer their elderly mental patients,
and some younger patients meeting disability criteria, to private institutions. Between 1965
and 1972, rates of admissions of individuals over 65 to state and county mental hospitals
halved, from 146 per 100,000 to 69 per 100,000. The locus of care for these individuals
shifted from asylums to nursing homes. Between 1960 and 1970, the number of nursing
home facilities increased by 140 percent, of nursing home beds by 232 percent, and of
nursing home patients by 210 percent.51
6.2.2. The tepid return of staffing grants
The Great Society movement had implications for CMHCs, too. With private practitioners
distracted by the Social Security legislation, bureaucrats and activists once again turned
their attention to the staffing issue. Originally, not not all were in favor of returning to
49
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the staffing grants campaign. In fact, advocate Mike Gorman (Executive Director of the
National Committee Against Mental Illnesses) had persuaded Dr. Stanley Yolles (Felix’s
replacement at the NIMH), to pursue additional funding only after more centers had been
constructed.52 In the meantime, the NIMH had issued regulations requiring centers to
include a proposed staffing pattern in their application for construction funds, in hopes that
this might encourage applicants to develop a plan for their longer-term financial viability.53
But an internal memo authored by his colleague Robert Atwell convinced Yolles that the
time was ripe for additional legislation. Seeking to add an additional 1,800 centers to the
232 projects in operation, Yolles and Atwell began to draft legislation.54
The time was ripe for favorable APA participation, too. Leadership changes at the
Association had renewed some attention to public practice. Several key promoters of psychodynamic (and thus private) treatment had stepped down from leadership positions; while
psychiatrists with sympathies for public practice had taken on larger roles. Dr. Daniel Blain
– the founder of the Mental Hospital Institute for the study of state and county mental hospitals, and the former Commissioner of Mental Health for the state of California – had just
become President. Dr. Walter Barton – the former superintendent of Boston State Hospital
– was the organization’s new Medical Director. Eager to support the new bill, the APA’s
new leaders quieted the AMA’s opposition. This they did by exchanging the AMA’s silence
on staffing grants for the APA’s support on other issues (general practitioners had become
too progressive, and the AMA needed specialists to o↵-set their electoral influence).55 The
new leaders also invited diverse attendees to a conference on CMHCs in January 1965, at
which a motion was passed to support the bill. Participants from the public sector were far
more numerous than at other conferences, and included state mental health authorities, the
Secretary of the DHEW, and the governor of Illinois. Serving as a counterweight to the more
conservative interests at the conference (the AMA, state medical societies, and the APA
52
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district branches) were the National Council of Churches, the American Nurses Association,
and the influential President of the United Automobile Workers, Walter Reuther.56
It is true that labor groups had become more interested in the CMHCs – so much so
that the AFL-CIO agreed to coordinate lobbying activities for the new bill.57 Even so, the
interests of the union in promoting the growth of the centers stemmed not from the potential
employment opportunities o↵ered by them, but from their value as treatment centers for
poor workers with psychiatric conditions.58 “Many of the treatment methods that seem to
o↵er the greatest hope of recovery,” stated Lisbeth Bamberger, Assistant Director of the
AFL-CIO Social Security Department, “are substantially more available to the well-to-do
than to low-income patients.” Citing a recent study conducted in New York, she noted that
while 50 percent of upper-income psychotic patients received treatment on an outpatient
basis, only 10 percent of lower-income psychotic patients received care outside the hospital.
Bamberger’s analysis, though acute in its analysis of the political economy of mental health,
nonetheless focused on the policy’s “consequences to workers and their families.” AFSCME,
furthermore, did not participate.59
Notice that the APA statements did not explicitly back public community mental
health. Speaking on behalf of the Association, Vice President Dr. Addison M. Duval
allowed for some conflation of community care and private outpatient practice. Celebrating
the deinstitutionalization of the past two decades, he stated:
“Today, two out of every three mental patients are being treated on an
outpatient basis and the majority of them in the private sector of medicine...
No, gentlemen, I submit that we haven’t been sitting on our hands waiting for
a handout from the Congress. We have demonstrated beyond any shadow of
doubt that it is possible to rid ourselves of the custodial care of the past. It is
possible to give every citizen in this country adequate care for mental disorders,
56
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promptly, at the right time, and at the right place, in his own community.”60
What he was suggesting, of course, was that Congress support community care by devoting
public funds to it. Dr Duval, after all, was Georgia’s Director of the Division of Mental
Health and a former employee of the federally-funded St. Elizabeth’s Hospital in Washington, D.C. But he was equally aware that the majority of his colleagues were uninterested in
public practice. “Our task,” he o↵ered, “is to help ensure that an ever-greater percentage of
[young psychiatrists] will turn from interest in private practice to a broader application of
their clinical skills in comprehensive community services.”61 The language of “community,”
“broad application,” and the “outpatient basis” carefully avoided any explicit advocacy on
the behalf of public services. In fact, by distancing CMHCs from state hospitals, the APA
loosened the association of mental health care with public sector provision.
The bill passed. Not quite a panacea for the CMHCs, it nonetheless authorized $73.5
million for the the centers’ operational expenses. Although Congress authorized the funds
for only three years, the Senate had insisted that the bill exclude a termination date. This
opened the door to their renewal. Nonetheless, the centers that received support in the
first year would receive substantially less in the second and third years (75 percent and 30
percent of the first year grant, respectively). The opportunity to expand public community
mental health, though already constrained, still remained open.62
6.2.3. The 1972 Social Security Amendments
The federal expansion of disability benefits excluded payments to people residing in public
institutions. This is one reason why the 1972 Social Security Amendments sit uneasily
between the Great Society reforms of the 1960s and the impending welfare retrenchment of
the 1970s and 1980s. Enacted just one year after the “Nixon shock” to international markets
in 1971, and just one year prior to the oil shock in 1973, the Social Security Amendments
of 1972 are, on the one hand, the first of many conservative e↵orts to control government
costs during this time. After all, the desire to “rationalize” state public assistance programs
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(accused of undermining employment, disrupting family structures, and abusing federal
funds) motivated conservative interest in the bill.63 On the other hand, the Amendments
expanded the categories of federal assistance and developed a new stream of federal income
support. That the mentally ill qualified for some of these funds would have significant
consequences for their deinstitutionalization, as well as for their unsuspecting public sector
care-givers.
As an organization that represented state and county workers, AFSCME’s primary
concern was the “federalization” of local jobs, not the e↵ects of the bill for patients in mental
institutions. Although the trade union generally supported income replacement programs,
it noted that the proposed bill would “transfer ... eligibility and cash assistance payment
functions from State and local governmental agencies to the Federal Government. However,
no provision is made [in the bill] with respect to an estimated 90,000 public employees
who presently perform these functions.” If those workers were left unemployed, the union
argued, it would ironically have the e↵ect of forcing them to participate in the programs
“as recipients rather than as gainfully employed individuals.”
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The fate of state welfare administrators did not concern the APA (quite unlike their
counterparts in France.) After all, states employed only a handful of the Association’s
members. The APA instead devoted its attention to the provisions of the bill that might
impact the 1965 Amendments’ coverage of (mostly private) psychiatric services. As Dr.
Gibson testified,
“Today my request is again basically for the elimination of all the discriminatory limitations applied to the treatment of the mentally ill: removal of the
190-day limit under Medicare on inpatient treatment and removal of the higher
coinsurance for outpatient care and services; under Medicaid the removal of
restrictions that limit treatment of eligible individuals under 65 to general hospitals.”65
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Lengthening the duration of Medicare coverage for inpatient treatment would benefit private
psychiatric and general hospitals; lowering co-insurance costs for outpatient care would
benefit clinicians in private offices; and the removal of Medicaid restrictions for poor patients
in general hospitals would reduce the volume of care in state and county mental hospitals.
Once again, the APA supported policy positions that benefited the majority of its members,
those in private practice, and did little to support the minority of public practitioners.
Yet the bill that ultimately came to pass had little to do with Medicare and Medicaid. Instead, it replaced state welfare programs for the aged, the poor, the blind, and
crucially, the disabled with the federally-administered Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
program, and added an unanticipated bit of fine print: recipients could not reside in public
institutions.
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Records show no indication that AFSCME nor the APA expected the eligi-

bility exclusion, in part because both groups were more concerns with the bill’s immediate
implications for their members. Perhaps psychiatric workers would have acted di↵erently
had they foreseen this clause – or the negative feedback e↵ects of the other Great Society
programs, for that matter.
6.2.4. E↵ects
As in France, the psychiatric workforce in America had expanded – but in the private, not
public, sector. This was partially the result of similar factors (the postwar baby boom, the
service transition, the new cultural interests of the 1960s); though the government played
a role, too. Part of the NIMH mandate included workforce development. No provisions
were made, however, to direct graduates of its training program into public mental health.
Unlike the Syndicat in France, the APA made no attempt to structure the program in the
interest of public sector work. Furthermore, the late development of public sector unions
66
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precluded groups like AFSCME from contributing to the program’s design in the 1960s.67
Over the following decade, the program did grow. Appropriations for the NIMH training
program had expanded to $117 million by 1972 (from only $3 million in 1950). Many
of its graduates, moreover, entered the public sector after graduation (nearly 80 percent,
according to one study)– but they tended to work in the federal bureaucracy as analysts
and program directors, not in the field as clinicians.68 As Connery keenly observed,
“Without casting aspersions on the motivations of medical professionals,
one wonders what assurance there is that even a greatly expanded training
program would not work primarily to increase the availability of treatment for
middle class neurotics, rather than to sta↵ adequately the proposed network of
centers.”69
At state mental hospitals, a quarter of positions for sta↵ psychiatrists remained unfilled.70
That few of these workers were represented by trade unions made it even less likely that
federal policy would reflect their interests.
Private psychiatry, meanwhile, was booming. Between 1968 and 1972, the country
added 26 private psychiatric hospitals – all of them for-profit, and all of them owned by
the many new private corporations entering the health care market.71 Spending on private
outpatient psychiatry now exceeded one billion dollars.72 The financial basis of these funds
came from neither the new federal insurance programs (note the protests of Dr. Gibson,
above), nor from private insurance companies, which lacked a national mandate to cover
67
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costly mental health services.73 Instead, out-of-pocket payments financed the vast majority of private office practice. A study conducted in the early 1970s found that the near
exclusive focus of these offices was patients with neurotic conditions from the professional
and managerial classes, or “middle class neurotics,” as Connery put it. Blue-collar workers,
white-collar (non-managerial) workers, and schizophrenic patients were underrepresented.
African Americans and Hispanics were “virtually absent” from these offices.74 Perhaps the
greatest beneficiary of the boom, however, was the private nursing home industry, where
spending now amounted to four billion dollars (more than twice that spent by states on
long-term public institutional mental health care).75 By the early 1970s, the nursing home
population had roughly doubled since the 1966 tax code tweak.76
Without the support of a public psychiatric workforce, public mental health was
losing traction on the ground (and becoming even less attractive to prospective workers).
Since SSI recipients could not reside in public mental hospitals (or public jails, halfway
houses, and similar institutions), local governments economized by releasing patients at
state and county mental hospitals and transferring them to this new federal program. The
year following the program’s enactment saw a record reduction in the institutionalized
population: 13.3 percent.77 States could also save costs by transferring patients eligible for
Medicaid (the majority) to covered acute and long-term care settings. As Gillon succinctly
summarizes,
“if a poor person were treated in mental hospital, the state would have to pick
up the entire bill. If, however, the patients could be transferred to a facility that
was not designated mostly for the treatment of mental illness, the government
would pick up as much as 70 percent of the bill.”78
Abetting this process was the structure of benefits for mental patients over 65, who constituted a large swath of the resident population. Although Medicare paid for up to 190
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days of inpatient psychiatric care (both in public and private hospitals), the benefit term
was too brief to support long-term care. Moreover, Medicaid could help cover the costs of
the burgeoning private nursing home sector, an industry made large and profitable by the
1966 tax code tweak. In the decade prior, the number of nursing homes increased by 140
percent, beds by 232 percent, and patients by 210 percent.79 For states, the writing was on
the wall: public mental hospitals no longer needed the budgetary attention than they once
did.
The relocation of deinstitutionalized patients was a shrewd financial move, but it
was not necessarily benevolent. A few “psychiatric ghettos” arose in the urban centers
near deinstitutionalizing hospitals.80 As private entrepreneurs converted run-down hotels
and houses into boarding homes and halfway houses, former mental patients often found
themselves living together once again; this time without professional medical attention. A
study conducted in 1974 in New York City found that one in four residents of the city’s
“welfare hotels” once resided in a public mental hospital.81 The elderly patients who now
lived in nursing homes, moreover, were not much better o↵. A study conducted in 1977 by
the federal government found that half of nursing home residents lived in facilities with over
100 beds, and about a third of those patients in facilities with over 200 beds. The majority
of facilities lacked trained medical sta↵ and few o↵ered the psychiatric care necessary for
those with serious conditions.82 What had occurred was not the deinstitutionalization of
patients from the hospital into the community, but rather, the trans-institutionalization of
patients from a medical institution to a merely custodial one.
Theoretically, CMHCs could help to provide some of the missing medical care for
79
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some patients. But the program had developed little since the addition of staffing grants.
When SSI was enacted, only 400 (out of the projected 2,000) CMHCs had received federal
funding. Since neither Medicare nor Medicaid guaranteed coverage of the CMHCs, the
centers’ long–term financial viability depended on alternative sources of payment, such as
local funding.83 Few organizations even attempted the project. Those that did, though,
found themselves depending on privately paying patients, for only they could support the
regular, lengthy therapy sessions o↵ered by the centers. Moreover, Congress soon expanded
the community mental health mandate to include services for substance abusers, addicts,
and children.84 Soon enough, CMHCs “began to focus on reaching more clients who could
verbalize their problems - and who could pay” as one therapist remarked.85 This meant
replacing services for the seriously mentally ill (access to medical care, housing, employment)
with services for those with milder conditions (marriage counseling, family therapy). In
fact, the demographic shift was so pronounced that that analysts coined a new acronym
for the centers’ clientele: YAVIS – young, attractive, verbal, intelligent, and successful.86
Although CMHCs in urban areas tended to be from poorer and non-white backgrounds, by
the 1970s, only 15 percent of the total CMHC patient population was from the schizophrenic
category.87 Very few CMHC patients had severe needs, let alone needs that had required
hospitalization.88 Poor mental patients were beginning to fall through the cracks.
Meanwhile, the reduction of state budgets had worsened conditions in public mental
hospitals, prompting a new wave of social movements aimed at protecting the mentally
ill. “Virtually every patient’s rights law suit in this country can be traced directly to
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over-crowding, understaffing, and inadequate funding of state institutions,” an AFSCME
lobbyist would later complain89 But rather than support the expansion of public funds, the
movements unconsciously aligned themselves with the interests of private psychiatrists. A
number of social scientists, both in the United States and abroad, had begun to question
the dominance of the psychiatric profession as arbiters of social norms. The publications of
scholars such as Thomas Szasz (e.g., The Myth of Mental Illness, 1961, and The Manufacture
of Madness, 1970) and Erving Go↵man (most notably, Asylums, 1961) circulated among
readers who were sympathetic to similar liberationist ideas in Black, feminist, and other
critical thought. Many of them responded by rejecting state-operated psychiatric services,
believing that the termination of these services would result in the termination of psychiatric
oppression, too. Few may have realized their inadvertent support for the privatization of
psychiatry in its stead.90
Related currents of thought had made their way into legal scholarship, too. In 1960,
physician-lawyer Morton Birnbaum coined the word “sanism” to refer to the discrimination
of the mentally ill. In his influential article, “The Right to Treatment,” Dr. Birnbaum
argued that involuntary commitment in a state hospital without adequate medical treatment
was the equivalent of incarceration without substantive due process.91 Inspired by this and
other writings, a dense network of interest groups followed the example of the Civil Rights
Movement and actively pursued legal recourse for patients mistreated by state psychiatry.92
A ripple of court decisions in the 1970s are evidence of their success. In 1971, U.S. District
Court Judge Frank Johnson Jr. ruled in Wyatt v Stickney that the care provided in a state
89
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hospital must give individuals “a realistic opportunity to be cured or improve his or her
mental conditions.” In 1972, a three-judge court in Wisconsin ruled in Lessard v Schmidt
that involuntary commitment was legal only when the lack of confinement would lead to
the patients’ “immediate harm to himself and others.” In 1973, the Supreme Court ruled in
O’Connor v Donaldson that involuntary commitment was illegal in cases of “non-dangerous”
individuals, who were otherwise “capable of surviving of surviving safely in freedom.”93 All
three cases chipped away at state authority in the area of mental illness – a development
that aided the ongoing financial retrenchment of its services. In e↵ect, these movements
both arose from and contributed to the pattern of deinstitutionalization in America.94

6.3. Accepting retrenchment
As in France, the economic shocks of the early 1970s, combined with ongoing war e↵orts,
strained public budgets – and pressured public mental hospitals to close. Devoting what
few resources they had to the conflict in Vietnam, American officials withdrew funding
from mental health and other social welfare initiatives.95 Support for the NIMH (and its
director, Stanley Yolles) was the first to go.96 Immediately after the OPEC crisis, the
budget for its training program declined. Just days prior, Betty Miller, the coordinator of
a new AFSCME initiative to promote careers in public hospitals, had met with Chief of the
NIMH Careers Training Branch, Vernon James. Her memo on the meeting acknowledges
both its inopportunity and its insecurity:
“I met with Vernon James on November 13, 1972. As of that morning,
his budget had been cut back. He did not know how much but he was quite
sure there would be no money for new programs at least until January. In the
event that there was money, it could only be applied to projects which would
be submitted in June, 1973, and would become operable January, 1974.”97
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The Miller memo captures an essential problem of public sector unionism in the 1970s, and
its role in this third and concluding feedback loop. Their mobilization arrived too late to
garner the political support from their managers to advance the interests of public mental
health workers and sustain services (section 6.3.1), even under a sympathetic Democratic
Presidential Administration (section 6.3.2). Rather, public managers in the APA remained
unable to convince the Association to support public mental health workers. By the time
economic retrenchment hit its peak under the reign of Reagonomics, politicians easily rescinded the employment protections o↵ered to workers of deinstitutionalizing and hospitals,
and halted the development of the CMHC program (section 6.3.3).
6.3.1. AFSCME’s delayed start
With the accrual of state-level bargaining rights, public sector unions had become larger
and more influential, particularly in Washington. By the early 1970s, AFSCME established
a Public Policy Analysis Department to study federal legislative a↵airs. Its primary focus,
moreover, was deinstitutionalization.98 Among the first of its activities was the publication
of “Out of Their Bed and Into the Streets.” The union had hired Mexican-American
journalist Henri Santiestevan, formerly the editor of the UAW monthly Solidarity and
a regular public relations consultant to Cesar Chavez and the United Farm Workers, to
author a report on the e↵ects of deinstitutionalization.99 Thoroughly critical, the report
emphasized the the e↵ects of this “national non-policy on mental health for “crime, nursing
home scandals, and community protests,” as well as for state hospital employees, who faced
“too many negative experiences with deinstitutionalization as a shell-game for budget cuts,
layo↵s, and profiteering.”100 Its publication, as Bill Hamilton of the AFSCME Public A↵airs
98
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office noted, took “nerve.”101 The public relations strategy, though bold, faced a difficult
political climate and a hostile public.102
The APA, now representing more private practitioners than ever before, continued
to distance itself from the CMHC program. By the early 1970s, it had “recommended that
the [CMHC] staffing grant program be changed to an operational grant program.”103 The
more muted language would allow for greater program “flexibility” – and kept the concerns
of private practitioners at bay by couching any support for public workers in more general
language. The AMA, for its part, testified in favor of “diminishing federal assistance.”104
AFSCME pleaded with these groups. In a speech to the APA in Philadelphia in 1970, the
union’s then-President Jerry Wurf argued:
“[Deinstitutionalization] defines an area in which hospital management can
do more than grumble about the indi↵erence of hospital employees. Here is an
opportunity for action to please and benefit the worker, and consequently, to
change the atmosphere surrounding the patient.”105
Contents.
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But the Association did not accept Wurf’s invitation to collaborate. In the same speech,
Wurf himself had acknowledged the economic realities of mental health work. While physicians had raised fees “at a rate 50 per cent faster than the cost of living,” “the wages of nonsupervisory hospital personnel average[d] less than subsistence level in private, non–profit
hospitals.”106 Lacking the support of the rest of the psychiatric workforce, and most importantly, their supervisors, AFSCME had missed its opportunity to form coalitions with
sympathetic political allies.
The dependence of the staffing grants on congressional approval also undermined
their political prospects. As states continued to transfer mental inpatients to federal programs, the Republican presidencies of the early 1970s hastened to cut funds not only from
the NIMH, but also from the CMHC program. Claiming that the program was never intended as more than a demonstration grant, Nixon’s DHEW Secretary, Casper Weinberger,
impounded the CMHC funds. But a solidly Democratic Congress protested the move,
prompting D.C. District Court judge Gerhard Gesell to overturn the decision and order the
funds released.107 Still, the dependence of the grants on congressional support rendered
them unstable.108 A pattern emerged in which Congress would renew appropriations, the
President (Nixon, then Ford) would veto the bill, and Congress would override it – a tenuous
solution to resolving the mounting issues in mental health policy.
AFSCME paired its public relations strategy with significant mobilization at the local
level. But here, too, it scrambled to find solutions to challenges whose root causes lay in
the past. Moreover, tremendous variation in state-level public policies made it difficult for
the union to arrive at a coherent strategy. In fact, for most of the 1970s, AFSCME lacked
106
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a unified policy position on deinstitutionalization. “As I understand it,” Mike Dowling
wrote to President Wurf in a memo raising the issue, “we [AFSCME] are totally against it
[deinstitutionalization] in Pennsylvania, with a modified acceptance in New York State, in
Milwaukee we are both against and for.”109
Much of this variation depended on the distinct policy and partisan context of the
various states. In California, for example, then-Governor Ronald Reagan had embarked
upon an aggressive policy of shutting down state hospitals, but “the single most important
element” of the process was the “need for careful handling of the potentially explosive issue
of employee redundancies and layo↵s,” as Scull observed in Decarceration.110 After four
closures, public unions there mobilized the solidly Democratic legislature to postpone plans
to close the remaining state hospitals by the end of the decade. It was the first time a
gubernatorial veto had been overturned in 28 years.111
Meanwhile, in New York, Democratic Governor Hugh Carey proved more willing to
develop a jointly acceptable solution to the pressures of deinstitutionalization. There, AFSCME helped to design a state-operated community mental health system, with guaranteed
funding and employment for redundant hospital workers. At national congressional hearings, the union and its allies from New York frequently hailed the option as an alternative
worth imitating elsewhere.112 But few other states had the large and protected public sector
union activity of California and New York to promote similar expansions in public mental
health.
109
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6.3.2. The Carter Presidency and the limitations of Left partisanship
Political scientists expect Left administrations to sympathize with the expansion of both
mental health services and public employment, but, the ongoing pressures of stagflation did
little to guarantee favor to public mental health workers. The arrival of President Carter to
the White House in 1977 was no di↵erent. First Lady Rosalynn Carter’s personal interest
in mental health issues prompted the Administration to set up a new President’s Commission on Mental Health (PCMH). It included nearly every interest group in the mental
health field – except public psychiatric workers. “Glenn Watts of the CWA [Communication
Workers of America] is the only labor representative on the Commission,” complained an
internal AFSCME memo, “while most other Commissioners are management or advocates
of deinstitutionalization.”113 Management, of course, included the American Psychiatric
Association. In an attempt to counterbalance the position of the Association and other
“advocates of deinstitutionalization,” AFSCME requested that the PCMH appoint the
union’s Vice-President Blatz to the Task Panel on Deinstitutionalization, Rehabilitation,
and Long-Term Care.”114 The request, though successful, ultimately did little to advance
the union’s interests in the sea of competing policy positions. In the Commission’s final
report, the mental hospital chaplain was listed as “Father Albert Blatz, St. Peter State
Hospital, St. Peter, Minnesota.115 ” No mention was made of his position in AFSCME.
Instead, the composition of the Commission indirectly favored the APA. While the
PCMH had failed to acknowledge public workers, its leadership was concerned about the
equitable representation of other groups. Of its 20 Commissioners, eight were women, three
were African-American, two were Hispanic, and one was Native American. Academics from
various disciplines, lawyers, human rights activists, and a minister were also included. Although the APA complained that the diversity of the Commission was “less than reassuring,”
three out of the twenty Commissioners were members of the Association.116 Furthermore,
113
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a grant from the Institute of Medicine helped to hire two additional deputy directors to the
support sta↵, both of whom were psychiatrists from elite universities.117 In the opinion of
an activist, Priscilla Allen, some of their contributions “were logically correct but did not
correspond with what actually happens in reality.”118 Allen, like many others, was concerned that the recommendations of the Commission would not benefit the most vulnerable
of mental patients.
“What we need is a more comprehensive and coordinated public and private strategy for financing mental health service,” the Commission argued, “where payment is based
upon the need for care, not diagnosis, and upon the appropriateness of care, not the discipline of the provider.”119 Its final report summarized all of the policy issues in the mental
health system, and o↵ered recommendations to remedy them. The report acknowledged
the importance of public finance for mental health care provision– and even went so far as
to support the campaign for national health insurance – but its more immediate, actionable
recommendations sought to bolster private care. Medicare benefits, for example, should be
amended to cover CMHCs and more acute and short-term hospitalization, as well as to reimburse more outpatient care(all services based largely in the private sector). Moreover, the
report said nothing of the Institutions for Mental Disease exclusion, and instead criticized
the Medicaid program for covering too much institutional care (including in nursing homes).
The report asked that states extend Medicaid coverage to more outpatient mental health
services, and that they invite private health insurers to do the same. Furthermore, the
report encouraged the “phase down and where appropriate closing of ...large State mental
American psychiatrist. While Dr Mitchell-Bateman’s personal interests concerned underserved populations,
her recent service to the profession as vice-president to the APA (1973) qualified her to speak on behalf of
members with more elite patient populations as well.
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hospitals.”120 Little was said about the other factors, outside of the health system, influencing deinstitutionalization. A vague recommendation that the administration “explore
the feasibility of creating a new system to meet the costs of chronic mental disability” was
the only one that acknowledged SSI’s role in deinstitutionalization. Personnel recommendations focused on the need to diversify the workforce and develop new curriculums.121 Taken
as a whole, the PCMH’s recommendations would benefit private community mental health
services – what AFSCME once disparagingly called “Rosalynn Carter’s pet cause” – over
any form of publicly provided care for poor patients with mental illnesses.122
Two years later, the still-Democratic Congress took up the recommendations of the
PCMH.123 Debates centered on the CMHCs, about which the APA and AFSCME developed
fundamentally di↵erent narratives. “Without being self-serving,” APA representative Dr.
John McGrath claimed, “private practitioners and facilities have, in many instances, been
left out of the mainstream of the evolution of community mental health.” Only if the bill
“went further to provide adequate incentives to the private sector” could the problems of
deinstitutionalization be solved.124 Encouraging health insurers to cover private outpatient
mental health services to the same degree as other health care services was the Association’s preferred remedy. Public sector workers, of course, strongly critiqued the APA’s
victimization narrative:
“Those who have been denied decent treatment from the private mental
health care establishment have been consigned to the public institutions where
AFSCME members strive to do the best jobs they can under terribly trying
circumstances.”125
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The union strongly advocated that the legislation provide for the state operation of community mental health centers, as well as for the continued support of longer-term state mental
health care facilities.126 By now, AFSCME represented 250,000 public mental health workers (amounting to 25 percent of its membership), while the APA’s “private sector tilt” had
rendered it increasingly hostile to public psychiatric work, and thus in the eyes of the union,
the “enemy.”127 After years of mistrust between them, it was at these hearings that public
workers were left most bereft of support by their supervisors.
Perhaps the clearest indicator of the union’s weakness is the agreement it struck with
lawmakers. Unlike their counterparts in France, who had secured their position at the
height of economic retrenchment, public mental health workers in America found themselves acknowledging the inevitability of redundancy. With lawmakers set on expanding
appropriations for CMHCs, the union sought to ensure that funds were disbursed only to
states with which it had negotiated protections for laid-o↵ hospital workers. To do this,
AFSCME turned to another set of public supervisors: state governors. Several key members of the National Governors Association, however, opposed the restrictions. After all,
they had few incentives to support them. Exchanging CMHC funds for employee protections would make those funds more difficult to access – not to mention prolong the state’s
financial obligations to workers it no longer needed. Noting the particularly prominent opposition of Pennsylvania’s Governor Dick Thornburgh, AFSCME turned to Pennsylvania
Senator Richard Schweiker, a key member of the Subcommittee on Health, for support. As
a Republican, Schweiker once had endorsed the idea that the federal government distribute
the CMHC funds via the states (previously the funds went directly to the centers).128 The
appeal was successful. A revised bill required the state-level distribution of the CMHC
funds and made their uptake conditional on the negotiation of employment protections.129
The APA did little else stabilize and secure public financing for mental health in the
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longer term. While AFSCME repeatedly campaigned for eliminating Medicaid’s Institutions for Mental Disease exclusion and expanding SSI eligibility to those residing in public
institutions, the APA remained vague on these issues. Consider the di↵erences between the
testimony of both groups. Dr. McGrath of the APA asked Congress to “provide adequate
resources, including major modifications in Medicaid, Medicare and the Social Security Disability Insurance to underwrite the income maintenance as well as the non-discriminatory
treatment costs for these individuals,” but he was not specific about what those modifications should be. Robert McGarrah of AFSCME, however, explicitly requested that:
“The SSI program must also be changed: There is no justification for prohibiting
patients in public institutions with more than 16 residents from receiving these
funds, when that money is made available to patients in private facilities, even if
hundreds of SSI recipients reside in them; Medicaid must be amended to remove
funding inequities that prohibit institutional coverage for persons 21-65.”130
SSI and Medicaid – programs for the poor – received little comparable attention from the
APA. Such specificity about policy change was only given to Medicare, which the Association
still hoped would cover private services (including CMHCs) more generously. The APA
spent little time on financing issues, however, for it was preoccupied with a more significant
problem: defeating the e↵ort to enact a patient’s bill of rights. The APA disagreed with
patient activists (and many legal scholars) that legislating patient protections would improve
care. At this, they were successful. The final bill deleted all mandates regarding patient
protections.131 As a result, the Mental Health Systems Act, though lauded as a landmark
by a Democratic Presidency and Congress when it passed in October 1980, in fact subdued
the ambitions of both public unions and many patient activists.
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6.3.3. The culmination: The 1981 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, the collapse of
CMHCs, and the end of employment protection
Even still, whatever optimism there was for the Act lasted less than a month. The success
of the Republican Party in the elections of November 1980 concluded a decade of partisan
realignment and ideological reinvention. The Party opened the next decade with a more
developed neoliberal strategy for reform. Not only had the party resumed the presidency
with the election of Ronald Reagan, its control of the Senate gave it command over a
congressional chamber for the first time since 1953. The passage of the 1981 Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act restructured federal spending and reduced support for social
programs. The area of mental health was no exception, even though neither the APA
nor AFSCME testified at the bill’s sprawling hearings.132 Congress converted the CMHC
appropriations into a flexible block grant program, financed at levels 75 to 80 percent below
those promised by the Mental Health Systems Act. The block grants carried few restrictions
and no guidelines.133 Relieved state hospital workers lost the protection guarantees of the
former bill. Private community mental health services, too, would su↵er. Limiting the
support for the approximately 800 CMHCs in operation (a meager fraction of the intended
2,000) compelled the program to dwindle over time. Today, CMHC block grants fund just
a third of psychiatric outpatient facilities in America.134
In the following years, AFSCME continued to lobby on behalf its laid o↵ members.
A new public relations document, “Patients for Sale,” doubled down on the language and
policy positions of “Out of their Beds and Into the Streets.”135 It encouraged Union locals
132
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to add full-time positions devoted to deinstitutionalization.136 In 1980, the Public Policy
Department projected spending over $100,000 on materials to train its sta↵ on how to
negotiate contracts for deinstitutionalizing hospitals.
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But the union lacked the political

allies to be e↵ective. A strategy document from that year makes no mention of involving
the APA in its political activities, and instead notes its struggle to find potential partners:
“AFSCME stands alone so far in opposition to irresponsible deinstitutionalization.”138 The
return of the Right also meant the exclusion of labor from federal policy-making. The
appointment of one AFL-CIO representative to the 44 member Task Force on Private Sector
Initiatives was the only official involvement of the Federation in the Reagan Administration.
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of public mental health services hence continued. Over the latter half of the twentieth
century, the number of state and county mental hospitals dropped by well over a third (from
334 at their 1973 peak to 207 in 2003).140 Moreover, the paltry availability of positions in
the community mental health sector made it difficult to support the transfer of their former
workers to non-hospital settings, unlike in France, where mental health workers could work
across the full range of inpatient and outpatient settings of the psychiatric sectors.
The APA remained passive about many of the core policy issues a↵ecting public
mental health services, such as Medicaid’s Institutions for Mental Disease exclusion and
the training of sta↵ for public services. The Association remained active in issues that
supported private practice. For example, when the Reagan Administration began to purge
young, disabled, and higher-income individuals from the disability benefit programs to save
costs, the Association convened a working group at the Social Security Administration in
136
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1983 to revise the programs’ eligibility criteria. The result was the expansion of benefit
categories, and the requirement that a psychiatrist or psychologist complete a medical
assessment for disability claimants before benefits could be denied.141 Later, in 1985, the
APA and the American Hospital Association collaborated to exclude psychiatric speciality
inpatient care from Medicare’s new prospective payments. The system paid hospitals an
average rate in advance for care according a system of categories known as the “diagnosisrelated groups” (DRGs). Excluding costly psychiatric care from this system helped to
protect the revenues of private providers.142 By the 1990s, the mentally ill accounted for
over a third of disability beneficiaries.143 It was not until 1999, furthermore, that Congress
modified the DRG regulations and implemented a per diem prospective payment system
for inpatient psychiatry.144
Initiatives led by career bureaucrats in the federal government sought to make a few
incremental policy changes in support public mental health services. Notably, a group of
public sector supervisors – state mental health directors – encouraged these changes. The
state officials lacked the influence of the APA (which could also claim to represent many of
them), but they nonetheless worked with DHEW to establish a National Plan for the Chronically Mentally Ill.145 The Plan ambitiously included numerous specific changes to federal
programs (including Medicare, Medicaid, and SSI) that would boost support for public sector care. Since the economic and political climate proved too hostile to implement the plan
through legislation, the federal government instead pursued smaller scale projects. One of
these was the 1986 Program on Chronic Mental Illness to finance the re-organization local
mental health delivery systems in nine large cities. The grants also permit mental health
authorities to subsidize rents for people with mental illnesses. Homelessness had become
141
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a pressing problem for the non-institutionalized, since the Reagan Administration also cut
funds for public housing support. Baby boomers presenting symptoms of schizophrenia (a
condition that develops in young adulthood) were amongst the most a↵ected. They lacked
the medical and employment history necessary to both access and a↵ord chronic psychiatric
care in the post-asylum era.146 However, the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, not government, funded $29 million program. Indeed, programs like these illustrate the tenuous
state of contemporary mental health services in America. Short-term, small-scale programs
for the most vulnerable cannot rely on secure, long-term public financing, and thus depend
on the goodwill of charitable foundations.147
Meanwhile, a more stable source of psychiatric care has emerged in a less desirable
location: prisons. In a study published in 1984, Steadman and colleagues found that while
the state mental hospital population decreased by 64 percent in the 1970s, the prison population increased by nearly the same amount (65 percent).148 The finding supported the
classic sociological hypothesis that “if the prison services are extensive, the asylum population is relatively small and the reverse also tends to be true.”149 However, the authors
of the study, like many others who have examined the expansion of the American carceral
system, underscored that the relationship was not quite so simple in the United States.
Many of the factors that spurred mass incarceration had little to do with those that deinstitutionalized the mentally ill (e.g., the reliance of victims’ movements on law and order
politicians in absence of a supportive welfare state, the criminalization of drug activity, and
the lucrative development of the private prison industry).150 But the connection remains.
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As Parsons explores in her forthcoming book, the same conservative politicians who reduced
funds for welfare and medical services also paid more attention to security and punishment.
Those who had been involuntarily confined in mental hospitals were now often involuntarily
confined in prisons instead.151 Causes aside, the result was that many people with mental
illnesses found themselves living in prisons, which in turn became providers of mental health
care.152 Today, some of the largest psychiatric institutions are prisons.153
Although the Reagan (and Bush) era was followed by a period of Democratic governance, the Clinton Administration adopted a Third Way approach to social spending (as did
many of its peer governments in other countries.) The economic retrenchment of the 1996
welfare reforms exemplify how Democrats continued much of the policies inherited from the
Reagan era. A small window of opportunity emerged for public psychiatric workers (and
patients) during the attempts to enact a universal health program in the early 1990s, but
this proved too costly for insurers, and too unattractive to private practitioners, to succeed
in Congress. The return of the Right in the early 2000s continued to maintain the status
quo. It was not until the enactment of the A↵ordable Care Act in 2010 under President
Obama that some attention was paid to financing mental health services, and even so, the
bill’s mental health reforms were limited.154 Moreover, the core financing issues remain.
The CMHC program hardly exists, insurers have limited incentive to cover psychiatric care,
and Medicaid still excludes Institutions for Mental Disease from its benefit package.
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Part III

Conclusions and Supplements
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Over the way, the subject of much ironical comment, half hidden even in winter
by its embosoming trees, lay the municipal lunatic asylum, whose cast-iron
railings and noble gates put our rough wire to shame. We could watch the
madmen, on clement days, sauntering and skipping among the trim gravel walks
and pleasantly planted lawns; happy collaborationists who had given up on the
unequal struggle, all doubts resolved, all duty done, the undisputed heirs-at-law
of a century of progress, enjoying the heritage at their ease. As we marched past
the men used to shout greetings to them through the railings – “Keep a bed
warm for me, chum. I shan’t be long” – but Hooper, my newest-joined platoon
commander, grudged them their life of privilege: “Hitler would put them in a
gas chamber,” he said; “I reckon we can learn a thing or two from him.
- Evelyn Waugh, Brideshead Revisited

Franck: You’re involuntary?
Lucie: No, voluntary.
Franck: Why?
Lucie: This restructures me.
- Abdellatif Kechiche, La Faute à Voltaire 155
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Franck: T’es P.O.? [Placement Obligatoire]
Lucie: No, je suis P.L. [Placement Libre]
Franck: Pourquoi?
Lucie: Ça me restructure.
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Chapter 7

Stigma, Ethics, and the Political
Economy of Mental Health
There is no question that many people with mental illnesses have su↵ered in public mental
institutions. For others, asylums provided the only social protection, custodial and otherwise, for millions of impoverished people. Often, institutions adorned with “trim gravel
walks” and “pleasantly planted lawns” provided high-quality and humane treatment, too.1
When economic (or, as Waugh poignantly notes, political) times were difficult, many asylums failed at these tasks, to the rightful horror of observers. Unfortunately, these injustices
have cast a long shadow.
The findings of the previous chapters should give readers pause about the stigma
associated with mental health care. Although psychiatric deinstitutionalization occurred
everywhere, not all countries erased their asylums. In fact, the countries that retained
more mental hospitals also developed more community-based services, such as outpatient
centers, day care facilities, employment workshops, and sheltered apartments. Moreover,
these trends are not merely the result of the creative entrepreneurship of private actors.
Governments around the world are the primary payers of mental health care. The complementary relationship between institutional and community care, along with its dependence
1

See the epigraph on the preceding page.
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on public support, reinterprets the public asylum and its shadow. It also requires explanation.
Walks are not trimmed and lawns are not planted without employees. The discovery
that the varying influence of public sector unions has shaped the supply of mental health care
worldwide brings new insights to the existing scholarship on deinstitutionalization, comparative political economy, and industrial relations. Most studies of deinstitutionalization have
focused on the English-speaking countries, without cross-examining their explanations in
other societies. Arguments about the intensity of movements, the revolution of medications,
and the pressure of money missed the presence of these factors elsewhere. Comparing an
understudied case to an influential one clarifies not only the conceptualization and measurement of deinstitutionalization, but it also spotlights the importance of public employees to
the study of mental health.
The role of public unions in the development of mental health policy is also significant
to the scholarship on comparative political economy. Studies often explain variations in
welfare state generosity by pointing either to demand-side factors (e.g., private unions and
interest groups) or to supply-side factors (e.g., Left political partisanship). But people with
mental illnesses lack the political resources to form an influential interest group, and they
often lack the employment history to depend on private trade unions to lobby on their
behalf. Neither can the partisan orientation of government predict the supply of mental
health care, for Leftists are as likely to retrench psychiatric services as Rightists are to
finance them. In short, neither demand-side explanations nor supply-side explanations can
account for cases where the supply of public mental health services is generous.
An influential group with an interest in maintaining and expanding public services
for the mentally ill is the very group that provides it. Using the political tools at their disposal, such as strikes, collective bargaining, as well as advocacy and public relations, unions
demand higher wages and employment protections from government. These increased revenues feed back into public services and to their employees. This dynamic applies especially
to services for the vulnerable, though with nearly half of welfare state expenditures devoted
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to public services,2 its costs and social implications are significant.
In addition to studying whether the strength public unions explains the extent to
which governments supply services for the vulnerable, this dissertation also studies how
these groups become influential. The scholarship on industrial relations often presumes an
antagonistic relationship between labor and management. Yet the public sector neutralizes their animosity. Government managers may make decisions about hiring and firing,
workplace protections, and production capacities, but they do not “own” government employees. Rather, public managers share the interests of their employees. Wage growth and
employment security benefit public workers as much as they do their managers. Where
these groups form coalitions, revenues for public services can grow.
With these considerations in mind, this dissertation examined the hypothesis that
independently organized managers are more likely to form coalitions with public sector
workers than managers who organize with their private sector counterparts, with respective
positive or negative feedback consequences on the supply of public services. An original
analysis that contrasts the di↵ering paths of French and American deinstitutionalization
finds significant support for this hypothesis. For most of the nineteenth century, French
and American alienists (the supervisors of public asylums) were loyal to the state, whose
ongoing expansion included the construction of a large network of public asylums. The
alienists’ respective organizations, the Congrès des médecins aliénistes et neurologistes de
France et des pays de langue française and the Association of Medical Superintendents
for American Institutions of the Insane, reflected this identity. But as time went on, the
development of both a✏uent society and military medicine produced a competitive new
specialty in the field of mental treatment. As elite, university-based neurologists began
to open private office practices, so too did their novelty and prestige begin to compete
with services provided by alienists. The budgetary crises of the late nineteenth century
impoverished asylums, hampering their competitiveness and enabling their criticism.
Despite their shared origins, the organizations that represented alienists in the United
2

See Section 2.3.2.
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States and France opted for di↵erent solutions to the same problem. In 1892, the Americans relaxed the strict membership requirements that previously allowed only medical
superintendents to join their group, re-branding themselves as the more scientific American Medico-Psychological Association and opening the door to private practitioners. But
French alienists redoubled their identity as public supervisors just four years later, in 1896,
formalizing their isolation in the establishment of the Association amicale des médecins des
établissements publics d’aliénés in 1907. Although the events of the previous century could
not have predicted these outcomes, the events of the twentieth century quickly reinforced
them. As public workers gained greater associational rights and physician organizations
continued to fragment, French alienists (now known as hospital psychiatrists) remained
both organized and independent. The repression of the Nazi Occupation had politicized
the French, and public psychiatrists were no exception. They joined their other public
sector colleagues in the unionization boom of the Liberation period, forming the Syndicat
des médecins des hôpitaux psychiatriques. In the United States, however, the weakness of
public unions and the unification of the medical profession reinforced the Superintendents’
decision to organize with their private sector counterparts. At the same time, private psychiatry continued to grow, with implications for the membership and political preferences
of the American Medico-Psychological Association and its successor, the American Psychiatric Association (established in 1921). At the onset of deinstitutionalization in the 1950s,
80 percent of the APA worked in the private sector.3
Over the following decades, the Syndicat’s support of public services and employment
progressively empowered the public mental health sector and its unions in three rounds of
positive feedback. The early years of the postwar period were just as economically propitious
in France as they were in the United States. Taking advantage of this, the Syndicat first
helped the government draft a document in 1960 that renewed the attention and resources
devoted to mental hospitals, many of whose residents had died of famine or starvation
during the war. But the unpublished administrative document lacked both the heft and
the constituency to spur the implementation of the new psychiatric “sectors.” It was not
3

See Section 4.3.

186

until the second round of positive feedback, launched by the events of May 1968 and the
maneuvering of the Syndicat thereof, that the public mental health workforce expanded.
The public psychiatrists also managed to acquire additional political and administrative
levers to pursue sectorization at this time. As the number of public mental health workers
increased, so too did their demands on the financial resources made available by the 1960
document. The sectors proliferated.
The third round of positive feedback occurred when economic conditions turned sour
in the 1970s, and public mental health workers and services in France faced the same constraints as those in other countries. Budgetary restraints and social critics questioned the
worthiness of public psychiatry. Yet the both supervisors and workers continued to pressure
government to disburse funds. Events hit a political breaking point when the President Mitterrand dramatically reversed his Leftist economic policies in favor of an austere approach.
At the Syndicat’s behest, however, political leaders reluctantly agreed to placate the demands of mental health workers by trading their employment security for a cost-containing
global budgeting system. The political coalition of public managers and their workers resulted in the long-term protection of not only sectorized workers, but also the sectors and
their clients.
The positive feedback of the French approach to deinstitutionalization stands in stark
contrast with the negative feedback experienced in the United States. When America’s own
reformist bureaucrats asked the APA to develop a similar plan to overhaul mental health
policy in the 1950s, the Association produced the 1963 Community Mental Health Centers
Act. Yet the APA’s political obligations to the more influential (and equally privatized)
American Medical Association stalled the allocation of public funds to sta↵ the new centers
(the first negative feedback loop). Without a sizable public mental health workforce staffing
the clinics, revenues faltered. The program relied on the pocketbooks of “YAVIS” patients
to make up for the loss of government funds.4 Meanwhile, the APA’s conspicuous absence
from the major welfare debates of the period had severe consequences for chronic mentally ill
patients residing in state and county mental hospitals. Although the APA reliably supported
4

“Young, a✏uent, verbal, intelligent, and successful,” see Section 6.2.4.
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financing reforms that benefit the private sector, their absence from debates implicating
the public sector gave legislators the tacit permission to exclude mental institutions from
Medicaid coverage, to exclude residents of public institutions from disability benefits, and
even to subsidize the competition of the private long-term care industry (the second negative
feedback loop).
The global economic crisis of the 1970s inevitably hit the United States. too. Public
unions had matured by then, but the economic downturn made it difficult for them to
reverse the decline of public mental health services (the third negative feedback loop).
Attempts to gain the support of the APA were usually met with silence. Neither did the
arrival of friendly political administration benefit them much. The President’s Commission
on Mental Health and its subsequent legislative project, the Mental Health Systems Act of
1980, included only a few favorable positions for public mental health workers and services.
The landslide return of Republicans to power the following year, moreover, dismantled those
reforms with rapidity and ease. It is hard to imagine the same events transpiring with such
facility in France. Today, the supply of American mental health care is among the lowest
in the advanced economies.
Attention to the comparative political economy of mental health recasts public psychiatry in a di↵erent light from its often unsavory image. Both the ample provision and the
generous financing of mental health care services helps to remove the stigma associated with
them. In the same way that a public school in an a✏uent district invites greater student
participation in its academic and extra-curricular life, the “noble gates” of a mental hospital can do the same for a psychiatric patient. Or consider how perceptions of the quality
of treatment in an upscale elderly care home di↵ers from the image of life in a destitute
one. The responsibility of each of these institutions for the most vulnerable members of
society subjects them, appropriately, to ethical scrutiny. However analysts should not be
naive about the ways in which political favor and economic patronage influence the quality,
reputation, and accessibility of mental health services. While Lucie’s eagerness to check
into psychiatric care may be difficult to imagine in the American context,5 this should not
5

See the epigraphs on page 182.

188

prevent us from understanding why.
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A.1 List of abbreviations
AFSCME American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees
AFL-CIO American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations
APA

American Psychiatric Association

AMA

American Medical Association

Amicale

Association amicale des médecins des établissements publics d’aliénés

AMPA

American Medico-Psychological Association

CEMÉA

Centres d’entraı̂nement aux méthodes d’éducation active

CES

Certificat d’études spécialisées

CFDT

Confédération française démocratique du travail

CGT

Confédération générale du travail

CHC

Community Health Center

CHS

Centre hospitalier spécialisé

CHU

Centre hospitalier universitaire

CMHC

Community Mental Health Center

CNAM

Caisse nationale de l’assurance maladie

Congrès

Congrès des médecins aliénistes et neurologistes de France et des pays de langue
française

CSMF

Confédération des syndicats médicaux français

DDASS

Direction départementale des a↵aires sanitaires et sociales

DHEW

Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
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DRGs

Diagnosis-Related Groups

DSM

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders

FO

Force ouvrière

IMD

Institutions for Mental Disease

ISP

Infirmier de secteur psychiatrique

JCMIH

Joint Commission on Mental Illness and Health

NIMH

National Institute of Mental Health

OECD

Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

PCMH

President’s Commission on Mental Health

SMP

Société médico-psychologique

Superintendents The Association of Medical Superintendents for American Institutions of
the Insane (also: the Superintendents’ Association’ often abbreviated as AMSAII in other texts)
Syndicat

Syndicat des médecins des hôpitaux psychiatriques; Syndicat des psychiatres
des hôpitaux (often abbreviated as SMHP or SPH elsewhere)

SSI

Supplemental Security Income

UNAFAM Union nationale de familles et amis de personnes malades (et/ou handicapées
psychiques)
WHO

World Health Organization
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A.2 Alternative measures for contemporary data in Chapter 2
Measures of the contemporary di↵erences in the supply of mental health care across
countries are drawn from the WHO Mental Health Atlas Country Profiles, a global mental
health data project developed in collaboration with national experts. More information
about the project’s data collection procedures can be found on its website. Although definitions and measurements of indicators vary across countries, experts reported observations
that satisfied the standardized criteria of the project, and withheld observations that did
not. I thus treat the observations as broadly comparable and assign the missing observations
a naught value.
All Mental Health Atlas measures concerning hospital care (mental and general)
and community care (outpatient and day) are included, save the measure of residential
community care – an ambiguous indicator of both long-term residence (institutionalization)
and non-psychiatric custodial care (deinstitutionalization). Adding these observations to
the combined community care measure, however, does little to change the findings presented
in Chapter 2. See how Figure 18 replicates Figure 2.1.2. Only England significantly changes
its position on the community care supply scale relative to other countries.

Figure 18: Mental health outpatient, day care, and residential community care facilities
per 100,000 population in 15 high-income democracies (Replication of Figure 2.1.2 with
residential facilities measure), 2011
193

Although the WHO collects the broadest range of mental health care indicators, it
is not the only international organization to compile data on psychiatric beds. Figure 19
replicates Figure 2.1.1 with observations from the OECD. Although the specific ranking of
countries on the supply scale changes somewhat, the clusters of high and low bed suppliers
remain similar.

Figure 19: Psychiatric beds per 100,000 population in 15 high-income democracies (Replication of Figure 2.1.1 with OECD measure), 2011
These alternative measures of institutional and community care can help to examine
their relationship (as identified in Figure 1 on page 6) in several ways. Figure 20 plots the
OECD measure of beds against the original measure of community care. Figure 21 plots the
original WHO beds measure against the more expansive community care measure, which
Figure 22 then compares to the OECD beds. Though somewhat weakened by the ambiguous
residential care measure, the positive association between hospital and community care
remains. More importantly, the general clustering of countries at the higher and lower
ends of the supply spectrum holds. Indeed, it would be surprising if the addition of an
extra indicator of mental health supply reduced the supply of mental health care in some
countries. Evidently that is not the case.
Substituting the WHO measure for the OECD psychiatric beds measure in Fig194

Figure 20: Scatterplot of psychiatric beds and community care facilities per 100,000 in
15 high-income democracies, with line of best fit (Replication of Figure 2.1.2 with OECD
measure of psychiatric beds), 2011
ure 2.1.3 on page 21 shows that public mental health spending still predicts the supply of
psychiatric beds (see Figure 23, below). It is also possible to substitute the public general
health spending measure in Figure 2.1.3 on page 22 with an indicator of private spending
(available from the OECD). As expected, Figure 24 shows that private (like public) spending cannot determine the general supply of hospital beds. In other words, the finding that
the mental health sector is more sensitive to the extent of government support than the
general health sector holds.
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Figure 21: Scatterplot of psychiatric beds and community care facilities per 100,000 in 15
high-income democracies, with line of best fit (Replication of Figure 2.1.2 with all community care, including residential facilities), 2011

Figure 22: Scatterplot of psychiatric beds and community care facilities per 100,000 in
15 high-income democracies, with line of best fit (Replication of Figure 2.1.2 with OECD
measure of psychiatric beds and all community care, including residential, facilities), 2011
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Figure 23: Percentage of mental health expenditures by the government health ministry as
a percentage of the health budget and psychiatric beds per 100,000 population in 15 highincome democracies (Replication of Figure 2.1.3 with WHO measure of psychiatric beds),
2011

Figure 24: Private health expenditure as a percentage of total health expenditure and
hospital beds per 100,000 population in 15 high-income democracies (Replication of Figure
2.1.3 with private spending measure), 2011
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A.3 Sources of historical data in Chapter 2
The longitudinal data in Chapter 2 draw on several sources. Data on recent years
is available from the OECD, while data on earlier years draw on country statistical yearbooks and other historical sources. These sources varied in the availability of data and the
terminology used:
• For Figure 8, Residents of government- financed psychiatric hospitals:
– Australia
∗ For 1935-1974, see the statistical yearbook, Australian Bureau of Statistics,
“Year Book Australia,” available here, and the following tables and subheadings:
· Hospitals for the insane: Patients, deaths, etc., or Mental hospitals:
Patients, Deaths, Etc, or In-patients at mental health institutions, orInpatients under the care of state mental health services
· Average number of patients resident in mental hospitals (or hospitals for
the insane) per 1,000 of (mean) population
– Finland
∗ For 1935-1958, see the statistical yearbook, Doria Statistics, “Selaus Nimekkeen Mukaan Kokoelmassa (Suomen Tilastollinen Vuosikirja)” (National Library of Finland), available here, and the subheading, Aliénés/Mental Defectives
– United States,
∗ For 1940-1972, see Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, “Funding and Characteristics of Single State Agencies for Substance
Abuse Services, 2007” (Rockville, MD, 2009).
• For Figure 9, Government-financed psychiatric hospitals:
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– Australia.
∗ For 1935-1974, see the statistical yearbook, and the following tables and
sub-headings:
· Hospitals for the Insane: Number, Sta↵s, Accommodation, or Mental
hospitals: Number, sta↵, accommodation, or Mental health: In-Patient
Institutions, Accommodation, and Sta↵
· Number of Institutions, or (Number of) Hospitals, or In-patient institutions
– Denmark.
∗ For 1942 - 1980, see the statistical yearbook,Danmarks Statistik, “Statistik
Årborg,” available here, and the following tables and sub-headings:
· Hospitals for the Insane: Antal Sygehuse, or Antal institutioner (hospitals/hôpitaux)
· Sindssygehospitaler, or Psykiatriske sygehuse (I alt), o Psykiatriske specialsygehuse m.v.v -- Fordeling efter ejerforhold (maisons d’aliénés/mental
hospitals/psychiatric hospitals/ psychiatric hospitals by owner )
· Statens Sindssygehosp (de l’État/State) and Kommunale (des communes/municipal)
∗ Note: Includes both State and Municipal/Communal hospitals, author’s calculations.
– Germany
∗ For 1953-1967, see the statistical yearbook, Statischen Bundesamtes, “Statistisches Jahrbuch,” available here, and the following tables and sub-headings:
· Psychiatrische Krankenanstalt, or Krankenhäuser für Psychiatrie
· Ö↵entliche Krankenanstalten
199

· Zahl der Anstalten, or Krankenhäuser.
∗ Note: Data collection downswings during periods of division and reunification (not shown in figure); Yearbook also includes number for neurological
institutions; institutions for addicts.
– Finland
∗ For 1951-1993, see the statistical yearbook, and the following tables and
sub-headings:
· Psychiatrische Hospitals
· Hospitals and Hospital Beds
· Number of hospitals
– New Zealand
∗ For 1935-1971, see the statistical yearbook,Stats NZ, “Yearbook Collection:
1893-2012,” available here, and the following sections:
· (First section, untitled) or General
· There are

public mental hospitals in the Dominion maintained wholly

or in part out of the public revenue.
– Sweden
∗ For 1935-1946 see the statistical yearbook, Statistics Sweden, “Statistical
Yearbook of Sweden,” available here, and the following tables and subheadings:
· Établissements sanitaires civils
· Hopitaux d’aliénés de l’État
· Établissements
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∗ For 1956-1966, see the statistical yearbook and the following tables and subheadings:
· Hospitals
· State mental hospitals for mentally diseased
· (Number of) Hospitals
∗ For 1967-1982, see the statistical yearbook and the following tables and subheadings:
· Hospitals
· Mental Hospitals
· (Number of) Hospitals
– France
∗ For 1935-1976, see France Meslé and Jacques Vallin, “La Population Des
Établissements Psychiatriques: Évolution de La Morbidité ou Changement
de Stratégie Médicale?,” Population 36, no. 6 (November 1981): 1035,
https://doi.org/10.2307/1532324, Tableau 1, Taux pour 100 000 habitants.
(Note that the absolute number is also available).
• For Figure 2.2.2, Beds in government-financed psychiatric hospitals
– Australia.
∗ For 1935-1974, see the statistical yearbook and the following tables and subheadings:
· Hospitals for the Insane: Number, Sta↵s, Accommodation, or Mental
hospitals: Number, sta↵, accommodation, or Mental health: In-Patient
Institutions, Accommodation, and Sta↵

201

· Number of beds and cots, or Beds and cots for patients
– Denmark.
∗ For 1942 - 1980, see the statistical yearbook and the following tables and
sub-headings:
· Antal pladser, or Antal pladser I alt, or Antal pladser- sindssygdom, or
Antal normerede sengepladser (Lits/beds, or Number of beds - total, or
Number of beds for mental diseases
· Sindssygehospitaler, or Psykiatriske sygehuse, or Psykiatriske specialsygehuse m.v.v -- Fordeling efter ejerforhold (maisons d’aliénés/mental
hospitals/psychiatric hospitals/ psychiatric hospitals by owner
· Statens Sindssygehosp (de l’Etat/State) and Kommunale (des communes/municipal).
∗ Note: Includes both State and Municipal/Communal hospitals, author’s calculations
– Germany
∗ For 1953-1967, see the statistical yearbook and the following tables and subheadings:
· Krankenhäuser für Psychiatrie, Ö↵entliche Krankenanstalten
· Zahl der Normal-betten, or Zahl der plan-mâßigen Betten.
∗ Note: Data collection downswings during periods of division and reunification (not shown in figure).
– Finland
∗ For 1952-1993, see the statistical yearbook and the following tables and subheadings: Psychiatrische Hospitals / Hospitals and Hospital Beds
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– France
∗ For 1963-1976, see Mesle and Vallin 1981, Tableau 2, Lits réglementaires
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A.4 Announcements of changes to membership eligibility, Organizations
representing public asylum supervisors in the United States (1892) and France
(1907)
The choice to expand or restrain membership eligibility at the turn of the twentieth
century bifurcated the development of the APA and the Syndicat, and consequently placed
their countries on opposite deinstitutionalization trajectories. Reprinted below are the
documents of their predecessor organizations announcing their respective decisions. The
announcement of the American Medico-Psychological Association (later, the APA) in 1892
to extend membership to more “scientific” – and hence private, office-based – physicians
of neurology and other mental sciences is on the following page;6 its new constitution and
by-laws are on page 207.7 The announcement of the Association amicale des médecins des
établissements publics d’aliénés (later, the Syndicat) in 1907 to isolate itself from private
practitioners, with its adopted by-laws, is on page 213.8

6

“Notes and Comments: The American Medico-Psychological Association,” American Journal of Insanity
49 (1892): 128–29.
7
“Constitution and By-Laws,” American Journal of Psychiatry, Proceedings of Societies, 78 (1921):
247–52.
8
“Association Amicale Des Médecins Des Établissements Publics d’aliénés.,” Annales MedicoPsychologiques.: Journal Destiné à Recueillir Tous Les Documents Relatifs à La Médicine Légale Des
Aliénés. 5–6 (1907): 221–27.
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culturel (1984-1988).” La Documentation française, December 1982.
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des statistiques, January 29, 2009. http://solidarites-sante.gouv.fr/ministere/documentationet-publications-officielles/rapports/sante/article/rapport-missions-et-organisation-de-la-santementale-et-de-la-psychiatrie
Demay, M., and J. Demay. “Une voie française pour une psychiatrie di↵érente, document
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